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Abstract  
 
 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on an analysis of the relationship between migrant workers’ agencies 
and development in China, looking through the lens of the autonomy of migration. It analyses 
how the escape of migrant workers from the containment system and the insubordination of 
migrant workers to capital relation drive social transformation in China. As varying 
preconditions of development lead different regions down different pathways, this dissertation 
focuses on the three most economically advanced provinces in coastal China – Guangdong, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu – to reveal the relationship between migrant workers and development in 
different contexts. Theoretically, it challenges the current explanations of Chinese internal 
migration. It offers a new perspective from which to view the struggles and resistances of 
migrant workers as a dynamic process which constantly puts pressure on the existing control 
regime. Historically, capital always attempts to capture moving labour and subordinate it in 
capital relation. However, labour always attempts to escape. It is this energy of escape that is the 
target of the control regime. This dissertation provides concrete empirical evidence to trace the 
interaction of migrant workers’ agencies with the development of different regions. Different 
historical preconditions lead to different pathways of capitalist development, which are related to 
the different strategies of subordination of migrant workers to capital in China. Also, although 
migrant workers are always involved in escaping from the existing control regime, they behave 
differently according to the differences in the control regime and subordination strategy. It offers 
a suggestion of future trends in the insubordination of migrant workers in China: along with the 
spread of neoliberalism and the integration with the global market, increasing numbers of people 
are dragged into capital relation, and the subordination of labour to capital is deepening. The 
global division of labour is also spreading to inland China. Although, initially, development 
strategies differ from region to region, there is a tendency for them to converge. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The Chinese socialist revolution created the fundamental social, political and 
economic conditions for China’s consequential sustained economic development 
(Petras, 2006). During the Mao period (1949-1976), China organised vast 
infrastructure projects and initiated several strategic reforms that provided the basis 
for long-term growth. Although China was isolated from international trade and 
investment for most of the Mao era, it achieved both rapid growth and 
industrialisation (Hart-Landsberg, 2010). Following in the footsteps of the East 
Asian and Latin American Development Models, China’s Development Model has 
attracted the world’s attention. Since 1978, the Chinese central government has 
dedicated itself to developing its socialist market economy, impelling an export-
oriented development strategy, attracting foreign investment, encouraging private 
sector development and conducting state-owned enterprise reform. This reform and 
opening up has not only led to successful economic growth, but also to a significant 
transformation in Chinese society. One of the most significant changes has been the 
creation of the biggest internal migration waves in Chinese history, and possibly in 
the world.  
 
Every year, hundreds of millions of migrants leave their home towns to work in 
urban or economic advanced areas. The take-off of the Chinese economy is 
inseparable from the contributions of migrant workers. The migrant workers, the 
majority of whom are categorised by the Household Registration System (hukou 
system) as having rural-registered permanent residences, have long worked in 
factories as ‘low-cost labour’. The Chinese state working with international capital, 
have transformed these workers from rural peasants to wage labour. At the beginning 
of the reform era, the huge gap in living standards between rural and urban areas 
made working in urban or coastal areas a sensible choice for migrants looking to 
improve their quality of life. However, along with the deepening of reform and 
opening up, the conflict between migrant workers and the state and capital has raised 
 11 
 
and attracted public attention. From ‘emergencies’1 caused by wage arrears, such as 
suicides and self-mutilation of migrant workers, sit-ins, blocking of roads, and 
protests, to strikes asking for better pay, resisting unfair treatment from employers, 
or asking for unpaid and contested social insurance, the rise of the struggles and 
resistance of migrant workers has forced the state to elaborate and restructure its 
policies, and even regimes, to maintain social stability; it has also forced capitalists 
to adjust their strategies of management to maintain production and their exploitation 
of migrant workers.  
 
Clearly, in China, the socio-transformation process has significantly influenced both 
the making of migrant workers and their acts of resistance. In turn, the resistance by, 
and struggles of, migrant workers have deeply reshaped China’s development 
process. The relationship between the state, capital and the migrant workers is the 
key factor in this interaction. In this dissertation, I bring a new perspective to the 
view of migrant workers in rapidly transforming China, the autonomy of migration 
approach (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Mezzadra, 
2010). Applying this approach, I emphasise the importance of an analysis of the 
conflict between the projects of the state and capital to subordinate migrant workers 
and the insubordination of migrant workers under this control regime. The conflict 
between subordination and insubordination is “a central feature of capitalism” 
(Holloway, 2002:44). The subordination of labour is capital’s attempt to contain 
migrant workers; however, it is always resisted by the insubordination of labour.   
 
The pathway of capitalist development is deeply influenced by the socio-economic 
and political environments of a given country: different preconditions lead to 
different strategies of capitalist development. In China, the coastal areas are the 
front-runners of economic development, but based on their different historical 
preconditions, they have followed different pathways. Capitalist production process 
always begins by capturing and transforming mobile labour into exploitative 
production relations. Once capital has succeeded in this, the differences in the 
                                                 
1
Xinhuanet, 2015, MoHSS: Emergencies caused by wage arrears are increasing significantly 
(Renshebu:qianxin yinfa de tufashijian mingxian zengduo 人社部：欠薪引发的突发事件明显增
多) http://xhpfm.mobile.zhongguowangshi.com:8091/v200/newshare/414447  
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development pathways also lead to different strategies of subordination of the 
migrant workers. But also, to differences in the forms of insubordination by migrant 
workers.  
1.1 Research Questions  
Since reform and opening up, China has experienced increasing regional disparities. 
The coastal areas, in particular, have followed different economic development 
pathways which are closely related to the diversity of their various pre-conditions of 
socio-economic transformation, as well as the different ways that capitalism was 
introduced. In this dissertation, I scrutinize the three most successful development 
pathways in China, the Pearl River Model of Guangdong Province, the Wenzhou 
Model of Zhejiang Province and the Sunan Model of Jiangsu Province, to examine: 
 How different preconditions influence the development pathways of the three 
provinces; 
 How different capitalist pathways lead to different strategies to capture the 
moving bodies of migrants, that is the making of migrant workers process of 
the three provinces; 
 How, after capture by the state and capital, migrant workers are transformed 
into wage labour in these three provinces and how each pathway of capitalist 
development influences the subordination strategies; 
 How migrant workers escape from and defy such strategies; 
 How the state and capital react to the insubordination and escape of migrant 
workers. 
 
These questions can be summarised as one main question: What is the relationship 
between development and migrant workers’ agency in different socio-economic 
environments in China?  
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This dissertation therefore focuses on the interactions between the migrant workers 
and the development of capitalism in three different contexts, Guangdong Province, 
Zhejiang Province, and Jiangsu Province. It will ascertain if the different historical 
processes of subordination of migrant workers to capital led to different diversified 
strategies and tactics to protect their rights. It will also analyse how the process of 
subordination of migrant workers to capital in different socio-economic contexts 
influences the formation of the migrant working class and the subjectivity of migrant 
workers.  
 
1.2 Socio-Economic Transformation Since 1978 
As Zhu and Pickles (2013:37) state, through reform and opening up the Chinese 
economic structure has experienced three fundamental transformations: firstly, it 
transformed from a planned economy to, in official discourse, a ‘socialist’ market 
economy; secondly, it moved from public and collective ownership to an 
increasingly privatised economy; and lastly, it shifted from a domestically-oriented 
economy to an export-oriented economy that was increasingly integrated with the 
global market. There is no doubt that China’s reform and opening policy has been 
successful with regard to economic growth as measured by GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product). China’s average annual economic growth rate averaged close to 10% after 
the reform and opening policy was promulgated in 1978 (taking the 1978 GDP as a 
base number) until 2000 when it dropped slightly to an average of 8% (NBS, 2014). 
The year 2008 saw a global economic crisis which caused many countries to go into 
economic recession, yet China has maintained a high level of economic growth: the 
annual GDP growth rate from 2008 to 2011 was 9%, 8%, 10.4% and 9.2% 
respectively (NBS, 2014). This sustained economic growth has not only improved 
national living standards significantly but also increasingly affects the world 
economy. 
 
A series of interventions have promoted China’s economic growth, but they have 
also brought enormous challenges to Chinese society. This growth is based on 
unstable grounds – China is dependent on foreign investment and overseas markets, 
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which affects its ability to bring about steady, long-term development to a great 
extent. Capital moves through transnational corporations to pursue the most 
competitive international division of labour thus compelling Chinese governments 
and enterprises to rely on their low-cost labour to compete with other companies, 
regions and even other developing countries. Hence, to attract and maintain Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), the Chinese government has adopted capital supportive 
policies. 
 
Market reform has intensified exploitation and increased inequality (Hart-Landsberg 
& Burkett, 2005). The marketisation of public services and social welfare has 
increased the cost of living and dispossessed many of workers’ socioeconomic rights 
of the pre-reform period. Especially in rural areas, the reform of the grain circulation 
system, accompanied by the collapse of rural health care and free compulsory 
education, has created preconditions for ‘releasing’ rural labour power to be 
absorbed and exploited by capitalist production process. Furthermore, land reform 
has sped up the commercialisation of farming land, the secure capital of rural 
labourers who are forced to sell their labour to secure subsistence. Urban areas have 
also been affected by the collapse of the socialist regime. The monetarisation of 
housing allocation, medical care, education, food, household necessities and other 
public services has also forced urban residents into a market economy. In the Maoist 
era of state socialism, the ‘working class’ as a whole made great strides vis-a-vis 
other social groups, the peasants, bourgeoisie and intellectuals, in terms of political 
status, wages, social welfare and employment security. Permanent workers in state-
owned enterprises enjoyed cradle-to-grave welfare, permanent job tenure, subsidised 
housing, life-long medical and pension benefits and guaranteed, good incomes. 
However, in the reform era, the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy has 
given rise to a national labour market that enhances labour mobility and flexibility. 
The state-owned enterprise reform has resulted in a setback for state workers’ status 
and livelihoods. By 1995, the permanent employment system was officially 
dismantled, and between 1998-2005 a pool of 30 million ‘off-duty’ (xiagang 下岗) 
workers was created (Feng, 2009). The working class lost both its glory and benefits 
of the pre-reform period and laid-off workers have become one of the most 
vulnerable social groups in China. Workers in state-owned enterprises, foreign-
 15 
 
invested enterprises, and town- and village-owned enterprises are now all 
subordinate to a dictatorial management empowered by labour contracts and 
enterprise reforms and untrammelled by the Party or the Union (Lee, 2010). 
 
Additionally, behind the figures of growth and prosperity, inequalities exist across 
regions, ownership sectors, industries and occupations. Urban and rural inequality is 
one of the most significant results of uneven development. The speeding up of 
economic growth in China is founded on the dispossession of rural society. Rural 
labourers are extracted from the countryside and pushed into secondary and tertiary 
industry, which leads to rural hollowing. Accompanied by the reform and opening up, 
job opportunities in foreign-invested enterprises and town- and village-owned 
enterprises have mushroomed. The elderly and children are left behind while rural 
labourers in urban areas are excluded from social welfare and public services. Low 
wages also constrain the growth of domestic demand. Even though the Chinese 
economy has continued to grow since the global economic crisis that surfaced in 
2008, the crisis has caused a notable increase in plant closures in export-dependent 
areas and in the unemployment rate of rural migrant workers.
2
  
 
Because of the pro-capital policies supported by the state, millions of migrant 
workers are enduring blatantly dictatorial management practices in the private sector 
where state regulations are rarely enforced. Migrant workers regularly experience 
non- or late payment of wages, low-level wages, compulsory overtime, poor working 
conditions, occupational injuries, and sometimes even intimidation through physical 
violence and corporal punishment. However, this all leads to mounting resistance by 
                                                 
2
 See: Facing the wave of factory closures, China state limits the downsizing of factories (miandui 
daobi chao zhongguo xianzhi qiye caiyuan 面 对 倒 闭 潮  中 国 限 制 企 业 裁 员 ) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_7730000/newsid_7735600/7735671.stm;  
Middle and small size enterprises facing high human resource cost, a new wave of factory closures 
emerging (Dongguan zhongxiao qiye rengong chengben yali gao qiye xian xinyilun daobichao 东莞
中 小 企 业 人 工 成 本 压 力 高 企 业 现 新 一 轮 倒 闭 潮
http://business.sohu.com/20151209/n430554305.shtml;  
Economic recession leads to a wave of factory closures （jingji weiji yinfa Guangdong guanchang 
chao经济危机引发广东关厂潮） http://chinaworker.info/ccn/2016/02/18/11920/;  
Sudden factory closures raise fears for Pearl River Delta's electronics manufacturing sector 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1867320/sudden-factory-closures-raise-fears-
pearl-river-deltas. 
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workers, even rural migrant workers who are stereotypically considered controllable, 
obedient and passive, victims of the export-oriented development strategy, poor 
labour legal system and the collusion between local government and capitalists. This 
stereotypical picture of migrant workers also leads to the conclusion that they need 
to be protected by outside powers and to be offered rights from government or 
‘labour laws’. China, now, is facing a turbulent period of social instability and labour 
unrest.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed examination of the transformation from a socialist 
planned economy to a capitalist economy, examining the socialist market economy 
in official discourse. It also analyses the economic reforms that have brought about 
significant social transformation: agricultural and rural reform, the establishment of 
SEZs (Special Economic Zones), decentralisation and land reform. By studying the 
reforms and adjustments, a clear socio-economic transformation process which 
deeply influences the making of migrant workers and shapes their insubordination 
becomes apparent.  
 
1.3 Migrant Workers in China  
In the past, migrant workers were invisible to the public view: they were considered 
a reserve labour army, permitted to enter cities when needed and who drifted back to 
rural areas whenever hardship beckoned. They were primarily limited to the sectors 
of the labour market that only provide low paying, insecure, low status and 
dangerous jobs, eschewed by the urban citizens (Chan & Pun, 2010). They were 
dehumanized and de-individualised, treated like a group of faceless strangers by the 
local governments of their destinations. At the beginning of the reform era, migrant 
workers began to infiltrated into the urban spaces, and they began to change the 
social structure and power relations there, inconspicuously and imperceptibly 
(Solinger, 1999; Li, 2002). However, in recent years, as well as these daily 
inconspicuous activities and imperceptible politics, migrant workers have also had a 
louder voice. Firstly, the production and reproduction process of a 200 million strong 
workforce cannot be ignored in contemporary China. Secondly, migrant workers are 
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actively involving themselves in all kinds of activities to fight for both their labour 
and civil rights, which affects socio-economic transformation, as well as political 
regime re-structuring in China. 
 
Chapter 3 illustrates the making of migrant workers in the reform era. I trace the 
historical track of migrant workers in China, closely observing the path of this 
mobile group from farmlands to factories, and analyse the current situation of 
migrant workers in the workplace. The hukou (household registration) system 
excludes migrant workers from public social welfare such as education, medical care 
and housing in urban areas and is utilised by the state as an efficient instrument that 
allows it to define and designate migrant workers as ‘outsiders’. Although the 
Chinese government has adjusted this regime several times and gradually loosened 
its control over migrants’ mobility, it remains one of the most important tools of the 
control regime in its handling of migrant workers. In this chapter, I trace the 
adjustment and reforms of the hukou system during the reform era, to show how it 
has affected the mobility of migrants.  
 
1.4 Research on Migrant Workers  
Migrant workers have also caught the eye of academic scholars who have researched 
different aspects of their lives. When migrant workers are studied as a floating 
population, questions focus on their demographic features, looking at the decision-
making process and the structural background of migration (Fan, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; 
Fan & Sun, 2008; Gallagher, 2011; Zhang, 2001). When they are seen as potential or 
semi-citizens, based on the hukou system, questions focus on the urbanisation and 
citizenisation processes – how they go about obtaining the same status and benefits 
as people holding an urban household registration, or even getting an urban hukou 
(Chan, 2009, 2010; Huang, 2011; Lee, 2007; Solinger, 1999). The research studies 
the living conditions and ‘attitude’ of migrant workers in urban areas. It has also 
included a gender perspective, as female migrant workers have to shoulder more 
responsibilities of social reproduction activities than male migrant workers (Fan et 
al., 2008; Fan, 2008; Pun, 2005). Such research has provided us with a rich 
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foundaiton of knowledge of migrant workers’ situations and living conditions. 
However, sociological and demographic research often treats migrant workers as an 
object of analysis, a social group or a social status, without heterogeneity. 
Demographic research on migrants can provide us with a general overview of the 
features of migrant workers but it cannot provide us with the details of their real 
lives. And in the perspective of urbanisation and citizenisation analysis, urban 
citizenship is automatically set as the ultimate goal of all migrant workers, ignoring 
the diversity of individual lives and desires. Migrant workers within these two 
paradigms are generally considered as a social group in need of specific policy 
design and assistance. Both demographic research and citizenisation research treat 
migrant workers as ‘others’ of society, depoliticised and disempowered.   
 
Another substantial depiction of migrants’ identity in China is as waged-workers – 
those whose wage is their main or only source of income. Increasing numbers of 
scholars are analysing migrant workers based on the ‘class’ paradigm (Chan, CKC, 
2009; Pringle, 2011; Pun, 2005; Pun et al., 2008; Pun & Lu, 2010; Silver, 2003; 
Shen, 2006). Based on the analysis of migrant workers’ labour disputes, strikes and 
protests, scholars attempt to trace the class formation process of migrant workers. 
This class-based research focuses on the transformation of migrant workers from 
‘class in itself’ to ‘class for itself’ through collective activities, which indicates the 
formation of class consciousness of migrant workers. Some researchers (Pun, 2005; 
Pun & Smith, 2007; Smith & Pun, 2006) focus on the factory regime or labour 
regime of migrant workers, studying the discipline of migrant workers under a 
certain social institution.  
 
Since 1978, migrants from rural China have been gradually involved in the process 
of subordination to capital. However, there is a need for a new perspective from 
which to view the relationship between labour and capital. Normally, current 
researchers focus on the ‘capital-labour’ perspective, which treats migrant workers 
as victims of capitalist production system, while the elites continue to dominate and 
exploit the working class. The migrant workers are seen not only as the object of 
capitalist labour relations without any agency. In reality, their resistance obstructs 
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ruling relations and often forces the elaboration of new strategies by the state and 
capital. Moreover, their everyday practices are powerful and meaningful enough to 
push the state and capital to transform beyond the coordinates of the existing social 
compromise and control regime. Therefore, in this dissertation, I offer a new 
perspective with which to view migrant workers in this rapidly transforming China, 
one which focuses on the ‘labour-capital’ rather than the ‘capital-labour’ relationship. 
The ‘labour-capital’ perspective sees worker’s agency as an active and powerful 
force to push the socio-economic transformation, not the opposite. Migrants’ 
mobility is an active force, which constantly faces oppression and suppression. The 
control regime constantly attempts to absorb the refusal and escape of migrant 
workers, the state and capitalists actively working to break up the capacities and 
strengths of migrant workers by fragmenting groups and struggles, exacerbating and 
re-organizing internal divisions and oppressing people’s power.  
 
Chapter 4 provides the theoretical terrain for the dissertation. It reviews the studies 
on migrant workers and young generation migrant workers in China and provides a 
new lens, the autonomy of migration (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007; Papadopoulos 
et al., 2008; Mezzadra, 2010), through which to understand the daily struggles of 
migrant workers. The mobility of migrant workers can be viewed as a power that can 
be used against capitalist production process. Moreover, the daily struggle of migrant 
workers can lead to social transformation and the creation of a new generation of 
migrant working class. As migrant workers are not a homogeneous social group, the 
actual struggle of migrant workers is diverse. Firstly, the background and range of 
individual migrant workers (age, education, cultural background, etc.) profoundly 
shapes their behaviour and gives rise to a variety of struggle patterns. Secondly, their 
resources, including production means (farmland), education and occupational 
training backgrounds, social resources and working experiences, determine their 
bargaining power to some extent. Last, but not least, migrant workers’ socio-
economic environment has a very strong influence on the nature of their labour 
unrest. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
This dissertation is based on both primary data and secondary resources. It begins 
with an analysis of the background to the research, including a detailed study of the 
socio-economic transformation in China since 1978 and the pathways migrants have 
followed in the same period. Additionally, it provides a panoramic view of the 
labour disputes and strikes involving migrant workers in the reform era. The analysis 
is based on Chinese and English academic resources, literature surveys, Chinese 
media reports, and statistical data. These secondary resources are supplemented by 
extensive fieldwork in three provinces: Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. The 
research aimed to discover what was in and on respondents’ minds, and to elicit 
information; therefore a qualitative approach using in-depth interviews was chosen 
as the major research method as it allows respondents to expand on their responses to 
questions.  
 
According to Berg (2007), interviews can generally be divided into three types: the 
standardised (formal or structured), the unstandardised (informal or nondirective) 
and the semi-standardised (guided-semi-structured or focused). The major difference 
between these types of interviews is their degree of rigidity concerning 
presentational structure. The standardised interview designs the interview questions 
in a formally structured schedule. All interviewees are required to respond to each 
question, so that “each subject [has] approximately the same stimulus so that 
responses…will be comparable” (2007:69). The unstandardized interview has no 
formal structure: interviews need to “develop, adapt and generate questions and 
follow-up probes appropriate to the given situation and the central purpose of the 
investigation” (2007:70). The semi-standardised interview implements a number of 
predetermined questions in a systematic and consistent order, but the questions are 
open-ended. Interviewers can freely digress “to probe far beyond the answers to their 
prepared and standardised questions” (2007:70). The latter two forms of interviews 
can elicit additional information about various phenomena and explore the 
interviewee’s various ways of understanding the world.  
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Therefore, semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used to gather 
information about migrant workers’ desires, feelings, ideas and opinions, as well as 
their migration and labour rights protection stories in the field. These methods help 
us to understand the insubordination of migrant workers under the existing control 
regime. Interviews were also done with related agencies of labour relations, 
including labour bureau officials, trade union officials, factory owners and labour 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) officials to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the interaction between the subordination and insubordination of 
migrant workers. They provide us with a pathway to understanding the patterns of 
relevant labour disputes and strikes involving migrant workers and socio-economic 
changes. Employers, labour bureau officials, mediators and arbitrators in labour 
disputes mediation committees and local arbitration committees, officers and 
volunteers of NGO which work on migrant workers’ issues were also interviewed to 
collect an all-stage picture of current labour disputes in China. The involvement of 
different agencies in the interviews indicates the influences of the control regime, i.e. 
the state and capital, on migrant workers at different levels. The narrative methods 
also unfold the roles of migrant workers’ everyday struggle to effect change on the 
control regime, in factories, in streets and in towns and cities.  
 
1.6 The Choice of Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu for Fieldwork  
China is experiencing rapid economic growth via diverse paths of economic 
development across regions and provinces. The decentralisation of authoritative and 
financial power combined with political centralisation has provided local states with 
incentives to develop and protect local economies, and in particular, incentives to 
promote marketisation and privatisation locally. Meanwhile, evaluation-based 
incentive schemes have led to inter-regional market segmentation, increasing inter-
regional development inequalities and unequal provision of certain public goods 
(Wang et al., 2007). The coastal provinces in China are the forerunners and 
beneficiaries of the decentralisation reform, having achieved rapid industrialisation, 
modernisation and urbanisation by taking advantage of their history and geography 
as well as this decentralisation. 
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Fieldwork was conducted from October 2012 to September 2013 in the coastal 
provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. It included around 100 interviews 
conducted, of which 56 interviews have been involved in this dissertation.  These 
sites were chosen because, with the advent of reform and open policy, they had 
unparalleled opportunities to attract foreign direct investments, and develop a private 
economy, which in turn created a huge demand for cheap labour. Since 1978, the 
eastern regions have attracted hundreds of millions of migrant workers from central 
and western China. According to data published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, in 2012, 165 million migrant workers were working in the eastern regions 
(65.4% of the total) and Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu were the most attractive 
provinces. Guangdong absorbed 20% of migrant workers, while Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu both absorbed around 10% (NBS, 2013). Moreover, according to the China 
Labour Statistical Year Book (2014), in 2013 there were a total of 665,760 labour 
disputes involving 888,430 labourers – of which 91,965 disputes involving 150,513 
labourers were in Guangdong. This was 13.8% of the total number of the labour-
related disputes accepted by the labour arbitration courts and 17% of the total 
number of labourers involved. In Zhejiang, the number of labour dispute case was 
50,374 involved 85,286 labours, while in Jiangsu the number was 62,577 involved 
87,031 labourers. The enormous number of disputes in these provinces (concentrated 
in Guangdong) were also to the benefit of their governments, trade unions and other 
institutions inasmuch as they had the opportunity to learn from each and to improve 
their administrational abilities in labour relations. 
 
Guangdong has long been at the forefront of China’s economic reform and 
development and it has also experienced huge numbers of labour disputes, strikes 
and protests: in fact it has both the most migrant workers and the most labour 
disputes in the country. Besides the aforementioned 17% of the total number of 
labour-related disputes occurring in Guangdong, there were also numerous other 
disputes and strikes that do not appear in these official records Although there have 
been numerous previous studies of labour conflict in the province (Chan, CKC, 2009; 
Pun, 2005, 2009; Lee, 2007; Gallagher, 2004, 2011; Leung, 2012), these have all 
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been from the ‘capital-labour’ perspective: it is worth studying its labour disputes 
and strikes from the reverse perspective: ‘labour-capital’. My fieldwork in 
Guangdong concentrated on the Pearl River Delta (PRD), specifically Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Foshan and Dongguan, which contributes over 80% of the province’s 
GDP growth and attracts over 90% of the incoming migrant workers.  
 
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong has been the most economically 
dynamic zone. One advantage of the PRD is its geographical proximity to major 
international shipping routes, which allows it easy access to the global market. 
Hence, in the late 1970s the central government built three of four Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong. The SEZs were given greater political and economic 
autonomy in the fields of finance and fiscal matters, foreign trade and investment, 
commerce and distribution, allocation of materials and resources, labour, and prices 
than other jurisdictions in China. The economic success of the PRD is directly linked 
with foreign investment, particularly from East Asia. In the PRD, manufacturing 
firms import semi-finished goods or raw materials based on foreign-patented 
technology, and export the finished products to foreign markets. Combined with 
Hong Kong capital, the PRD has established itself as a low-value-added, labour-
intensive manufacturing base offering cheap migrant labour from the less-developed 
inland provinces – and it has become one of the most successful export-oriented 
development models in China.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the success of the PRD model since 1978 and its subsequent 
crisis. The combination of foreign capital and the local states led to anti-labour 
policies, which have met with fierce resistance from migrant workers. Since 2008, 
the global economic recession has uncovered the weakness of the PRD economy, 
which was behind the rapid growth of GDP in Guangdong. The Guangdong 
government’s plan for industrial upgrade since 2008 initiated a wave of strikes and 
struggles, while the geographic advantage of the PRD proved to benefit not only the 
flow of foreign capital but also the circulation of ideology. NGOs from Hong Kong 
have also played a major role in arming migrant workers with ideas, experiences and 
strategies for change. In this chapter, case studies of the Honda strike and the 
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Yuyuan Shoe Factory strike are used to analyse the struggle of migrant workers, 
particularly young generation migrant workers. The different agents involved in this 
process are also discussed and evidence of the formation, through the struggle 
between migrant workers and the controlling political and economic regimes, of a 
new generation of migrant workers is sought. 
 
Although abundant academic resources and data about labour relations in the Pearl 
River Delta exist, the Yangtze River Delta has been less studied by scholars (Pringle, 
2011; Friedman, 2014; Liu, 2010). Within this area, the northern part of Zhejiang 
Province and the southern part of Jiangsu Province have followed different 
development pathways and also have experienced different labour relations 
situations. When discussing the introduction of capitalist relations of production, it is 
worth including Zhejiang and Jiangsu as examples to show the diversity of the 
process. The most representative development path in Zhejiang is the ‘Wenzhou’ 
Model (named after the municipality in which it developed), which relies on family-
based industrial plants and the specialised market of daily necessities, while 
Jiangsu’s economic growth relies more on collective Town and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs). Labour relations in these two provinces also differ. In Zhejiang, the local 
trade union officials actively involve themselves in solving conflicts between local 
private enterprise owners and migrant workers, which leads to the creative practical 
application of collective bargaining. In Jiangsu, local governments and local labour 
bureaus attempt to create networks to prevent strikes and labour disputes in advance 
and to resolve the matters as soon as possible. The different control strategies are 
closely linked to the pre-conditions of capitalist development and the everyday 
activities of migrant workers. In Zhejiang, interviews with workers, trade union 
officials, labour NGO staff, scholars, factory owners, enterprise managers and local 
government officials were conducted in Hangzhou, Yongkang, Yiwu and Wenling. 
In Jiangsu, an industrial town in Changzhou is studied in detail, as Changzhou is one 
of the most typical cities of the ‘Sunan’ Model, and still relies on local private capital 
to the present. 
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Chapter 6 focuses on Zhejiang Province in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), another 
successful model of economic development in China. Unlike the PRD model of 
development in Guangdong Province, Zhejiang’s Wenzhou Model is fuelled by local 
private capital and its migrant workers mainly originate from the province’s rural 
areas. It is described as ‘Small Commodities, Big Market’, indicating the structure of 
the Wenzhou production and distribution model, based on thousands of family firms 
relying on specialised markets (Fei, 1986, cited in Wang, 2008:25). Hence, it is 
endogenous, small-scale, family-based and oriented to domestic markets, especially 
township markets. This model not only encourages the comparatively equal 
distribution of economic growth outcomes among different social groups but also 
relatively balanced power relations among labour, capital and government when 
compared with other economically advanced development areas in China. In this 
chapter, the development of the private sector in Zhejiang is explored, as are the 
unique patterns that the development of capitalism has made in shaping labour 
relations in this region. The particular socio-economic environment and characters of 
migrant workers in Zhejiang have led to the creation of a new regime of collective 
negotiation in labour disputes (jiti xieshang, 集 体 协 商 ). Although collective 
negotiation has been confirmed by Chinese labour law as a legal option for workers 
to solve labour disputes and reach agreements on wages, working conditions, 
contracts and so on, it has frequently remained unimplemented (Pringle, 2011). The 
town of Xinhe in Zhejiang, a woollen sweater manufacturing town, is the case study 
in this chapter, and its migrant workers are shown to utilise their power to force local 
states and capitalists to adjust their practices. 
 
Jiangsu Province is also located in the YRD, but it has taken a different development 
path from Zhejiang Province. The rapid transformation of the Sunan area in south 
Jiangsu is typical of the development model of this region, which is named after it. It 
is based on the collective investment of communities in collective Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs). Local states of the Sunan area are deeply involved in the 
commercial operations of collective TVEs. They are also actively involved in their 
creation, investment, operation, production, marketing and employment. 
Urbanisation, based on the development of small cities and towns, means migrant 
workers do not need to migrate long distances to find jobs in the non-agricultural 
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sector. Hence, migrant workers in Jiangsu are mainly local people hired directly by 
local TVEs. However, in the late 1990s the Sunan Model faced a severe crisis and 
underwent a ‘rebirth’ to the new Sunan model which is characterised by Foreign-
Invested Enterprises and Industrial Zones/Parks. The legacy of the collective 
economy, however, continues to strongly influence the power relations between local 
states, migrant workers and local capitalists. Local states in Jiangsu tend to intervene 
in the conflict between capital and labour directly, leaving limited space for the other 
two groups. The Sunan Model is the focus of Chapter 7, which includes an analysis 
of its emergence, its restructuring and its legacy with regard to the socio-economic 
transformation of China. Due to its particular environment, the struggle of migrant 
workers in Jiangsu has been more peaceful and less militant than in the other two 
provinces. This is closely linked with the relatively good working conditions and 
migrant workers’ deep embedment within the local communities, as well as the 
management style of local private TVEs. Two collective actions by migrant workers 
in Yaoguan Town are examined, and based on their analysis, the power relations of 
different agencies in Yaoguan are revealed. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the reaction between migrant workers’ daily struggle and the 
shifting of the control regime in the three cases studied. Moreover, it will provide a 
synthesis of the previous chapters based on a comparative analysis.  
 
1.7 Ethical Issues 
Social researchers have an ethical obligation to their colleagues, their study 
population, and society at large, because they delve into the social lives of other 
human beings. The ethics of research concern the appropriateness of the researcher's 
behaviour in relation to the subjects of the research or those who are affected by it. 
Ethical issues can arise at any one of the planning, implementation and reporting 
stages of research. Although some ethical issues appear a matter of courtesy and 
common sense, they often give rise to complexity. It is difficult to make clear-cut 
dichotomies between what is right and wrong. However, social researchers must 
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accept the responsibility of ensuring the rights, privacy, and welfare of the people 
and communities that they study. 
 
According to Gray (2009:73), there are four main areas of ethical principles: 
1. Avoid harm to participants; 
2. Ensure informed consent of participants; 
3. Respect the privacy of participants; 
4. Avoid the use of deception. 
This research was planned, conducted and reported following these principles. 
Because discussing labour disputes, strikes and protests, and grievances about 
employers or government or trade unions with migrant workers has the potential to 
cause harm in interviewees’ work and daily life, ethical issues were considered even 
more seriously in this research. In designing the research, potential risks for harm 
were accounted for in order to take steps to alleviate the situation in advance, such as 
interviewing migrant workers away from the factory and factory-provided dormitory, 
keeping conversations confidential, storing identifying records securely, and so on. 
Research subjects were interviewed based on their voluntary participation, the 
background and purpose of research, as well as the rights and responsibilities of both 
the researcher and participants having been clearly explained. The data collected 
during the fieldwork was stored securely to avoid information falling into the wrong 
hands or becoming public. 
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Chapter 2: The Socio Economic Transformation of China 
Since 1978 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the reform and opening up launched in 1978, China’s fast economic growth 
and rapid social transformation has been quite remarkable. The gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased by almost 10% per annum from 1978-2000 and has grown 
by approximately 8% per annum from 2000 to 2014 (NBS, 2015) It has become the 
second largest economy in the world, having overtaken Japan at the end of 2010. 
China has also managed to reduce poverty dramatically, effectively lifting 600 
million people out of poverty (World Bank, 2010). Additionally, the opening up 
policy has fuelled the inflow of FDI into China and since 2010 it has been the second 
largest FDI destination. The dramatic increase in foreign investment in China is 
partly because of its competitive advantages in the global production chain, such as 
cheap raw materials, cheap labour and an investment-friendly environment. It is also 
related to the wave of relocation of capital in the global market, inspired by the 
ideology of neo-liberalism. As Harvey (2005:120) stated, “the outcome in China has 
been the construction of a particular kind of market economy that increasingly 
incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control”. 
Accompanied by the inflow of FDI, the Chinese industrial structure has been 
gradually transformed over the years. China has become the global factory for daily 
consumer goods, as well as the most attractive manufacturing and research base for 
transnational companies, such as BP, General Motors, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and 
others. The export-oriented development strategy has successfully pushed China into 
following the steps of other Asian Tigers, creating another Asian development 
‘miracle’.  
 
The reform and opening-up policy has not only brought in economic achievements 
such as the rapid growth of GDP and the total amount of foreign capital investment. 
The significant improvement of the average wage and living standards in both rural 
and urban areas has also greatly influenced the social transformation process. Rural 
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society has gradually disintegrated and disappeared and capitalist relationships have 
replaced the traditional rural social networks and institutions. Peasants are losing 
their position in previous production relations and being dragged into a so-called 
‘wage labour’ system. Every year, hundreds of millions of peasants migrate within 
China, entering factories and becoming wage labourers. The previous winners of the 
socialist system – workers in SOEs – have been dislocated and lost their glories. The 
central government focuses on retaining its legitimacy of control through pursuing 
economic achievement and the local cadres and local governments transform 
themselves into entities pushing economic growth, ignoring the other contents of 
development. The dramatic socio-economic transformation has deeply influenced 
everyone in the society and, in turn, the socio-economic transformation is pushed by 
everyone in the society.  
 
In this chapter, I begin by examining the rural society transformation of China. The 
rural reform has not only improved the productivity of the agriculture but also fuels 
the development of China as a whole. The chapter then moves to the analysis of FDI, 
which has played a crucial role in China’s economic development. Alongside 
opening to the global market, privatisation has been another important process of 
reform. The privatisation process in this chapter will be divided into two parts: top-
down and bottom-up, with the former referring to the reform of SOEs and the latter 
referring to the rise of the private sector. Finally, this chapter will deeply analyse one 
of the key agencies of development in China – local governments. The 
decentralisation process distributes the fiscal and political power to local 
governments, which efficiently motivates regional autonomy. Local cadres, as 
providers of economic growth to the central government, are deeply engaged in 
promoting economic development, which has brought about both positive and 
negative influences on local development.  
 
2.2 Rural Reform  
2.2.1 Socio-economic transformation of rural China 
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After three decades of reform and opening up, Chinese rural economy and society 
has experienced dramatic transformation. Accompanied by rapid industrialisation 
and urbanisation, primary industry
3’s share of output of total GDP and the proportion 
of employed persons in it have been declining steadily since 1978 (Figures 1 and 2) 
– GDP output share from 28.2% in 1978 to 9.4% in 2013 and employment from 
70.5% in 1978 to 30.1% in 2013. In 2013, the total output of the primary industry 
was RMB 5532.17 billion, and it employed 241.7 million people.  
 
Figure 1 Composition of GDP by the three strata of industry (1978-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2014 
 
                                                 
3
 Primary industry: agriculture (including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery). 
Secondary industry: industry (including mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply 
of electricity, water and gas) and construction. Tertiary industry: all other industries not included in 
primary or secondary industry (NBS, 2002). 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PI/CurrentSurveysIndicators/200204/t20020419_27198.html  
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Figure 2 Number of employed persons by the three stratas of industry (1978-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2014 
 
Meanwhile, the population holding rural registered permanent residence (nong cun 
hu kou农村户口) has been declining due to one child policy and urbanisation. In 1978, 
over 80% of the Chinese population lived in rural areas, but by 2013 this had fallen 
to less than a half (46.3%). In a similar fashion the number of rural employed 
persons actually working on farms fell dramatically: in 1978, nearly all rural workers 
were employed by the agriculture but by 2013 with increased agricultural 
productivity and the growth of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs), two-thirds of 
rural workers were employed in non-farm work. Farming is no longer the main way 
of making a living. As Figure 3 shows, the net income from household operations
4
 
has made up the major share of rural households’ income since 1979, followed 
closely by income from wages and salaries. In 2013, the per capita net income from 
wages and salaries was RMB 3,447.5 while that from household operations was 
RMB 3,533.4, household operations’ income having increased from less than 15% to 
43.6% in 2013.  
 
                                                 
4
 Income from rural household operations refers to income earned by the rural household as one unit 
of production and operation. Family business activities, according to industry, are divided into 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, manufacturing, construction, transportation, post and 
telecommunications, wholesale, retail and catering, social service, culture, education, health, and 
other household operations. The main source of income from household operations is agricultural 
activities. Data on income and expenditure of rural households are obtained from the sample surveys 
on rural households. 
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Figure 3 Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households from Different Sources (1979-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2014 
 
The changing structure of the net income of rural families is closely related to the 
socio-economic transformation of rural society in China. Firstly, the introduction of 
the household responsibility system (HRS) stimulated farmers’ incentives. 
Productivity increased dramatically, leading to the fast growth of rural economy after 
the reform had been initiated. However, even after decades of reform, the Chinese 
agricultural sector remains small-scale and family-based. Although the application of 
chemicals, fertilizers and other modern technologies has significantly increased the 
per-hectare output, the small-scale and family-based operation of farming restricts 
the possibility of further growth. Additionally, although the Chinese central 
government has raised grain prices several times since 1979, and finally abolished 
food rationing in the early 1990s, grain prices have been kept at an artificially low 
level to secure the urban food supply (Oi, 1999:619). The prices of other agricultural 
products, too, remain unreasonably low and so it is impossible for the majority of 
farmers in China to survive by farming alone. Secondly, with the deepening of 
reform, the rural public service and social welfare system collapsed (Hart-Landsberg 
& Burkett, 2005) and the commercialisation of subsistence-satisfaction has brought 
an increasing demand for cash. The cash consumption expenditure of rural 
households has increased significantly: between 2002 and 2012, their per capita cash 
consumption expenditure increased nearly four-fold, from RMB 1467 to RMB 5414 
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(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013).
5
 This demand for cash income pushes 
rural labourers to leave farming to become semi-waged labour and millions of rural 
labourers have been released from people commune system, to enter the secondary 
and tertiary industries. At the beginning of the reform era, the surplus rural labourers 
were absorbed by TVEs so, although they left the land, they did not leave their 
hometowns. Later, the flood of foreign capital into coastal areas of China began to 
lure more migrant labourers from inland China. Every year, hundreds of millions of 
migrant workers leave their hometowns and move to cities and towns to find jobs. 
According to statistical data, in 2013 there were 225.42 million rural to urban 
migrant workers in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). Even those 
who stay in the agricultural sector are involved in capitalist production to some 
extent.  
 
The rural land reform followed the implication of the Household Registration 
System (HRS). Under the HRS, collectively owned land was assigned to individual 
households with contracts of up to 15 years. Thus ownership remains collective; the 
peasants may manage and utilise, but not dispose of, the land. Initially, even these 
limited rights were not allowed to be transferred (Chai, 1997; Lin, 1987, 1992; Oi, 
1999a, 1999b) but since the 1980s transfer rights have been gradually loosened: 
peasants can transfer their land use rights to others, but only for agricultural use. 
Thus rural land circulation was speeded up along with the economic growth in rural 
China. According to the statistical data, between 1984-1992 only just over 6% of 
rural households in China had ever transferred the rights to their farmland, but in 
2003, this rose to over 17%, a total area of 228 million mu
6
 (Liu, 2013). Since 2004, 
the transfer area of rural land nearly doubled (to 403 million mu by the end of 2014), 
accounting for 30.4% of total contracted rural land. The transfer process involved 
58.33 million rural households, accounting for 25.3% of the total contract 
undertaking households (Economic Management Department, Ministry of 
Agricultural, China, 2015a), with the ratios of transferred rural land in advanced 
economic areas being much higher. Shanghai leads the affected areas with 71.5% of 
rural land involved in the transferring process, followed by Jiangsu, (58.4%), Beijing, 
                                                 
5
 Source: http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01  
6
 Chinese unit of area, 1 mu ≈ 666.67 m2. 
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(52.0%), Heilongjiang, (50.3%) and Zhejiang, (48.0%). It is notable that Anhui and 
Henan also have a high rate of transfer – 41.0% and 37.1% respectively (ibid.): 
although their economic growth rates are not among the top ranking in China, they 
are the biggest migrant labour output provinces. The migration of rural labour and 
the transfer of rural land interact with each other in Anhui and Henan. Nevertheless, 
this transfer of rural land has increased rural land revenue and agricultural earnings 
significantly. According to an investigation (Liang, 2014), agricultural outputs per 
mu rose by 7% after transferring, while labour inputs per mu decreased by 30%.  
 
Furthermore, rural land transfer stimulates the development of rural specialty 
cooperatives and improves agricultural industry integration. As mentioned above, 
Chinese agricultural production remained small-scale and family-based even after 
the launch of the HRS and it is this which blocks further growth. According to the 
Minister of Agriculture (Han, 2015), 230 million households are contracting 1330 
million mu of rural land, which means each rural household holds less than six mu 
on average. The growth of rural specialty cooperatives has increased along with the 
transferring of rural land. There were 1.13 million rural specialty cooperatives by 
2014, 254,000 more than in 2013 and 65.42 million rural households involved in the 
cooperatives, each cooperative having an average of 50 members (Economic 
Management Department, Ministry of Agricultural, China, 2015b). This agricultural 
integration not only creates conditions for the further release of rural labourers to 
other industries but also creates increasing wage-labour within the agriculture. 
 
2.2.2 Decollectisation and Re-Collectivisation 
 
The early stage of industrialisation in one country is often based on the extraction of 
its agricultural surplus (Zhou, 1995). As shown in Lippit’s research (1974), the 
potential agricultural surplus in China in the pre-revolutionary period would 
probably have been 30% of total agricultural output. However, only a small 
proportion of the surplus went to support modern industrialisation in this period. 
After a short transitional period between 1949-1953, the CPC started to concentrate 
on industrialisation. Hence, it was necessary to generate an agricultural surplus to 
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facilitate the modernisation and industrialisation of the country. In the meantime, the 
central government also wanted to maintain the stability of rural society, which 
meant allowing peasants and their families to retain sufficient resources to satisfy 
their living needs. Therefore, the CCP has directed the socialist transformation from 
private farming to collectivisation in Chinese rural society since then. During the 
Mao period, a direct appropriation of the entire rural surplus was the basic 
mechanism for capturing the agricultural surpluses available to support 
industrialisation and infrastructure development (Gabriel, 2003). The rural collective 
system was formed by the three-level administrative institution: people’s communes, 
production brigades and production teams. Within the collective system, the 
distribution of agricultural output was based on work points which were linked to the 
jobs that peasants performed every day. The work points system was meant to 
indicate the quantity and quality of performance, however, it was extremely difficult 
to monitor agricultural work because of the nature of agricultural production. 
Peasants in the production team normally got the same amount of fixed work points 
regardless of the quantity and quality of jobs and so the work points system became 
egalitarian and inefficient (Lin, 1988).  
 
Hence, it happened that members of the collective production team engaged in 
different actions to ‘fight back’ against this inefficient and unfair system. For 
example, in Li’s 2009 research based on a village in Jiangsu Province, the members 
tried to bargain with official regulations and to shirk their work. Sometimes they 
even staged strikes. With the chaos that ensued at the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
peasants began to escape the people’s commune system secretly. In coastal areas, 
people participated in commercial business, smuggling, and other forms of private 
economy. Additionally, peasants in rural China also tried to contract rural land and 
take responsibility for their profits and losses. This attempt, later known as the 
‘household responsibility system’ (HRS), has had a far-reaching impact on Chinese 
rural society, and Chinese society as a whole.    
 
It is widely believed that the launch of the HRS was a bottom-up process. In 1978, 
the practice of fixing farm output quotas on a household basis had been secretly 
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adopted in some mountain areas and poor areas of Anhui. This was not the first time 
this land reform practice had been instituted. The most famous case was that of the 
town of Yongjia, in Wenzhou, Zhejiang in 1956. The fixing of farm output quotas on 
a household basis in Yongjia was based on the real situation in rural area, supported 
by leaders of the county Party Committee and practiced throughout the whole county. 
It was undoubtedly a heresy in the Mao era, and was immediately banned by central 
government which issued a series of documents to reinforce rural cooperatives which 
tightly bonded the farmers with rural land. The replacement of the collective system 
with the household responsibility system in the village of Xiaogang, Fengyang 
County, in Anhui Province faced the same official response at the beginning. 
Although the central government had already started to reconsider rural polices, the 
experiment in Xiaogang was originally considered the reverse of the socialist 
principle of collective farming and it was prohibited in the document issued by the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC in September 
1979 (cited in Lin, 1988). However, as the HRS efficiently stimulated peasants’ 
motivation and increased agricultural productivity, it slowly spread from Anhui to 
other provinces. The Chinese central government provided its first official approval 
in the document ‘Certain Problems Concerning the Further Strengthening and 
Improvement of the Responsibility System for Agricultural Production’ (also known 
as Document 75) (Chai, 1998), which restricted the HRS to poor agricultural regions, 
mainly hilly and mountainous areas and remote areas. The restriction did not work 
very well as rich regions also actively engaged in this decollectivisation process. Full 
official recognition of the household responsibility system as universally acceptable 
was finally given in late 1981 and since then the central government has officially 
promoted the HRS nationwide. By the end of 1983, the HRS had spread to almost all 
China’s rural areas (Lin, 1988).  
 
The Chinese agricultural institution’s shift from collective production to individual 
family-based production prompted remarkable growth in productivity. Between 1978 
and 1984 in particular, the HRS provided an efficient and immediate impetus to the 
growth of grain output with an average annual increase of 5.0% (Survey Office of 
The National Bureau of Statistics in Chongqing, 2015). This growth was mainly 
stimulated by the improvement of the output of grain crops per hectare, the result not 
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only of peasants’ enthusiasm, but also of the utilisation of modern agricultural 
techniques, such as the use of chemical fertilizers, modern machinary, pesticides and 
weed killers, new crop strains and new farming techniques (Li, 2009). The central 
government also increased the grain purchasing price to stimulate agricultural 
growth. Figure 4 clearly shows that the growth rate of the output of cereal crops per 
hectare maintained a significantly high rate, except in 1980.   
 
Figure 4  Growth Rate of Output of Grain Crops per Hectare (kg/hectare) in China, 1976-1999 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01  
 
After the glut of grain from 1983 to 1984, rural households’ income decreased. 
There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, although the government still paid a 
higher price for grain quota sales, it no longer paid a high over-quota sale price for 
any over-quota sales. Secondly, as the free market of grain was not fully opened, the 
market prices plummeted with increased supply (Lin, 1988). Also, while the Chinese 
government emphasized urban development and industrialisation, it continued to 
keep grain prices artificially low and supplies stable for the urban areas. The ability 
of decollectivisation to reduce inefficiencies and to increase productivity became 
exhausted and the growth of agriculture stagnated (see Figure 4). The decrease in 
rural household income, combined with the rise of rural TVEs, catalyzed the first 
wave of rural labour transfer – peasants leaving their lands but not leaving their 
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home towns (li tu bu li xiang 离土不离乡) which restructured the aspirations of the 
entire rural labour force. In 1994, the central government again raised the purchasing 
prices which led to an increase in grain output. Accompanied by the speeding up of 
foreign investment inflow, millions of people not only left their lands but also their 
home towns; some went to cities, and some to other richer and more industrialized 
rural areas, to find alternative lucrative income opportunities. Yang and Yang 
reported (2009) that approximately 55 million rural labourers left their hometowns 
for more than half a year.  
 
Therefore, even though the central government still insisted on consolidating the 
institution of the HRS, some changes were introduced to allow agriculture and rural 
China to transcend the limitations of the HRS system. As Deng Xiaoping said in 
1990 “the rural economy eventually needs to become collectivized (ji ti hua 集体化) 
and coordinated (ji yue hua 集约化)” (Deng, 2004, cited in Zhang & Donaldson, 
2008:29). Re-collectivisation again comes to the forefront of discussion. It is 
believed by the Chinese government to be an efficient tool for agricultural 
modernisation (nong ye xian dai hua 农业现代化), that is, making the transition from 
traditional agriculture to modern agriculture and from uncoordinated and small-scale 
operations to coordinated and large-scale operations. It is believed that vertical 
integration is an efficient way to achieve a modernized agriculture sector that is 
commercialized, specialized and scaled-up, as well as standardized and 
internationalized. The re-collectivisation of farming since the mid-1990s is not like 
the collectivisation process in the 1950s. The agricultural cooperative organisation, 
not the communist people’s commune, is the core entity of this process. Peasants can 
join and leave the organisations freely, and receive a share of the profits.  
 
Of the different forms of agricultural cooperative organisations existing, the so-
called ‘dragon head’ agribusiness companies are the main vehicle for agricultural 
vertical integration. The development of agribusiness is based on both the support of 
Chinese administrative level governments and the rising power of capital. Within the 
production process of agribusiness, peasants have been dragged into the emerging 
capitalist production process to some extent. Peasants in rural China, who have 
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participated in agricultural cooperative organisations, are losing their power in the 
organisation of agricultural production process, to the agribusiness – capital. 
Although some peasants retain their use right of land and control over their own 
labour, they have to sell their entire harvest to the agribusiness company in order to 
pay for technical support from these companies. Some even rent out their use right of 
land to agribusiness companies and work on the piece of household land allocated to 
them by the collective, in effect, becoming semi-proletarian farm workers (Zhang & 
Donaldson, 2008).  
 
Looking back at these three decades (1978-2008) of rural reform, we can see that it 
evolved spontaneously in response to underlying economic forces and people’s 
subjectivities. The story of Xiaogangcun has frequently been used by government 
officials and mainstream media in China to “illuminate the initiatives of Chinese 
peasants in decollectivisation, to underscore the spontaneity and the grassroots 
nature of the process, and to prove the necessity and legitimacy of the reform 
policies in the countryside” (Li, 2009:268). However, it is worth emphasizing that 
the spread and promotion of the HRS shows the interaction between the state and the 
peasants. In the beginning, the HRS was not accepted by the central government, but 
with its quick spread, the central government reversed its attitude, instead promoting 
and consolidating the HRS. It should also be noted that HRS was not welcomed 
everywhere in China in the 1980s. In these ‘non-welcoming’ areas, the 
decollectivisation was a top-down process planned and imposed by the state, rather 
than a result of local initiatives. The effect of rural decollectivisation is not limited to 
only the agricultural sector; it also contributed to the speeding up of industrialisation 
of China, the surplus value from rural China providing a steady flow of support to 
urban areas.   
 
2.2.3 The rise and the fall of collective Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs)  
 
Alongside the reform of the agricultural sector, the development of rural industry 
also characterizes the process of economic change in the Chinese countryside. 
During the Mao period, the constraints of the state plan left limited space for 
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localities to generate additional revenues. Both land and enterprises were either state 
or collectively owned; below the county level, people’s communes and production 
brigades had collectively owned enterprises (Oi, 1999). The history of these kind of 
collectively owned rural enterprises, the she dui qi ye (commune and brigade run 
enterprises 社队企业), can be traced back to the Great Leap Forward in 1958 when 
they were created to provide inputs to the collective’s agriculture production. The 
commune and brigade enterprises remained in place until the beginning of reform. 
The rural decollectivisation process negatively affected financial flows for local 
governments, which pushed local cadres to turn to developing their local rural 
industries. The growth of domestic demands offered TVEs opportunities to realise 
value from locally controlled resources (Harvie, 1999). As private economy was still 
a sensitive area, collectively owned rural industries were given preferential treatment 
and during the 1980s, they had the opportunity for rapid development despite the 
political and economic constraints.  
 
With the spread of the HRS, the people’s communes and brigades lost their power 
and in 1984, the existence of people’s communes, production brigades and 
production teams came to an end and the commune and brigade run enterprises were 
officially renamed as Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). TVEs, unlike state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), are locally embedded. They are owned and run by the 
local community and their profits remain at the local community level. TVEs 
respond to market signals by themselves (the central plan did not constrain them) 
and so they were more flexible and market-concentrated. TVEs targeted areas where 
there were severe shortages or where SOEs were weak or absent. As SOEs in the 
planned economy era had to take responsibility for housing and other social welfare 
and services, they had much heavier burdens than TVEs. TVEs also took advantage 
of labour-intensive production and appropriate production technologies. More 
importantly, local cadres actively engaged in the development of TVEs as their 
political and economic self-interest and the goal of economic development matched. 
TVEs’ finance, supplies, sales, production and personnel became intimately linked 
with local government as they enjoyed low taxation and other preferable policies and 
this close relationship greatly facilitated TVEs’ development in the first decade of 
the reform era. 
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Table 1 clearly shows the achievement of TVEs between 1978 and the mid-1990s. 
Collective TVEs had good performance records regarding output growth, job 
creation, profit rate and growth of total factor productivity. From 1978 to 1995, the 
output of collective TVEs increased 100-fold, from RMB 49.3 billion to RMB 
6891.5 billion. The number of TVEs also grew sharply from 1.52 million to 22.03 
million, while the number of employees increased from 28.27 million to 128.60 
million. At the same time, the importance of collective TVEs to the national 
economy increased dramatically. In 1980, SOEs were the leading source of non-
agricultural jobs, but by the mid-1990s the TVEs had become the single largest 
source of employment for non-farming jobs, absorbing the surplus rural labour 
released by the de-collectivisation process.  
 
Table 1 Basic Statistics of China's TVEs, 1978-1995 
Basic Statistics of China's TVEs, 1978-1995 
Year Number of 
Enterprises 
(Million) 
Workers 
Employed 
(Million) 
Gross Output 
Value (Billion 
RMB) 
Current Prices 
Growth (%) 
1978 1.52 28.27 49.3 - 
1980 1.43 30.00 65.7 - 
1984 6.07 52.08 171.0 - 
1985 12.23 69.79 272.8 59.5 
1986 15.15 79.37 345.1 29.8 
1987 17.50 88.05 476.4 34.5 
1988 18.88 95.45 649.6 36.4 
1989 18.68 93.66 7428 14.3 
1990 18.50 92.65 8462 13.9 
1991 19.09 96.09 1162.2 37.3 
1992 20.79 105.81 1797.5 54.7 
1993 24.53 123.45 3154.1 75.5 
1994 24.95 120.18 4258.9 35.0 
1995 22.03 128.60 6891.5 61.8 
Source: Cited in Harvie, 1999, State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1996, Tables 11-
29, 11-30, 11-31, pp.387-389. 
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It should be noted that the popularity of rural industry was mainly concentrated in 
the eastern coastal area. Whereas non-agricultural production accounted for more 
than 80% of total agricultural output in eastern coastal areas in 1994, it was only 
15.5% in the central and 19.5% in the western areas. In Jiangsu Province, the 
flourishing of TVEs in the south even created a famous development path that came 
to be known as the ‘Sunan Model’.7 In coastal areas such as Wenzhou8 and some 
locales in Fujian, where private enterprises prevailed, their success was also fostered 
by a close relationship with local authorities. The private sector in such areas was 
shielded by the ‘red umbrella’, that is, the local authorities allowed them to be 
treated as a ‘collective’.  
 
The collective TVEs experienced a decline in market share and profits in the mid-
1990s, their own limitations constraining their further development. The market had 
changed rapidly and had become much more intensively competitive. Low-skilled 
workers, unsophisticated management, capital shortages, inability to attract business 
partners and engage in alliances with research institutes all limited the ability of 
collective TVEs to upgrade to the higher value-added manufacturing industry. The 
fuzzy property rights and close relationship with local authorities, which used to be 
the ‘advantages’ of collective TVEs in the 1980s, had turned into the disadvantages 
of collective TVEs in 1990s. The local governments, which had their own troubles of 
debts, unsold inventories and unemployment, increasingly appeared to be convinced 
that private ownership was the appropriate form to ensure economic growth and so 
the collective TVEs were dragged into the privatisation wave which continued until 
approximately 2000. 
 
The rise and fall of the collective TVEs can be seen as a unique phenomenon of 
Chinese society, as well as an effective response to the distinctive features of the 
Chinese transition process. It can be regarded as a ‘hybrid’ of planned and collective 
                                                 
7
 Sunan (苏南) refers to the southern area of Jiangsu Province, in the east of China. The Sunan area is 
also known as ‘Su (zhou)-(Wu) Xi-Chang (Zhou)’. In 2001, the Jiangsu government included Nanjing 
and Zhenjiang in the group of Sunan, because these two cities have achieved similar economic 
development as Su-Xi-Chang. Suzhong includes Yangzhou, Taizhou and Nantong, and Subei includes 
Xuzhou, Lianyungang, Yancheng, Suqian and Huai’an. 
8 
Wenzhou is a coastal prefecture level city of Zhejiang Province.  
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economy and market economy which provided a ‘third way’, rather than ‘shock 
therapy’, for the Chinese economy to transit from Mao-period to post-Mao period. 
Due to a particular set of external social, economic environment conditions, 
collective TVEs’ success was huge; but so was their fall. TVEs made a significant 
contribution to economic development, created millions of non-agricultural jobs and 
helped to speed up the industrialisation and urbanisation process in coastal areas of 
China. Even the collective ownerships in rural industry had mostly restructured to 
different forms of ownership, mainly private. The rise and fall of TVEs left 
intangible heritages, especially in management style. The influences of collective 
TVEs on labour relations will be fully discussed in Chapter 7, using Jiangsu as an 
example. 
 
After three decades of reform, Chinese rural society had experienced dramatic 
changes. Relying on the surplus value produced by rural society, China had 
successfully industrialised. In 2006, agriculture, the primary industry, contribution to 
the total national GDP declined to 10.7% and in the same year, the central 
government abolished agricultural taxes. Agricultural subsidies were also on their 
way to rural China and the agricultural sector started to get support from central 
government. During the reform era, China’s rural society made a great contribution 
to economic growth, not only in terms of direct economic contribution, but also 
indirect economic contribution, especially the hundreds of millions of migrant 
workers moving from rural to industrialized areas whose labour fuelled economic 
growth. However, their social reproduction process did not take place in the places 
they were working. Rural society continued to take responsibility for these 
reproduction processes, including health care, education, caring for the aged and the 
youth, and so on. The increase in inequality between rural and urban areas is solid 
proof of exploitation of rural society. According to an investigation in 2013 (China 
Society of Economic Reform, 2014), the number of young rural residents had 
significantly decreased over the past 20 years; people aged over 46 made up just over 
60% of farming labour in rural society. The non-agricultural labour staying in rural 
areas were mainly young males while the remainder of young labourers left to 
become migrant workers. This clearly shows that the structure of rural society had 
changed, deeply influencing the social-economic development of China.   
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2.3 Opening up and globalisation  
Besides domestic reforms, another deeply influential process was opening up to the 
global market. After years of disorder, chaos and stagnation of Chinese society and 
economy it was imperative that the Chinese central government make up for the time 
lost from the turbulence. Deng Xiaoping mentioned the opening up in 1975: “We 
should introduce new technology and equipment from other countries and expand 
imports and exports”,9 and again in 1978: 
[T]oday, as we work to achieve China's four modernisations, 
many conditions are present which were absent in Comrade Mao's 
time…After several years of effort, we have secured global 
conditions that are far better than before; they enable us to make 
use of capital from foreign countries and of their advanced 
technology and experience in business management”.10  
The opening up which was promoted by the central government was not limited to 
the utilisation of foreign capital and technology but also targeted participation in 
international trade. It also expected to gain enough foreign reserves to buy the 
necessary means to support a stronger internal dynamic modernisation process 
(Harvey, 2005).  
 
2.3.1 Opening up  
 
The central government of China did not take just one action to achieve its aims. It 
was a gradual process. The prudent central government started the process in small 
experimental units in Guangdong Province, close to Hong Kong.  
 
                                                 
9
 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, People’s Press, 1978;‘Some Comments On Industrial 
Development’, Original date: August 18,1975  
10
 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, People’s Press, 1978; ‘Hold High the Banner of Mao 
Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of Seeking Truth from Facts’. Original date: September 
16, 1978  
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In 1979, the establishment of Shekou
11
 Industrial Zone became the curtain-raiser to 
the opening up. Shekou Industrial Zone utilized external resources through the 
processing trade – importing all or part of the raw materials, parts and components, 
accessories and packaging materials from foreign countries, processing them on the 
Chinese mainland, then re-exporting the finished products. The experiment in 
Shekou provided a successful example of the export-oriented economic development 
strategy. In 1980, Shekou’s preferential treatment was extended to the entire city of 
Shenzhen, as well as to Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in 
Fujian. Gradually, the opening up expanded from coastal areas to the frontier zones, 
riverside areas and capital cities of all provinces, and then to inland China since 1978. 
At the beginning of the opening up, the main source of foreign capital was foreign 
loans, not foreign direct investment. Between 1979 and 1986, China utilized 28.87 
billion dollars of foreign capital, of which only 22.9% was foreign direct investment, 
mostly from Hong Kong. Foreign capital inflows remained modest during this period 
for several reasons. One was that China itself was still doubtful about the influences 
that an influx of foreign capital would have, especially capital from western 
capitalist countries. Another was that foreign investors remained cautious about the 
Chinese opening door policy. However, since 1992 and Deng Xiaoping’s South 
China tour, the inflows of foreign investment have dramatically increased. The 
increase in foreign investment inflows was also deeply influenced by the rise of 
neoliberalism, a worldwide trend that directed capital towards more profitable 
developing countries in the 1990s. China was one of the most attractive destinations 
of this wave and it has been the biggest host country of FDI among developing 
countries since 1993, the year that the amount of FDI exceeded foreign loans and 
became the largest foreign capital resource in China. Figure 5 shows that the FDI 
actually utilized in China increased from 1.96 billion dollars to 45.26 billion dollars 
by 1998. After a short adjustment period caused by the Asian economic crisis at the 
end of the 1990s, the trend in contracted FDI and FDI actually utilized reversed, 
stimulated by the prospects of China’s joining the WTO. As reported in the Global 
Investment Trend Monitor (UNCTAD, 2013), almost half (46%) of FDI flows to 
BRICs went to China between 1998 and 2012. 
                                                 
11
 The Shekou Industrial Zone is located in Nanshan District in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province.  
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Figure 5  FDI Actually Utilized and Annual Growth Rates, 1985-2013 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The utilisation form of external sources expanded gradually. In the beginning, equity 
joint venture was the main form authorized by the Joint Venture law
12
 in July 1979. 
Along with the deepening of opening up, the numbers of contracted joint ventures, 
wholly foreign firms and shareholding foreign-invested enterprises have begun to 
rise. Wholly foreign companies, which were authorized by the Foreign-Capital 
Enterprises Law, have become a particular favourite form of FDI since 1999 (Figure 
6 ). This is because even though wholly foreign firms were by law, supposed to 
export at least 50% of their production and only produce technologically advanced 
goods, their managements almost all managed to find a way around these 
requirements (Lemoine, 2000). 
 
                                                 
12
 Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. 
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Figure 6  Actually Utilized Value of Foreign Investment by Form (1997-2013) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01  
 
Meanwhile, total imports and exports also increased significantly, from 20.6 billion 
dollars in 1979 to 2209.6 billion dollars in 2013 (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7  Total Value of Imports and Exports of Goods (1978-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
As well as the rapid increase in exports and imports, the composition of foreign trade 
also improved regarding added value. In the 1980s, China successfully finished the 
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shift from mainly exporting primary products to mainly exporting manufactured 
goods. Machinery and transport equipment have led the manufactured goods sector 
since 1996 (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 Exports Value of Manufactured Goods by Category (1980-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The balance of exports and imports strongly indicates the export-oriented 
development strategy of China. China has been a trading surplus country since 1994 
and the balance increased ten-fold from 2004 to 2009 (Figure 9). The biggest trade 
surpluses were recorded with Hong Kong, the United States, Netherlands, Vietnam 
and the United Kingdom in 2014.  
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Figure 9 Balance of Exports and Imports (1979-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
The opening up successfully fuelled the take-off of China’s economy. After three 
decades of export-oriented development, China emerged as the world’s largest 
manufacturer in 2010, overtaking the United States. In 2013, gross value added 
manufacturing accounted for 28.9% of the total GDP and the value of exports has 
become one of the most significant parts of GDP. As shown in Figure 10, it is clear 
that the importance of exports to GDP increased steadily, reaching a peak in 2006 
when it accounted for more than one-third of the GDP, although there has since been 
a significant drop owing to the global economic recession.  
Figure 10 Value of Exports as % of GDP (1978-2013) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
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FDI inflows to China also contributed to the improvement in China’s productivity 
and rapid economic and trade growth. There were reportedly 445,962 foreign-
invested enterprises registered in China in 2013, the majority of them wholly 
foreign-invested enterprises. As shown in Figure 11, FIEs’ share of China’s 
industrial output has increased significantly since 1990; from 2.28% in 1990, it 
reached its peak in 2003 at 35.87%, but then fell to 26.11% in 2011 (Invest in China, 
2013). 
 
Figure 11 Industrial Outputs by FIEs as a Percentage of National Industrial Outputs (1990-2011) 
 
Source:  Invest in China, 2013 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/ 
 
FIEs are also essential to Chinese tax revenue. Figure 12 shows that FIEs have 
continually contributed more than one-fifth of total tax revenues since 2002.  
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Figure 12 Annual Growth Rate of Foreign-related Tax Revenues and the Share of Foreign-related Tax Revenus to 
Total Tax Revenues from Industry and Commerce (1992-2012) 
 
Source: Invest in China, 2013 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/ 
 
Additionally, China’s fast-growing imports and exports are also deeply related to 
FIEs. In 2012, FIEs in China contributed 47.94% of China’s imports and 49.89% of 
its exports. In 2006, the share of FIEs of Chinese exports and imports reached its 
peak values of 58.2% and 59.70% respectively (Invest in China, 2013). Furthermore, 
FIEs dominate high-technology exports. From 2002 to 2010, the contribution to 
China’s high-tech exports by FIEs rose from 79% to 82%, while that of wholly 
owned foreign firms rose from 55% to 67% (Morrison, 2014).  
 
2.3.2 Globalisation  
 
The opening up since 1978 has increasingly incorporated neoliberal ideology. The 
opening up also ended China’s isolation from the global market and created the 
opportunity for its emergence as a world economic power. China has grabbed the 
chance to engage in the globalisation process and the term ‘globalisation’ has gained 
wide use in both popular and academic circles. The ‘long boom/golden age’ of the 
world economy in the 1950s and 1960s, was terminated by the subsequent crisis of 
accumulation which also catalysed both globalisation and the hegemonic ambitions 
of the neo-liberal project (Bernstein, 2007). 
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Globalisation involves the international expansion of market relations and the global 
pursuit of economic liberalism. It integrates an increasing proportion of the world’s 
population directly into capitalist labour market. National and regional labour 
markets are increasingly integrated by international labour mobility (Overbeek, 
2002). The decentring and de-materialisation of economic activities lead to 
‘placeless capital’ and the ‘homeless subject’ (Papastergiadis, 2000). Bernstein 
(2007:2) defines globalisation as “conventional shorthand for the current phase of 
the restructuring of capital and its conditions of accumulation; manifested in new 
forms of the international centralisation and concentration; as well as mobility (and 
‘financialisation’), of capital”. It supports and promotes the restructuring of capital 
and its modalities of accumulation. Globalisation has a central plank, namely 
deregulation, which is promoted in neo-liberal ideology as the expansion of freedom. 
For capital, deregulation means removing controls on its mobility and operations, 
including its modes of recruitment and training of labour. Capitalists made the 
simple calculation that it was more profitable to locate industries where labour was 
cheaper, political culture was most compliant, and environmental responsibilities 
were minimal. Capitalism does not define labour cost according to local needs but 
from the position of the lowest global cost. It tries to reduce its contributions to the 
social income of workers employed by particular companies and to the social 
reproduction fund generally financed through taxation and government spending on 
social provision (Silver & Arrighi, 2000). On the part of labour, deregulation means 
a loss of freedom in opportunities and terms of employment, and in claims on social 
income that supplement wages in various ways and to various degrees.  
 
Globalisation and neo-liberalism advance the freedoms of capital and suppress the 
prospects and rights of labour; they also influence the flows of migration. In western 
states the social cost of labour is increasing and environmental regulation is 
tightening. It is much cheaper to relocate production to the periphery than to recruit 
labour from the centre as well as from the periphery. Capital moves closer to the 
periphery of cheap labour. Labour not only migrates to advanced capitalist 
economies in the global north but also moves to areas where rapid industrialisation 
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occurs, such as Asia and the Arab states. The global economy becomes 
dematerialised and deterritorialised. Investment is less and less affected by the 
material cost of goods and physical distance of transportation or by local laws and 
trade union demands, as it pursues economic optimisation and risk minimisation.  
 
Against the background of global capital movements, the Chinese government 
enacted ‘export-oriented’ industrialisation as its development strategy in the 1990s. 
China had, and has, to compete for Foreign Direct Investment with other developing 
countries that also depend heavily on foreign investment to power their export 
growth strategy, hence Chinese governments, at all levels, have dedicated 
themselves to creating an attractive investment climate and providing freedom to 
repatriate profits without restriction. As a result, labour policies geared toward 
investors have become more and more entrenched in order to maintain FDI levels 
and export competitiveness. Also, although high-technology exports are increasing, 
the majority of China’s production and export of goods is still heavily concentrated 
in the most standardised, lowest value-added portions of transnational production 
chains, mainly simple assembly operations. This technological dependency and 
concentration in low unit value-added production means that China’s exporters are 
under continuous pressure to cut their unit costs and output process by any means 
necessary to ensure sufficiently high volumes. This, in turn, means that they must 
focus their ‘innovation’ efforts on short-term cost cutting (largely labour cost 
cutting), rather than “developing intellectual assets, production skills, modes of 
serving customers, or actual products that can be understood as in any way 
proprietary” (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2005:617). 
 
Moreover，the decentralisation of the economy and the devolution of authority and 
decision-making power to local government are critical characteristics of the Chinese 
reforms. Because of the central authority’s strategy of decentralisation, local 
governments have to take charge of their fiscal authority and welfare responsibility 
(Lee, 2007). The local governments are also responsible for the creation of a 
business environment that will attract foreign investment and generate high levels of 
economic growth in their quasi-autonomous regions (Wang, et al., 2009). In many 
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cases, local authorities act as agents for FIEs, and the rights and concerns of workers 
are not part of their consideration. The incentives offered by local governments, both 
political and economic, to attract investment and export markets have led to an 
overwhelming emphasis on substantial autonomy from the central government and 
flexibility at the expense of workers’ safety, health and rights (Gallagher, 2004). 
 
2.4 Privatisation  
Generally speaking, the reform and opening up process has been gradual and 
problem-solving in China. China did not experience the ‘shock therapy’, undergone 
by other previously communist states. The Chinese central government carefully 
began with the easiest reforms and on an experimental basis, then gradually 
expanded the experience to other areas based on its desire to push social 
transformation without losing power. In practice, it went “from small to large”, 
“from east to middle and west”, and from “non-SOEs to SOEs” (Kanamori & Zhao, 
2004:13). The central government has successfully avoided disorder and turbulence, 
as well as maintained social and political stability during the transition process 
(ibid.). Hence, as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were the dominant entity of 
Chinese planned economy, vested interests group, as well as the ideological and 
political environment at the beginning of reform, constrained full scale reform. The 
reform of SOEs started with small adjustments that did not affect the institutional 
foundation. Large-scale privatisation of SOEs occurred in the late 1990s, as the 
earlier attempts at reforms failed. If we turn our eyes from the struggling reform 
inside the system, we find the entity outside of the system – the private sector – 
which has developed dramatically since 1978. It has successfully turned itself from 
“being constrained or even forbidden to develop” to “being an essential constituent 
of the socialist market economy” (Yao et al., 2010:1). It creates enormous business 
opportunities and jobs, as well as economic added value. Unlike the reform of SOEs, 
it is more a bottom-up process, pushed by social forces. Certainly, the rapid 
development of the private sector has also been assisted by local states and local 
cadres, combining their own political and economic goals.   
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The privatisation process in China is bi-directional and interactive models of reforms 
include ‘from top to bottom’ – the reform of SOEs, and ‘from bottom to top’ – the 
mushrooming of the private sector (Zheng & Yang, 2009). Privatisation is a major 
step in economic transformation. Nowadays, the state sector has narrowed its 
contribution to the value of industrial output from 77.26% in 1978 to 26.2% in 2011, 
and its contribution to urban employment from 78.32% to 19.8% in 2011 (Fan et al., 
2012). As the state sector has contracted, the private sector has been continually 
expanding; in 2013, its contribution to national GDP exceeded 60%. The number of 
private enterprises increased from 90,000 in 1989 to 12.54 million in 2013, 
accounting for 80.43% of the total number of industrial enterprises. The number of 
individual businesses (ge ti hu 个体户)
13
  increased from 12.47 million to 44.36 
million during the same period (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). Not 
only has the number of private enterprises increased dramatically, but employment in 
these private enterprises has also mushroomed: in 2013, the private sector created 
219 million job opportunities (Xinhuanet, 2014).  
 
With the spread of neoliberalism in the world, the composition of ownership in 
China has experienced significant changes, shifting from pure socialist public and 
collective ownership to mixed ownership. The central government believes that 
privatisation is the most efficient way to solve the low efficiency and profit rates of 
SOEs. This notion frequently appears in the media, supported by comments from 
government officials, to defend the privatisation process: private ownership is 
presented as inherently more efficient than state ownership. The majority of SOEs 
have been sold either to their previous managers or outsiders, especially the small 
ones released in late 1994 (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2005). Other large and 
medium SOEs have been transformed into limited liability or shareholding 
companies, the state maintaining control only over the most important and largest. 
Collective enterprises, especially collective TVEs, as discussed in the previous 
section, have been also re-structured. The private sector strives for survival, unlike 
                                                 
13
 ge ti hu means ‘self-employed individuals’. It can also use ‘…the terms ‘family business’ or 
‘individual business’ to identify these units. They are unincorporated and not included in the category 
of ‘private firms’. Historically these family businesses have been limited to fewer than eight workers. 
However, in March 2011 the State Council, China’s cabinet, approved legislation eliminating limits 
on the number of workers these businesses may hire. “China’s Cabinet Approves Individual Business 
Legislation”. (Lardy & Subramanian, 2012:34) 
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SOEs which can be complacent because they are not dependent on market forces. 
However, with the rapid development of the private sector, the interest holders of the 
private economy are increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo – ‘the important 
component’ of the socialist market economy. They are pursuing more space, more 
resources and more power. Although it appears that the privatisation process is led 
by the CCP, it is, in reality, driven by the exercise of class power and the nature of 
the reform process itself (ibid.). It inevitably drives the whole economy, moving 
towards a neoliberal structure.  
 
2.5 Regional Development and Decentralisation  
2.5.1 Regional disparity  
 
In China, the coastal areas, especially the south-eastern coastal areas, have taken the 
first step towards industrialisation and marketisation, as well as incorporation into 
globalisation, achieving enormous economic growth and development compared to 
China’s interior. There are ten coastal provinces or municipalities in mainland China: 
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guandong 
and Guangxi (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 Map of Coastal Provinces in China 
 
Source: Made by Author based on online source: 
http://www.58pic.com/tupian/zhongguoditushiliangtu.html  
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In 2013, six coastal provinces or municipalities were ranked in the Top Ten of GDP 
and eight in the Top Ten of GDP per capita in China (Tables 2&3). 
 
Table 2 Top 10 provinces regarding GDP in 2013 
Rank Provinces 
GDP 
(CN¥ in 
millions) 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$ in 
millions) 
PPP GDP 
(intl.$) 
Share of 
total 
GDP 
(%) 
Real 
growth 
(%) 
 
Mainland China 58801880 9494588 16185934 100.00 7.7 
1 Guangdong 6216397 1003746 1711139 10.57 8.5 
2 Jiangsu 5916175 955269 1628499 10.06 9.6 
3 Shandong 5468433 882974 1505253 9.30 9.6 
4 Zhejiang 3756849 606609 1034118 6.39 8.2 
5 Henan 3215586 519212 885129 5.47 9.0 
6 Hebei 2830141 456976 779031 4.81 8.2 
7 Liaoning 2707765 437216 745345 4.60 8.7 
8 Sichuan 2626077 424026 722860 4.47 12.5 
9 Hubei 2466849 398316 679030 4.20 10.1 
10 Hunan 2450167 395622 674438 4.17 10.1 
Average rate: CN¥ 6.1932 per US dollar; CN¥ 3.6329 per Intl. Dollar based on PPP (IMF WEO Data 
Oct.2014)
14
 (PPP: abbreviation of purchasing power parity) 
Source： China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
                                                 
14
 World Economic Outlook Database, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx 
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Table 3 Top 10 provinces regarding per capita GDP in 2013 
Rank Provinces 
Per Capita GDP(CN¥) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Tianjin 62574 72994 85213 93173 99607 
2 Shanghai 69164 76074 82560 85373 90092 
3 Beijing 66940 73856 81658 87475 93213 
4 Jiangsu 44253 52840 62290 68347 74607 
5 Zhejiang 43842 51711 59249 63374 68462 
6 Nei Mongol 39735 47347 57974 63886 67498 
7 Guangdong 39436 44736 50807 54095 58540 
8 Liaoning 35149 42355 50760 56649 61685.9 
9 Fujian 33437 40025 47377 52763 57856 
10 Shandong 35894 41106 47335 51768 56322.6 
 
Mainland China 25608 30015 35198 38459 41908 
Source： China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
When discussing the economic miracle of China’s development, two economic 
zones always rise to the top of conversations – the Pearl River Delta15 (PRD) and the 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD).16  
 
Since 1978, these two areas have experienced dramatic economic growth as they 
were at the frontier of reform and development. The PRD and YRD created RMB 
9776 billion and RMB 5306 billion in 2013, 17.2% and 9.33% of the total GDP 
respectively. Meanwhile, the GDP per capita of these two areas were more than 
twice the national average (YRD was slightly higher than PRD). However, even 
though they have created similar economic growth, they have not gone down the 
                                                 
15
 The Pearl River Delta is the area surrounding the estuary of the Pearl River in Guangdong Province. 
It refers to a network of cities, which include Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, Zhongshan, 
Zhuhai, Jiangmen, and parts of Huizhou and Zhaoqing.  
16
 The Yangtze River Delta economic zone refers to 16 cities in Shanghai, southern Jiangsu, and 
eastern and northern Zhejiang Provinces. They are Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, 
Yangzhou, Zhenjiang, Nantong, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan and 
Taizhou. 
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same developmental paths. Numerous pieces of research have tried to summarise the 
characters of the development models in PRD and YRD, explain the influential 
factors that guided these two areas onto different paths. The PRD was a central 
platform in China’s experiment with the market economy and integration with the 
world economy (Swee-Hock & Wong, 2009, p3). Its rise was primarily based on 
export-led development: geographic advantages, supporting policies from central 
government, and the export-orientated foreign investment from Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan combined with millions of cheap young migrant labourers to jointly fuel 
its economic development. Meanwhile, the economic development of the YRD post-
1978 was mainly an endogenous growth. However, compared with the PRD, 
heterogeneity within the YRD is much higher. Shanghai Municipality, as the 
location of the East China Military and Political Committee, East China District and 
East China Bureau of the Communist Party of China and the central government 
since 1949, controlled the whole area of the Yangtze River Delta. Shanghai’s 
importance means it is deeply involved in both the self-sufficient economy and the 
planned economy system. During the Mao period, over 90% of industries were state-
owned. Hence, as reform began, the state still dominated the ownership structure 
which made Shanghai follow a ‘conservative’ path. The reform and development of 
Shanghai came about through a top to bottom system. However, at the same time, 
township enterprises and private companies rose as a new force and became a major 
promoter of economic growth in Zhejiang and Jiangsu.  
 
The rapid development of coastal areas, as well as the increasing regional inequality 
in China, is linked to the role of local government in economic development. The 
active and vigorous local governments have attracted much attention from those 
analysing the Chinese socio-economic transformation. The positive role of local 
government in creating business and job opportunities, and an investment-friendly 
environment is impressive, inspiring other countries seeking their own development 
solutions to base them on the Chinese experience. On the other hand, the corruption, 
collusion between local cadres and business people, rent-seeking, environmental 
pollution, increasing disparity between the rich and the poor and other problems that 
distort the development process. However, no matter how uncertain the outcomes of 
local governments’ participation in economic promoting are, it is undeniable that 
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local governments in China have played an irreplaceable role in the socio-economic 
transformation process.  
 
2.5.2 Decentralisation  
 
Over 30 years of reform and opening-up, Chinese local governments, at provincial, 
prefecture, district and county, and township levels, have pursued every possible 
source and tried every possible way to attract investment and push local development. 
The usual reason given for this is that financial incentives and political incentives are 
the main reasons that motivate local governors to dedicate themselves to increase 
local economic growth.  
 
So far, the most influential theory that explains the Chinese economic growth 
miracle from a government system perspective is the hypothesis of ‘Federalism, 
Chinese Style’ (Montinola et al., 1995; Qian & Weingast, 1997) which points out 
that there are two fundamental reasons driving the effective incentives of local 
governments. The first is administrative decentralisation: the central government has 
delegated economic and administrative power to local governments since the 1980s, 
and this led to an increase in local governments’ autonomous rights of economic 
decision-making. The second is fiscal decentralisation based on fiscal contract 
responsibility system reform: the central government delegated financial powers to 
local governments, which meant that the local governments started to share fiscal 
revenue with the central government. The higher the fiscal revenue, the more could 
be retained by local governments, including 100% of extra-budgetary revenue. These 
two mechanisms have motivated local governments to preserve markets and develop 
the economy. Hence, ‘Federalism Chinese style’ is also known as Market-Preserving 
Federalism. From a political incentive perspective, it has three names: Zhou (2005, 
2007) sees it as political tournaments, Zhang (2005) calls it competition for 
economic growth while Xu (2005, 2007&2008) expresses it as the market of 
economic growth (Wang, Xu & Li, 2009). 
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Through administrative decentralisation, local governments gain more administrative 
power from central government. They obtain economic decision-making power and 
financial power, which consequently builds up their internal motivation to develop 
the local economy. In 1978, China started to reform the planned economy system of 
high centralisation. Administration devolution, administrative decentralisation and 
delegating the benefits were on the agenda and local governments began to act as 
interventionist states. The administrative decentralisation profoundly impacted 
property rights in China, leading to the situation of property rights localisation 
(Zheng & Wu, 1995). Property rights localisation is formed through the intervention 
procedure in local economy by local governments, which in turn binds local 
governments tightly to local economic growth (Li, 2008). 
 
2.5.3 Fiscal Reform and Political Incentives 
 
In the fiscal decentralisation aspect, central government has made different reforms 
and improvements in various periods since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (Table 4).  
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Table 4 China’s Fiscal System since 1950 
Year Fiscal System 
Tongshou 
tongzhi  
(total 
centrali-
sation 统
收统支) 
1950 Tongshou tongzhi (total centralisation) 
1: All local revenues turned over to the centre 
2: All local expenditures disbursed by the centre 
3: Lack of correspondence between revenue and 
expenditure 
1951-1957 Tongyi lingdao, fenji guanli, shouru fenlei fencheng 
(multilevel management, revenue-sharing by category 
and fixed rate) 
1: Three levels of budgetary administration 
2: Revenue sharing 
1958 Decentralized programme 
1: New revenue sources for localities 
2: Normal expenditure and extraordinary expenditure 
3: Fixed five-year sharing rates 
1959-1967 Dingshou dingzhi, shouzhi guagou, zonge fencheng, 
yinian yibian (sharing total amount at annually adjusted 
rate) 
1: Revenue sharing 
2: Annual Adjustment 
3: Interregional transfer 
1968-1976 Cultural revolution and fiscal turbulence 
1: 1968: Total centralisation(the 1950 model) 
2: 1969-1970:Modification of the 1969-67model 
3: 1971-1973: Fixing revenue and expenditure, 
contracting surplus and deficits, annual adjustment 
4: 1974-1975:Fixed revenue retention rate, sharing 
above plan surplus, contracting expenditure 
5: 1976: Modification of the 1959-67model 
1977-1979 Fiscal experiments 
1: The Jiangsu and Sichuan models 
2: The Guangdong and Fujian experiments 
3: Experiments with different revenue-sharing schemes 
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Fenzao 
chifan 
(serving 
meals to 
different 
diners 
from 
different 
pots 分灶
吃饭) 
1980-1985 
Huafen shouzhi Fenji baogan (dividing revenues and 
expenditures, multilevel contracting) 
1: Fenzao chifan (eating in separate kitchens) 
2: Fixed five-year revenue-sharing rates 
3: Fiscal decentralisation: Five central-provincial fiscal 
systems 
1985-1988 
Huafen shuizhong, heding shouzhi, fenji baogan 
(dividing tax categories, checking revenues and 
expenditures, multilevel contracting) 
1: Three types of revenues: central fixed, local fixed, 
and shared 
2: Specific revenue sharing 
3: Three central-provincial fiscal systems 
1988-1993 
Five central-provincial fiscal systems 
1: Basic sharing 
2: Basic sharing with growth adjustment 
3: Fixed quote delivery(fixed-sum transfer) 
4: Fixed quote with growth adjustment 
5: Fixed central subsidies 
Fenshui 
zhi (tax 
assignme
nt system 
分税制) 
1994-present 
Fenshui zhi (tax assignment system) 
1: Central taxes 
2: Local taxes 
3: Shared taxes 
Source: Wei, 2000. Fiscal Systems, Investment and Regions. In: Regional Development in 
China:States, Globalisation and Inequality. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 48-51. 
 
As shown in Table 4, in a change from the previous unitary system in which the 
central government had absolute control over revenue collection and budget 
appropriation (Lin & Liu, 2000), during the reform and opening-up period, “serving 
meals to different diners from different pots” (分灶吃饭 namely, the fiscal system of 
dividing revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments and 
holding each responsible for balancing their budgets) and the fiscal contract 
responsibility system were the norm from 1980 to 1993. Responsibilities for budget 
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allocations were clearly divided between the central government and local 
governments. Local governments undertook to remit a fixed tax amount to the 
central government, hence the central government did not interfere with revenue 
increasing and expenditure decreasing actions by local governments, thus enhancing 
the sustainable and stable power of local governments to distribute production 
resources and manage local enterprises. The fiscal contract responsibility system 
linked local economic development with local governments’ fiscal revenues and 
encouraged local governments to play a role in speeding up economic growth to 
increase fiscal revenue. It also stimulated the local enterprises developed by local 
communities sharing an interest with local governments and local enterprises. 
Among the Central-Local-Enterprise tripartite relationship, the central government 
regularly gave up the direct administration of companies but turned to a mandatory 
of the operation of local governments and enterprises. Looking to strengthen their 
links to local development, local governments started to link closely with local firms 
(Liu, Zhou & Shao 2012).  
 
The fiscal contract responsibility system made a great contribution to China’s 
economic growth, but it also brought serious problems for central government’s 
fiscal revenue. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, the central government was 
in serious fiscal crisis. With the sharp decrease of the ratio between fiscal revenue 
and GDP, as well as the ratio between central government and total fiscal revenue, 
central government was facing an unprecedented situation of ‘weak central’. Lack of 
central fiscal revenue resulted in the underdevelopment of national defence and 
infrastructure construction. During the rapid economic growth of 1980 to 1990, 
although the average annual GDP growth rate was 9.5%, the fiscal revenue did not 
increase. According to the Ministry of Finance, the ratio of central government fiscal 
revenue to GDP fell from 31% in 1978 to 14% in 1992. This sharp decline 
undermined the ability of central government to exert macroeconomic regulation and 
control (Liaowang, 2008). Therefore, in 1993, central government reformed the tax 
and fiscal systems, adjusted tax categories, and redistributed and reallocated 
financial and administration power: 
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 Based on the arrangement of expenditure duty of central and local 
government, fiscal revenue is allocated to the categories of tax. The 
categories of tax include central tax, local tax and shared tax. The most 
important central taxes are value added tax and consumption tax, while the 
most important local taxes are business tax and local income tax. 
 Tax refund and transfer payment system. 
 Establishment of national and local tax bureau for separate taxation. 
 
The fiscal system reform helped central government to reclaim the fiscal power from 
local governments. However, the interest in economic development and subjective 
consciousness of local governments increased rather than decreased because of the 
added pressure on local fiscal expenditure and led to behaviour modifications by 
local governments as described below. 
 
The value added tax created by enterprises is shared by central and local 
governments, and is directly collected by national tax bureaus. National tax bureaus 
are vertically managed and not linked with local governments. The central 
government takes 75% of the value added tax while local government receives 25%. 
All the preferential policies made by local governments to protect and promote local 
enterprises therefore lose efficiency in the eyes of local governments and so the 
enthusiasm to develop local industrial enterprises, one of the driving factors for the 
transformation of Town Owned Enterprises, is diminished (Liu, Zhou & Shao, 
2012:69). The local governments then turn to business tax and off-budget revenue.
17
 
The main source of business tax is the construction industry while off-budget 
revenue is mainly composed of land sales income – the reason local governments 
pay so much attention to land development. Land sales income has become the 
primary source of local revenue. Local governments acquire agricultural land from 
peasants, paying low levels of compensation based on crop prices. Then, utilizing the 
land as capital, local governments make efforts to attract investment, raise funds, and 
develop commercial housing, etc, which brings in large amounts of revenue. It is 
land-urbanisation without industrialisation and population urbanisation as 
                                                 
17
 The off-budget revenue refers to revenue which is excluded from government's revenue. In China, 
the off-budget revenue is composed of social welfare income and road maintenance fees. 
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preconditions. Easily achieved with only a small budget, it allows local governors to 
gain political success but forces a large population of migrant workers and their 
families to live in the city as outsiders because they do not officially have urban 
residency. Even though migrant workers dedicate their productive labour to 
construct cities, they are denied the social welfare tied to the hukou or household 
registration system.  
 
Overall, fiscal decentralisation is still the mainstream of central fiscal policy, even 
though since 1993 the central government has taken back fiscal power to some 
extent by reforming the tax-sharing system. Since the tax reform, the expenditures of 
local governments have been influenced by central government to a certain degree 
because of tax refunds and transfer payments. However, local governments have 
gained more administrative power and have developed an interest consciousness 
similar to that of businesses that encourages them to protect local interests and argue 
with the central government. Because social welfare and social reproduction are run 
by local governments, they tend to escape the responsibility of taking care of migrant 
workers who lack local hukou and therefore have difficulty in accessing social 
insurance, relevant public services and social welfare for migrant workers, such as 
housing, medical care and education. They are insecure. After spending their most 
productive years in cities, migrant workers have to return to their home towns for 
social reproduction. The local governments of their original home areas are normally 
less developed than the destination provinces and, lacking any production process, 
cannot afford the costs of social welfare, putting the social reproduction process at 
risk.  
 
Not only fiscal, but political incentives also play a significant role in local economy 
development. During the reform and opening-up period, the central government set 
‘economic development’ as its first goal to enhance its political legitimacy. As the 
total economic increase is composed of economic increases of different regions, the 
central government has demands on local economic development. Thus central 
government demands economic growth and local governments supply it. Thus, there 
is only one ‘demander’ and many providers in this market, which leads to intense 
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competition – tournament competition. The precondition of this tournament 
competition is political and personnel centralisation. Cadre promotion opportunities 
are a strong ‘cardio-tonic’, which motivate local governors to take part in the 
tournament competition.
18
 The competition is guided and pushed by superior 
governments, up to and including central government, thus combining personnel 
centralisation and political incentive. It does not rely on the revolution of the 
political regime. However, on the other hand, the competition has caused a series of 
distorted impacts, which obstruct the transformation of government functions and 
development strategies. To a great extent, the deficiencies of promotion tournament 
competition, the especially serious conflict between the goal of political incentives 
and the rational design of governmental functions, results in significant problems for 
current economic development. Local governments play not only the role of referees 
but also athletes in the economic growth competition game and this dual identity of 
local governments causes the failure of establishment of market order (Zhou, 2007).  
 
Local governments only focus on economic development while ignoring public 
services and social welfare improvements. Those who are concerned about these 
public welfare issues have no power of appointment or removal of governors. Not 
limited by environmental pollution and consumption of energies, the comparative 
advantage and processing cost advantage are based on the unreasonable pricing of 
factors of production. Local governments lower land prices to attract more foreign 
investment, capital costs are twisted by low-interest rates and policy-based lending, 
the connivance of local governments ignores environmental costs, and labour costs 
are depressed by the ‘race to bottom’ and the hukou system (Zhou, 2007). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Generally speaking, China has moved from a socialist central planned economy to a 
socialist market economy over the past three decades. Through the liberalisation, 
                                                 
18
 The promotion process is controlled by upper level government. One of the most important indexes 
for promotion is economic development. Therefore if cadres want to get promotion, they need to 
compete with each other for the limited positions available. 
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decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation processes, China is now deeply 
integrated into the neo-liberal order. In the foreseeable future, these processes will 
continue to move on. Both the social and economic atmospheres have experienced 
dramatic transformations. Although China’s economic growth has encouraged other 
developing countries, it has not come without a price. China may have rapid 
economic development, but it also has many problems. Globally, the meeting of 
China’s reform and opening up and neo-liberal policies has forcefully expanded the 
influences of neo-liberalism in the world. China’s incredible wage labour advantages 
and investment-friendly environment allows it to successfully compete with other 
low-cost locations. It draws other developing countries to participate in a brutal price 
competition which further depresses the average wages of manufacturing workers in 
the world. Domestically, over-dependence on foreign investment and exports make 
the economic structure unstable and unsafe, causing China to be vulnerable to 
external economic changes in the global market and financial crises. Since 2008, the 
global economic recession has severely impacted the manufacturing industry, 
leading to labour protests related to the closure and relocation of factories. The 
uneven and unfair distribution of the economic growth outcomes creates gross 
income inequality and the flawed social re-distribution system further harms 
vulnerable social groups while the rigid and hysteretic authoritarian institutions are 
unable to resolve the accumulating social contradictions. China’s workforce is forced 
to go through the proletarianisation process by the breaking of the ‘iron rice bowl’, 
evisceration of social protection, creation of a flexible labour market, avoidance of 
responsibility for the social reproduction process and the privatisation of assets 
formerly held in common (Harvey, 2005). Thus, these unresolved social problems 
have led to a wave of social protest and social movement.  
 
Of the rounds of social protest, the most impressive are those of the peasants and 
migrant workers, who sometimes combine their actions. Migrant workers, previously 
peasants, hold a rural residence identity, working in the non-agricultural sector as 
waged-labourers. This workforce group has made a significant contribution to 
China’s economic growth, as the primary supply of low-cost labour. Normally, the 
voice of migrant workers is non-existent in the grand narrative, official propaganda 
and public media. They are simplified to numbers in the statistical data, 
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unidentifiable faces in social news, or dehumanized objects of public policies. 
However, as the socio-economic transformation process deepens, there is emerging 
evidence that migrant workers are contributing to this process. Migrant workers are 
not only a factor of production, but also agents of socio-economic changes. In reality, 
they are actively participating in shaping and reshaping the socio-economic 
transformation. Firstly, their migration from rural area to urban areas itself is an 
active attempt to struggle with the rigid urban and rural dual-track system. Even as 
they confront capitalist repressions in the workplace and within their living spaces in 
cities from the local administration, they have penetrated every aspect of social life 
through their everyday activities. On the social side, faced with the pressure of their 
daily struggles, government control of rural-urban mobility has gradually been 
loosened. Secondly, even in the early mid-1980s and 1990s, migrant workers were 
not passive and obedient. On the labour regulation side, migrant workers’ resistance 
to exploitation in the production process has forced the local state and capitalists to 
improve working conditions and enforce the minimum labour standards stipulated in 
China’s first labour law of 1995. There is clear evidence that, since the beginning of 
this century, migrant workers have shown a new tendency, moving from defensive 
protests targeting government officials, to strikes aimed directly at employers, 
reflecting the emergence of class consciousness as expressed through collective 
strike action (Pringle, 2015:198). The struggle of migrant workers has become more 
than just short-lived, place-of-origin loyalties and wild-cat strikes and protests. The 
individual interests of migrant workers are more and more gathered and aggregated 
into class-oriented collective interests and their economic requirements progressively 
go beyond the minimum standards. Political interests are also gradually surfacing. 
Additionally, the imperceptible experiences of migrant workers in daily life also 
cause them to exert pressure on the existing regime controlled by the state and 
capital. 
 
In the next chapter, I trace the making of migrant workers in China. The dynamic 
reactions between the state, capitalists and migrant workers have shaped and 
reshaped the making of migrant workers. It shows that the energy of mobility of 
migrant workers has pushed the state and capital to upgrade their control regime. 
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Chapter 3: The Making of Migrant Workers in China Since 
1978 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Chinese society has undergone a dramatic 
transformation since 1978, which has affected the social, political, economic, and 
cultural environments. The state sector workforce, previously beneficiaries of the 
centrally planned economy, have gradually lost their advantages, and become the 
sacrificial lamb of privatisation. The entrepreneurs, or capitalists, are not only 
accumulating wealth but also gaining rising political status and powers. Peasants 
have been released from collective production teams and are no longer bonded to 
their farm lands. They are categorised as ‘rural surplus labour’ by economists and the 
media, as a consequence of production being redistributed to more economically 
advantageous places. From the top-down perspective, we can see the huge influences 
of the state on different social groups. However, on the ground, the daily praxis of 
various social groups is contending with and undercutting the range of existing 
institutions, continually reshaping the socio-political framework of China.  
 
A rise in the number of rural-urban migrants has accompanied the reform and 
opening up, leading to a relaxation of controls over the socio-economic and political 
spheres. Millions of people have left from their home towns to seek new 
employment opportunities. Some journalists have even contended that this wave of 
human movement in China is the largest the world has ever seen (Xiaokang, 2007). 
Initially, foreign investment enterprises and collective town and village owned 
enterprises absorbed the floating population from rural areas and embedded them 
within the manufacturing plants. Utilising this plentiful supply of low-cost young 
migrant workers (nongmingong 农民工 ), China has transformed itself into the 
‘world’s factory’, especially for light manufacturing products. Migrants subsequently 
entered into the so-called ‘secondary labour market’ in urban areas, taking informal, 
poorly paid, high turnover, high-exploitative, and dead-end industrial jobs. It is 
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extremely difficult for migrant workers to achieve meaningful improvements in 
skills, education, health and political and cultural participation (Hong, 2011). 
Moreover, the restrictions and unfair treatment are not limited to economic life, but 
affect all areas of their lives. They are ineligible for the rights and benefits that urban 
residents receive, for example, the right to education for their children, medical care, 
welfare benefits, pensions, and even the right to rent or buy flats in cities. Despite the 
significant contributions that migrants have made to the rapid economic development, 
they are still seen and treated by the state as ‘second class citizens’. The hukou 
(residence registration) system has successfully divided Chinese society into two 
parts: rural and urban and this is the primary reason for the disadvantaged 
institutional and social positions of migrant workers (Fan, 2008). Through the hukou 
system, the state controls the moving of people (see Section 3.2) and shapes the 
spatial separation of production and reproduction of rural labour.  
 
This relentless exploitation has caused some unrest in the Chinese migrant worker 
sector, previously considered obedient and passive. Labour shortages in the Pearl 
River Delta, a series of strikes, and the rapid growth of labour disputes via legal 
systems, show the pervasiveness and intensification of this unrest. Migrant workers’ 
problems have attracted attention from both the Chinese central government and the 
general public because these problems have the potential to undermine state stability, 
economic development and social welfare. With the suicides of young workers at 
Foxconn
19
 and the wave of strikes in China led by migrant workers in their early 
twenties, young migrant workers suddenly came to the fore. Unlike their fathers’ 
generation, today’s young migrant workers have been exposed to urban lifestyles and 
values, and have higher expectations. However, the harsh reality is that they have 
limited opportunities to realise those desires in the face of urbanisation. Meanwhile, 
rural society has gradually disintegrated, severely limiting opportunities and spaces 
for young migrant workers to settle down. In short, they are facing disembeddedness 
from both rural and urban society (Huang, 2014). Young migrants are trapped by 
capitalist production system, which controls their life but does not allow them to 
                                                 
19
 Foxconn is a Taiwan company belonging to Hon Hai / Foxconn Technology Group, which is 
founded in 1974 with US$7,500, producing mechanical and electrical parts. It is a contract 
manufactured, includes Apple, Blueberry, etc. 
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settle. Hence, they have to develop new strategies and tactics, different from those of 
their fathers, to gain living spaces and protect all their rights, not just labour rights.  
 
This chapter begins by reviewing the migrant workers’ pathway since 1978 and the 
exploitation of the general patterns of migrant workers in contemporary China. It 
examines the changing characteristics of migration to reveal the differences between 
the older generation and the young generation migrant workers. Finally, as labour 
dispute cases and strikes have become more frequent in recent years, this chapter 
analyses the trend in changes of the labour disputes cases, both individual and 
collective, as well as giving a general picture of the strikes and protests.   
 
3.2 Migrant workers (nongmingong) in China 
 
3.2.1 A brief review of migrant workers in China 
 
The development of migrant workers as a ‘class’ is closely related to the ‘reform and 
open-door policy’ launched by the central government and their existence is 
inseparable from the hukou system. During the early 1950s, mobility into and out of 
the urban areas was relatively unrestricted. By the mid-1950s, however, the 
establishment of the hukou system segregated rural from urban areas and imposed 
strict controls on migration across regions, leading to a deep rural-urban division. 
Through the hukou system, the Chinese government has successfully created an 
institutional exclusion, which treats registered people differently “according to the 
different categories and locations of their registration…those registered are restricted 
in their migration between regions” (Wang, 2005:22). From birth, every Chinese is 
given a socio-political status and identity associated with the geographical location 
of their birth. The system was initially designed to aid in forward planning of future 
needs for industrial and agricultural labourers as well as for the provision of goods 
and services. It is utilised by modern intellectual and political elites as an efficient 
tool to transform the rural population into a culturally distinct and alien ‘other’, 
which facilitates the liberation process of the new socialist society (Cohen, 1993). 
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The utilisation of the hukou system in the reform era has contributed greatly to 
economic growth and socio-political stability. As a cornerstone of the CCP’s one-
party authoritarian political system, it functions admirably as a means of social 
control and the institutional exclusion of the rural population guarantees the 
maximum exploitation of this massive pool of unskilled and surplus rural labour. 
 
The origin of the hukou system can be traced back thousands of years to Imperial 
China when it was based on community-oriented, regionally-based organisations of 
families and clans and used mostly for the purposes of taxation, farmland allocation 
and social control. This system also existed in many other traditional societies, as 
common mechanisms of ranked kinship and feudal classes (Fan, 2008; Wang, 2005; 
Solinger, 1999). The PRC’s hukou system inherited both the operational 
characteristics and mechanisms and the legal framework and stipulations of the 
imperial system. The CCP wanted to follow a development strategy of ‘direct 
industrialisation’, i.e. putting the majority of state investment into heavy industry 
production and were aware that this would lead to severe shortages in the supply of 
consumption goods, services, amenities and housing in urban areas. Hence, the 
number of urban residents needed to be strictly controlled. The establishment of the 
hukou system during the 1950s was inseparable from the central planned economy 
and the political system of the CCP. In August 1950, the central government issued 
the first national regulation relating to the system, ‘Provisional Regulation on the 
Management of Special People’ (Wang, 2005:44) and in 1955, the State Council 
issued the formal legal basis and ordered local governments to establish a permanent 
hukou system. In 1958, the National People’s Congress passed the ‘Regulations on 
Household Registration in the People’s Republic of China’, which made the hukou 
system law nationwide. Henceforth, “residence status became an ascribed, inherited 
one, determining an individual’s entire livelihood and welfare simply on the basis of 
where the registration was located” (Solinger, 1999:36). 
 
The advent of reform and opening up seemed to create an obvious opportunity to 
abolish the hukou system. The rural household responsibility system had 
significantly increased productivity and so when the people’s communes were 
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dissolved and farmers released from the land – allowing the rural population to 
regain the power to control their own labour, rural families made the decision to set 
off for towns and cities, to make a living. Economic reform policies encouraged rural 
labourers to leave rural areas and enter the non-agricultural sector, especially on the 
coast and in large cities. However, unlike the rapid economic system reform, the 
reform of social exclusion institutions lagged behind. Although the hukou system 
was deeply affected by the socio-economic transformation, it has continued to 
survive in the reform era, reflecting the deep legitimacy and resilience of the system 
and the CCP’s fear of losing the power of social control. It is also a very cheap way 
for the state and new emerging capitalists in China to make use of the massive labour 
reserve army, the peasants, and to retain them as urban noncitizens (Solinger, 1999).  
 
Initially, the central and local governments refused to loosen their control of the rural 
population’s mobility. As the centrally planned economy had not been totally 
abolished, the governments believed that if the urban population growth rate 
outstripped the speed of urbanisation, it would have a negative effect on economic 
development and socio-political stability. Hence, the rural population were only 
permitted to enter cities temporarily and the state was not obliged to provide any 
welfare for them. In 1981, the State Council issued a document to prevent the 
peasants moving into cities (Zhang, 2001). However, the official ban did not do 
much to curb the re-emerging migration. The central committee of the CCP issued 
two important rulings, the ‘State Council Notification on the Question of Peasants 
Entering Towns’ in 1984 and ‘Provisional Regulations on the Management of the 
Population Living Temporarily in the Cites’ in 1985, with the effect that peasant 
workers who wanted to work, enter into business or engage in service trades were 
allowed to reside in urban areas if they could make arrangements for their own food 
supply. Thus, the 30-year-old employment management system restricting rural-
urban migration was ended. It was the first time that Chinese farmers had the right to 
do business outside their home towns. However, the urban local governments still 
refused to take on the duty of accepting these ‘outsiders’ and so rural labourers were 
encouraged to work in nearby small towns where emerging TVEs were in need of 
labour. Meanwhile, market exchange gradually replaced central economic planning, 
and the de-collectivisation of agriculture was completed. The rural economy took off 
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because the township and village enterprises (TVEs) grew rapidly: between 1983 
and 1988, 63 million peasant workers work for TVEs (Han, 2007:195). The migrant 
workers were described as ‘deserting the land but not leaving their home villages’ in 
that period. Meanwhile, in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) rural factories, 
typically funded by investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan, preferred to hire less 
expensive migrant labours from the interior (Andreas, 2008) and the number of 
egress migrant workers increased rapidly from less than 2 million at the beginning of 
‘reform and open-door’ to 30 million in 1989 (Han, 2007). 
 
From 1988 to 1990, the Chinese government adopted various economic measures to 
control the inflation induced by the overheated economy. As a result, many 
construction projects were suspended or abandoned, and economic growth slowed 
significantly. To protect urban workers, many rural migrants were fired, which led to 
a reverse flow of urban to rural migration and the capacity of TVEs to absorb 
workers also declined: the numbers of rural migrants fell dramatically. However, the 
decline did not last long – by 1990-1991, the number of rural migrants had again 
reached those of 1988, and some areas even exceeded their previous levels (Wang & 
Cai, 2008).  
 
The influx of foreign capital into coastal areas, as well as the mushrooming TVEs 
and private sectors created an urgent need for low-cost, docile, disposable rural 
migrant workers. The movement of rural populations, combined with the mechanism 
of the market, could not be prevented or stopped by urban officialdom. Millions of 
migrants moved inter-provincially, with or without official permission and this 
strong forward momentum forced the government to confront the failings of its 
control plan. In 1992, Chinese economic reforms began to deepen and address global 
integration. The CCP strongly encouraged the growth of the private capitalist sector 
and ‘zone fever’ developed nationwide as the preferential regional policies for FDI 
(foreign directed investment) and trade were expanded more widely (Gallagher, 
2004). Wholly foreign-owned and joint ventures enterprises all grew rapidly, 
creating a dramatic increase in the demand for migrant workers. Growing income 
inequalities, the lack of employment opportunity, the reform of the urban hukou 
 77 
 
system and the demise of the system of resource allocation and subsidisation to 
urbanites brought about by market forces and the reform of SOEs combined to lead 
to large-scale migration. In 1993, there were 62 million migrant workers, an increase 
of 32 million from 1989. Market reforms had also accelerated since China joined the 
WTO in 2001, subjecting Chinese enterprises to international competition: firms 
were under increasing pressure to reduce labour costs (Andreas, 2008) so companies, 
especially labour-intensive enterprises, preferred to use cheap migrant workers.  
 
According to Pun, Chan and Chan (2010:136-137), the state promoted massive rural-
urban labour migration, thus turning rural bodies into industrial waged labour. This 
process should be analysed on two levels, the structural and the individual/familial. 
On the structural level, the central government’s segregation policies as shaped by 
the national development strategies, caused a deep rural-urban divide. To facilitate 
rapid urban economic growth and meet increasing demand for low-cost workers, 
rural authorities carried out the central government’s direction by exploring inter-
provincial labour cooperation and coordination programme initiatives (Pun, 2007): 
these strong state initiatives support the labour needs of emerging industries and 
facilitate labour supply flow to the manufacturing sites (Solinger 1999). On the 
individual/familial level the low prices of agricultural products and limited education 
and village employment opportunities mean that young rural men and women tend to 
move to cities to find more development chances. Some rural women want to escape 
arranged marriages, familial conflicts and patriarchal oppression, others to widen 
their horizons and experience modern life and cosmopolitan consumption styles in 
the cities. Thus, personal decisions in out-migration, shaped by the state-led pro-city 
development, strategy, support the goal of the state in channeling labour from rural 
areas to coastal industrial zones. The official categorisation of migrant workers, 
however, means that their social status and class identities are ambiguous. Chinese 
governments encourage them to migrate for work but refuses to grant them the right 
to permanent urban residence, and the maintenance of this distinction between 
permanent and temporary residents through the hukou system enables local 
governments to avoid the costs of social reproduction of migrant workers. 
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The hukou system has clearly undergone significant changes and adaptations, in 
response to market-oriented economic development, decentralisation of political 
authority and fiscal income, and importantly, the strong pressures of resistance by 
the rural population (Wang, 2005). In the 1990s, the central government encouraged 
local governments to provide services necessary to support the flow of migration; it 
also gave local governments increasing autonomy in local hukou management. Local 
governments turned from simply pushing migrant workers out to guiding the flow, 
composing ‘legitimate channels’ for movement and bringing migrants under official 
management.  
 
By adjusting its control strategy over time, the state avoided losing the highly 
valuable political usefulness of hukou-based institutional exclusion and social 
control (Wang, 2005:52). However, the adaptations and changes that have taken 
place have done little to improve the living conditions of, or eliminate the 
discrimination against, migrant workers. The social control is only adjusted when 
facing unavoidable pressure and resistance. Hence, the visible adjustments of the 
hukou system, such as the emergence and extinction of temporary residence permits 
and the ‘blue seal’ hukou20 from the 1990s to the 2010s (mainly present in south-
eastern coastal provinces, and aimed at stimulating the housing market), the 
implementation of the points-based system
21
 (initially in Guangdong Province, and 
later in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai), and the Ministry of Public 
Security’s(Beijing Wanbao， 2005) call to eliminate the classification division 
                                                 
20
 The Blue Seal Hukou, used by several cities, got its name because the official seal validating this 
type of registration uses blue ink as opposed to the usual red. It allows the holder the same rights and 
status as local hukou holders, with the possibility of becoming a permanent local hukou holder after 
five years of qualified residency (especially those changing from agricultural hukou to non-
agricultural hukou). The criteria to obtain such a transitional hukou are, largely, wealth and education 
or skills. Self-sponsored applicants must be wealthy and capable of investing, whereas sponsored 
applicants must have an advanced education and skills that are in great demand or a record of high 
achievement (Luo, 2012:129), similar to international immigration policy. This particular type of 
hukou was finally abolished in 2014. 
21
 The points-based system allows migrant workers to get an urban hukou once they have earned 
sufficient points. It is based on ‘qualification’ and ‘quota’. Eligibility is assessed using a number of 
variables under multi-tiered categories. As local governments have autonomy to issue hukous, the 
criteria vary from place to place. However, quality attributes, such as educational attainment, 
professional qualifications and skills rank highly, as do property ownership, years of residence, 
participation in social security, investment and taxes paid. Differing from the ‘blue seal’ hukou, it is 
an evolved exclusionary strategy for inclusion of a selected few. The majority of migrant workers do 
not qualify (see Li, 2013). 
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between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou, occurs only when the hukou system 
is facing unavoidable resistance and pressure from the excluded and the rapid 
changing socio-economic environment. Firstly, the deepening of economic reform 
and development, combined with the spread of neo-liberalisation, created a strong 
combination of migrant workers and market economy and the marketisation process 
has proved irreversible and unstoppable. Additionally, the export-oriented strategy 
for development which made China the ‘world’s factory’, with its competitive 
advantage of low-cost labour also brought with it the requirements of the flexible 
and ‘free’ waged labour who constantly push the state to adjust the hukou system. 
Secondly, the one-child policy led to low birth rates. This, coupled with the ageing 
population (Golley & Tyers, 2006; Banister et al., 2010), means that the previously 
‘inexhaustible’ supply of migrant workers is actually in danger of being exhausted. 
China is now facing a scenario of structural labour shortages (Carrillo, 2012): data 
collected by NBS shows that the annual growth rate of migrant workers is declining. 
Thirdly, the young generation migrant workers, the main body of migrant workers, 
unlike their parents’ generation, are less tolerant of abuse and injustice, and readier 
to defend their interests. Moreover, the shift from a farming lifestyle to a waged 
labour lifestyle creates the pre-condition for the rise of class consciousness.  
 
Although the hukou system excludes migrant workers from official entitlement to 
‘citizenship’, they act as citizens in metropolises, cities and towns, constantly 
reshaping the institutional framework through their daily activities. They contribute 
to breaking the state’s exclusive system and creating a smoother way for both 
themselves and those who follow them. It is highly unlikely that, in the foreseeable 
future, the state and capitalists will give up this efficient social control tool that is 
migrant workers’ mobility. Meanwhile, the migrant workers will not stop moving: 
their non-stop daily activities are their most powerful weapon to force the state to 
face the failure of the reforms of, and adjustments to, the hukou system.  
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3.2.2 Characteristics of Migrant Workers 
 
Although the numbers and patterns of migrant workers are changing along with the 
development of the economy and transformation of society, they have been invisible 
and voiceless in public for a long time. They were considered as an amorphous flow 
of undifferentiated labourers without histories or personalities. Worse still, they were 
treated as a potential source of unrest (Selden & Perry, 2010). Therefore, it is 
difficult to obtain accurate data and information about migrants before the 1990s. 
Additionally, the concepts of migration, floating population, peasant workers and 
migrant workers are often confusing and overlapping. In China these concepts are 
inextricable from the hukou system. Normally, migration means people simply 
moving from one place to another. However, in China, migration (qianyi迁移) means 
one needs to obtain an official change of permanent registration and this applies to 
all types of hukou. Moreover, a floating population, (liudong 流动) refers to the 
persons who, by official definition, are “engaged in partial temporary relocation” 
(Solinger, 1999:15), and lack official registration. The floating population moves in 
and out, without changing their official registration. In reality, the majority of the 
floating population are peasants. Peasant workers (nongmingong), according to the 
definition of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, are those with a rural hukou 
who work in the non-agricultural sector in the local area or migrate for work for 
more than six months. ‘Local migrant workers’ are those who do not leave their 
towns of residential registration and do non-agricultural jobs (National Statistics 
Bureau, 2015). ‘Out-going migrant workers’ refers to those who work outside their 
town’s boundaries. In many contexts, peasant workers and migrant workers are seen 
as interchangeable concepts. However, the term ‘migrant workers’ is now gradually 
taking the place of ‘peasant workers’, as the latter is considered a discriminatory 
label. However, it is not the label itself which attracts the discrimination, but rather 
the social and political power relations which create the label to define meaning and 
order in the social world (Li, 2001:24). People who hold rural hukou and work in 
urban areas are excluded from the rights and benefits linked to urban hukou: they are 
named and categorised as ‘outsiders’.  
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At the beginning of the reform era, the re-emergence of migrants in the urban areas 
did not immediately trigger a systematic official control. However, as increasing 
numbers moved to cities and towns, their destinations’ local governments began to 
change their strategy to manage the migrant population. The state and the local states 
tried to build a ‘net’ to capture these mobile subjects. Labour and construction 
bureaus, public security, the Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau, and 
offices in charge of civil affairs, family planning, taxes, public health, housing, 
commerce, transportation and grain all became involved in the administration of 
migrants’ affairs, collecting data and information (Solinger, 1999). This overlapping 
of the management of migrants not only set up numerous obstacles to migrants’ lives 
in cities and towns, but also brought about confusion in the statistical data and 
information relating to them. The 1990 national census was the first to introduce 
systematic information about migration, but as the definition of migration excluded 
some of the short-term migrants (it defined migrants as those who left their 
hometown for more than a year), it resulted in an underestimation of the amount of 
migration. The definition of short-term migrants was changed from one year to six 
months in the 2000 national census. Other authoritative sources include 
administrative registration records from the Ministry of Public Security and the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission, large-scale sample surveys 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, and statistical data collected by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. However, as the definition of migrants varies across these 
data sources, this, too, has led to inconsistency and incomparability problems 
regarding coverage and enumeration methods and conflicting estimates of the size of 
the floating population (Wei & Zhang, 2012). However, overall, the statistical data 
from these sources can provide us with a general overview and movement history of 
migrants in cities and towns.  
 
Migrant workers’ contributions to the rapid economic development of urban areas 
are also counteracting negative images of them, as ‘trouble makers’ and ‘urban 
resources grabbers’. More importantly, migrant workers have made unremitting 
efforts to earn spaces and rights in the places where they live and work and their 
daily actions are also reshaping the social order. As a result, they are increasingly 
being watched by not only the public, but also the authoritarian state. Departments 
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specifically targeting migrant workers have been created in different ministries and 
the Bureau of National Statistics of China established a statistical and monitoring 
system which has annual statistical data and analysis of migrant workers since 2008.  
 
Generally, the volume of migrants has increased during the reform era, despite 
experiencing some fluctuations caused by the economic situation and administrative 
restrictions. Rough estimates suggest that the number of migrant workers in the late 
1970s was less than 2 million (Li, 2008). By the end of the 1980s, with the 
development of rural industry and consequent increase in numbers employed by 
TVEs, approximately 95 million migrant workers were employed by TVEs alone 
(NBS, 1992, cited in Li, 2008). Meanwhile, the influx of foreign investment, 
especially from Hong Kong and Taiwan to coastal areas, also led to increased 
employment of migrant workers. According to one survey conducted in the Pearl 
River Delta (Li, 1994), there was 156,000 migrant workers in Dongguan, 22.4% of 
the total labour force in this area. Then it increased to 369,000 in 1988, (51.3%) and 
656,000 in 1990, a staggering 90% of the labour force. The total number of migrant 
workers increased four-fold from 1986 to 1990 in Dongguan (Li, 1994).  
 
In the 1990s, the number of migrant workers continued to grow, but with the 
slowdown in the growth of TVEs, more of them left their home towns for urban 
areas. Since 1992, stimulated and encouraged by Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour, 
the reform and opening up had deepened and speeded up. City governments changed 
their attitude to migrant workers, especially those experiencing a labour shortage, 
such as Shenzhen. Meanwhile, the big cities, which suffered from unemployment 
and an increasing number of laid-off workers due to the reform of SOEs, maintained 
their negative and restrictive policies. As a result, the increase in rural migrant 
workers slowed in the late 1990s. According to estimates, around 30 million rural 
migrant workers moved into large and medium cities in 1994, increasing to around 
50 million in 1999 (Yang & Yang, 2009). With the dawn of the New Millennium, 
the growth in migrant worker numbers again increased rapidly in line with the rapid 
growth of foreign investment enterprises and the private sector. In 2004, around 120 
million migrant workers worked and lived away from their home towns for more 
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than three months, increasing to 132 million in 2006. Figure 14 shows the increase in 
migrant workers since 1989.  
 
Figure 14 Number of Rural Migrant Workers in China, 1989-2006 
 
Source: Li, 2006, cited in Li, 2008:5. 
 
Table 5 shows that the number of migrant workers reached 229.78 million in 2008 
and continued to grow slowly over the next five years to 273.95 million in 2014. The 
growth rate slowed, not because of administrative restrictions or economic 
restructuring but simply because the majority of the so-called rural surplus labourers 
had already transferred from rural to urban areas in the reform era. Moreover, the 
growth rate of local migrant workers exceeded that of outgoing migrant workers in 
2010, reflecting their changing characteristics.  
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Table 5 Number of migrant workers (2009-2014) 
Number of Migrant Workers (10,000) 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total number of migrant workers 22978 24223 25278 26261 26894 27395 
1. Outgoing Migrant workers  14533 15335 15863 16336 16610 16821 
1a). Migrating individually 11567 12264 12584 12961 13085 13243 
1b). Migrating as a family  2966 3071 3279 3375 3525 3578 
2. Local Migrant workers  8445 8888 9415 9925 10284 10574 
Source: NBS, 2009, 2015 
 
Figure 15 Growth Rate in Numbers of Migrant Workers (2010-2014) 
 
Source: Calculated based on data in Table 5 
 
China’s administration is divided into several government levels: provincial (shengji 
省级), prefectural (shiji 市级), county (xianji 县级), township (xiangji 乡级) and village 
(cunji 村级). Thus, the spatial level of migration can also be divided into different 
levels: inter-village, inter-township, inter-county, inter-prefectural, and inter-
provincial migration. Normally, movement between villages is not reflected in the 
statistical data. As economic development varies between regions and the income 
gap between rural and urban areas is enormous, it is not surprising that the 
destinations of migration are the economically active regions. In the1980s, cities 
attracted 56.6% of inter-county and 50.8% of inter-provincial migrants. The 1990s 
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also saw an increase in migration: the 2000 census reports cities and towns attracting 
57% of inter-provincial rural-urban migrants. Migrants were also moving further: 
inter-provincial migrants accounted for over 40% of the total of inter-county 
migrants, which means that more migrants moved between provinces (Fan, 2005a).  
 
When looking at the regional distribution of rural migrants’ destinations, it is clear 
that in this period (1980s-1990s) the eastern region was the most attractive 
destination. According to the census figures for these two decades, the eastern region 
accounted for 57% and 78.4% respectively of the total inter-provincial in-migration. 
The eastern, central and western regions refer to three economic belts, providing a 
convenient scheme to reveal regional disparities and inequalities (Fan, 2008). The 
eastern region includes all the coastal provinces, the most advanced economic areas 
in China, and it benefits from the high positive net migration figures. The central and 
western regions, in contrast, are losing their active labour force.  
 
Between 1995 and 2000, 13,303,080 migrants moved from the central to the eastern 
region, while 5,812,370 moved from the western to the eastern region. This was a 
significant increase on the 1985-1990 numbers of 2,263,270 and 1,238,890 (see 
Figure 15). Also, almost six million migrants moved within the eastern region during 
the same period. Within the eastern area, Guangdong was the most attractive 
province; according to the 1990 and 2000 censuses, its net in-migration numbers 
were 911,000 and 11,062, accounting for 46.6% and 64.5% respectively of total net 
in-migration in the eastern area. In 2004, 34 million migrant workers constituted 
44% of the total provincial population. Jiangsu Province also showed positive rates 
of in-migration: 248,000 and 667,000 in 1990 and 2000 respectively. Zhejiang, 
another rapidly developing province in the Yangtze River Delta, showed an 
interesting inversion between 1990 and 2000. In 1990, Zhejiang was a province with 
more out-migration than in-migration: a total of 626,000 migrants left and only 
321,000 arrived. However, in 2000, the net in-migration rates turned positive, with 
2,714,000 migrants in and 968,000 out. Overall, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
were the most attractive destinations for migrant workers in the eastern region, 
receiving 45% of the total migration between 2000 and 2005.  
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In the first decade of the new millennium, the eastern region maintained its 
advantage, attracting the majority of migrant workers. Guangdong continued in the 
lead, followed by Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shandong, all of which also placed in the 
top ranks of GDP in China. Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan, with their large rural 
populations, provided the greatest amount of migrant workers. However, the 
situation has changed slightly since 2010. According to the statistical data, the 
proportion of migrant workers in eastern regions has decreased slightly, from 66.9% 
in 2010 to 60% in 2014, while numbers in the central and western regions are 
increasing (NBS, 2009, 2011, 2015). In 2011, for the first time, the number of inter-
provincial migrant workers was less than intra-provincial migration (NBS, 2012). 
This was because firstly, the income gap between the eastern region and the other 
two regions had decreased to almost zero: wages in the eastern region were  growing 
slowly and the cost of living cost was going up quickly, while income in the central 
and western regions grew significantly. Secondly, the inflow of capital into inland 
regions of China had created more jobs. More and more factories chose to relocate to 
areas with rich labour resources, low land prices and strong support from local 
governments. Moreover, the age range of migrant workers had changed, with the 
average age increasing from 34 in 2008 to 38.3 in 2014. The heavy family burden on 
migrant workers, such as taking care of parents and children, the education of 
children, health care of the whole family, and housing needs, kept them closer to 
their home town. Of the intra-provincial migration, towns attracted nearly half of the 
total (46.1%), while the prefecture-level cities attracted 28.9% in 2014.  
 
As discussed above, migrant workers normally work in the manufacturing, 
construction and service industries. In urban areas they fill the positions known as 
‘3-D’ jobs (dirty, dangerous and demeaning). The 2000 census showed that migrant 
workers filled 68% of jobs in manufacturing, 80% in construction and over half in 
the service sector (Li, 2008). They continued to form the largest employee group in 
manufacturing until 2014, although their numbers decreased from 37.2% in 2008 to 
31.3% in 2014 (NBS, 2010, 2015). Also, manufacturing jobs are concentrated in the 
eastern region: 43.1% of migrants there work in manufacturing, compared to only 
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20.1% and 13.2% in the central and western regions. As shown in Table 6, the 
proportion of migrant workers in the construction industry has increased since 2008 
although this rise is not spread evenly over the regions. In 2013, as mentioned above, 
the eastern region migrant workers gravitated towards manufacturing, but 
construction accounted for 30% of migrant workers in the western region and 20.1% 
in the central region. It is noteworthy, too, that the volume of self-employed migrants 
is increasing: in 2009, only 6.4% of the total migrants were self-employed but this 
figure rose to 17% in 2014.   
 
 
 
Table 6 Distribution of rural migrant workers by industry, 2008-2014 
Industry Classification (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Manufacturing 37.2 36.1 36.7 36 35.7 31.4 31.3 
Construction 13.8 15.2 16.1 17.7 18.4 22.2 22.3 
Transport, Storage and Post 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.5 
Wholesale and Retail Trades 9 10 10 10.1 9.8 11.3 11.4 
Hotels and Catering Services 5.5 6 6 5.3 5.2 5.9 6 
Services to Households, Repair 
and Other Services 
12.2 12.7 12.7 12.2 12.2 10.6 10.2 
Sources: NBS, 2013, 2015 
 
When looking at gender composition, we see that that significantly more males than 
females leave their home town to be migrant workers: two-thirds of migrant workers 
are male and only one-third female. There are also gender differences in employment. 
More male migrants work in the construction industry while more female migrants 
work in the retail and service industries. This is closely related to the gender division 
of labour within the household where women take more responsibility for the family, 
caring for children and parents. The gender split is also affected by migrant workers’ 
lack of access to public service and social welfare: schooling, health care, housing, 
pregnancy and giving birth, all the most important events of the social reproduction 
process, have to take place in their home registration areas, which means that the 
majority of rural females stay in their home towns.  
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Another popular stereotype of migrant workers is their low educational attainment. 
In 2004, 65% of migrant workers had completed China’s nine years of compulsory 
education (typically ages 6-14), 18% had only attained a primary school level (ages 
6-11), some of whom did not even finish, while 12% had completed upper-middle 
school (ages 15-17). Only 5% went on to higher education (NBS, 2006). Ten years 
later, the situation had improved: 16.1% finished upper-middle school and 6.7% 
entered higher education. Migrant workers were also increasingly participating in 
occupational training. Although generally the educational background of migrant 
workers is weaker than that of urban residents, it is higher than those who remain at 
home which leads to rural society experiencing ‘hollowing’, losing its young, active, 
and educated labourers.  
 
3.2.3 Features of young generation migrant workers 
 
As the average age of migrant workers has increased over the years, so the number 
of migrant workers under the age of 40 has decreased: the pool of surplus rural 
labourers is beginning to dry up. China’s one-child family planning policy 
dramatically decreased the birthrate, leading to a decline in the population growth 
rate. The young generation migrant workers exhibit different characteristics and 
group features to their parents’ generation. The ACFTU survey and the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China survey, both carried out in 2010, revealed key 
differences between the ‘young’ and ‘old’ generation migrant workers: 
 The young generation have more education and job training: 31.1% of the 
young generation of migrant workers, aged between 21 and 25 had completed 
upper-middle school education or above and 36.9% of young generation 
migrant workers had undertaken job training compared to 22.9% of the old 
generation. 
 They have less experience of agricultural work than the old generation: only 
11% of young generation had agricultural work experience against 35.7% for 
the old generation.  
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 There is a slight shift in employment patterns: more young generation 
migrant workers worked in the manufacturing and service industries, and 
fewer in construction. See Table 7  
 On average, new generation workers changed employers once every four 
years, while older migrants did so only once every ten years. 
 
Table 7 Employment patterns of young vs older generation migrant workers 
Industry Classification (%) 
Egress migrant workers 
Total Older generation New generation 
Manufacturing industry 39.1 31.5 44.4 
Construction industry 17.3 27.8 9.8 
Transportation, warehousing and 
postal services 
5.9 7.1 5.0 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 7.8 6.9 8.4 
Accommodation and Catering 
Services 
7.8 5.9 9.2 
Resident Services and other services 
industry 
11.8 11.0 12.4 
Others 10.3 9.8 10.8 
Source：National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010 
 
The young generation workers have greater individualism, attraction to urban 
consumer culture (Pun 2005), higher job turnover rates and less loyalty to their work 
(Pun, Chan & Chan, 2010). During their job selection process, they focus on not only 
the ‘hardware-wage’ but also ‘software-welfare’, such as factory environment, 
company reputations, and even individual development chances. They prefer to 
choose jobs with more respect, greater security and better development perspectives. 
Also, they are more likely than their parents to seek additional education and skills 
training to improve their job opportunities and their career. 
 
They are children of the reform era, treated well by their parents because the families 
only had one, or perhaps two, children. Their expectations for their career and future 
are higher than their parents and they rarely consider returning to the countryside as 
farmers. Instead, they are more acclimated to the city life (Gallagher, 2010). They 
identify far more with urban culture and have a stronger desire to forge a career and 
life for themselves in the city. Another significant feature of young generation 
migrant workers is their familiarity with the internet, social networking tools and 
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mobile telecommunications. This plays a significant role in the life of young 
generation migrant workers, helping them to get information and resources, contact 
their peers, even to organise worker protests. They have made good use of QQ (a 
Chinese instant online chat programme), weibo (Chinese Twitter) and other social 
networking tools to share information, send out real time updates to their co-workers, 
and to attract media attention to, and public support of, protests that have taken place 
since entering into the new century. 
A common socioeconomic environment and the same migrant worker status, has 
made young generation migrant workers to face many similar problems with the 
older generation of migrant workers, such as discrimination and numerous 
institutional barriers based on a farmer’s status. They are confronting increasing 
oppression by global capitalism, nation-state power and other cultural factors, such 
as familial patriarchy, which puts heavy stress on female migrant workers (Pun, 
2005).They are still confronted with many difficulties (NBS, 2010; ACFTU, 2010): 
 Low incomes and heavy labour intensity: the average monthly income of 
migrant workers was RMB 1417 in 2009, and young generation migrant 
workers earned RMB 1328. Young generation workers worked 26 days every 
month, usually for 9 hours a day. A small, but significant number (6.4%) of 
young generation migrant workers worked 11-12 hours every day.  
 Low rate of signed contracts: 54.4% of young generation migrant workers did 
not have a signed labour contract with their employers.  
 Gap between individual occupational skills and labour market demands: 
despite a higher level of education and more professional skills, their 
occupational skills can not completely meet the demands of urban labour 
markets. This is an obstacle to getting long-term stable employment in cities. 
 Gap between individual expectations and harsh reality: young generation 
migrant workers are more eager to settle down in the cities. However, 
because of the hukou system, they face numerous institutional barriers to 
access social welfare such as children’s education, medical care and housing.  
 Confusion of identity: the young generation lack a sense of belonging to the 
cities, yet they are not willing to return to their home towns as farmers. They 
live and work in cities without the identity of ‘citizen’. It appears that they 
belong nowhere.  
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The young generation migrant workers are facing ‘double disembeddedness’ from 
rural and urban society, and ‘atomisation’. The concept of ‘embeddedness’, 
pioneered by Polanyi, refers to the different conditions within which various modes 
of social action take place and upon which they depend. According to Polanyi (1944), 
in all human societies, production and distribution are ensured by certain principles 
of socioeconomic integration, including redistribution and reciprocity, as well as 
exchange (Bugra, 2007:2). Huang (2014) applied the concept of embeddedness to his 
analysis of young generation migrant workers in China. He found that, firstly, young 
generation migrant workers, especially those who used to be ‘the left-behind children 
in rural China’ (留守儿童), have fewer cultural, emotional, and ethical connections 
with rural society compared to their parents’ generation. The traditional rural society 
is disintegrating and can no longer support the embeddedness of the young 
generation. Secondly, having arrived at their ‘economic destinations’, young 
generation migrant workers have little opportunity to progress in the labour market 
and their career. Even though they are more educated, the jobs offered to them have 
not been upgraded. They still need to struggle within the so-called ‘secondary labour 
market’. Hence, they are also disembedded from urban society, where they live and 
work.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the making of migrants during the reform era. This 
review of the migration history in China during the reform era has revealed the 
economic development path, as well as the mobility of the so-called floating 
population consisting of mainly surplus rural labourers. The combination of the 
spread of neoliberal projects and the reform and opening up policies in China created 
the structural background for the making of migrant workers. The state and capital 
worked together to seize the moving bodies of migrants and transfer their living 
labour into the wage labour system. The long-lasting and stubborn hukou system has 
caused migrants to be institutionally excluded from the social welfare system and 
treated as second-class citizens in urban areas. The desire of capital to utilise the 
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benefits of relocation of production bases has led to the ‘super-exploitation’ of 
migrant workers. The central government’s desire to achieve economic growth and 
maintain social stability led to its connivance with capital and suppression of labour 
while local governments competing to attract investment in order to pursue local 
economic growth, conspire with capital. The working force is considered to be in a 
weak position in the transition period (Pringle, 2015).  
 
However, it is not enough to understand the making of the domestic migrants and 
their relationship with Chinese development only from the perspective of structural 
forces. China’s development strategy is not only a response to the needs of capitalists, 
but also deeply influenced by labour struggles. The struggles and resistance of 
migrant workers have forced the state and capital to search for different modes of 
articulating capital relations. How to frame the relationship of migrant workers and 
development from the perspective of migrant workers? How to trace the struggles 
and the entanglements between the state, capital and labour centred on control over 
migrant workers’ moving bodies and labour power? In the next chapter, I discuss the 
rise of labour disputes and strikes involving migrant workers and offer a new 
perspective on the study of migrant workers in China: the autonomy of migration. 
The chapter also discusses the strategy of capital to control migrant workers, 
mediated by both the central and local state, through the design and implementation 
of institutions, policies, regimes and development strategies.  
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Location 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapters, rapid socio-economic transformation has brought 
significant changes in every aspect of social life in China. The making of migrant 
workers is closely linked to this profound process. The coincidental meeting of the 
emergence of neo-liberal ideology and the reform and opening-up in China 
successfully stimulated marketisation and liberalisation. It then led to the demise of a 
paternalistic labour regime of state-sector workers. At the same time, the demand for 
low-cost migrant workers increased significantly in the private sector. To pursue 
economic growth, the state and capitalists conspired to absorb the surplus rural 
labourers into the fast growing private sector, while maintaining the segmentation of 
the labour market by utilising administrative (hukou) and legal institutions. 
Compared with the powerful authoritarian state and aggressive capital, it appears that 
migrant workers are in a weak position in the transition period. However, there is 
evidence that migrant workers are actually playing an important role on the socio-
economic transformation.  
 
Although migrant workers have made a great contribution to both the economic 
development and social transformation in China since 1978, they remained 
‘invisible’ and ‘silent’ in the sphere of public discourse for an extended period. They 
have gradually gained attention from the public because their mobility and daily 
activities have given them a concrete existence in Chinese society which can no 
longer be ignored or avoided. Scholars have studied, developed and improved the 
theoretical understandings of ‘nongmingong’ (peasant worker) from different aspects 
and perspectives. The change in terminology used to refer to migrant workers 
generally in the academic field and public discourse reveals these research outcomes 
and policy changes. Initially they were called mangliu (盲流, blind flows), and then 
liudongrenkou ( 流 动 人 口 , floating population), a term related to the public 
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administration and sociological sphere. The name nongmingong (农民工 , peasant 
workers) embodies the dual identity of migrant workers, as peasant and worker. In 
recent years, wailai wugongrenyuan (外来务工人员, migrant workers) has become 
popular with the media and government reports, reflecting the attempt of both 
governments and scholars to do away with the discrimination attached to the label of 
‘peasants’, as well as the attempts to involve migrant workers within the so-called 
‘citizenship’ context. Additionally, increasingly researchers are using class-based 
analysis in their study of Chinese migrant workers. These researchers bring the 
analysis of labour process, the labour regime, class formation, class consciousness 
and the class struggle back to the centre of analysis. Such research provides us with a 
variety of perspectives with which to understand the making of the migrant working 
class and the relationship between migrant workers and China’s development.  
 
This chapter will firstly reveal the changing features of the labour disputes and 
strikes involving migrant workers. It then discusses the studies of migrant workers in 
China so far. A gap remains between the understanding of migrant workers in 
academia and in reality, largely due to the migration theories only partially 
explaining the migrant workers phenomenon in China. This chapter will introduce 
two mainstream migration theories and explain their limitations. These limitations 
make it worthwhile bringing a new perspective to the study of the making of migrant 
workers in China, and the relationship between the socio-economic transformation 
and migrant workers that is the autonomy of migration approach. This new 
perspective treats migrant workers not just as a social group or status targeted by 
public administration and a cheap human resource for the ‘world’s factory’, but as 
active and live labour with subjectivities and consciousness. Their activities are one 
of the main engines driving the state and capital to adjust their control regime to 
maintain capitalist production process. Viewed through the autonomy of migration 
lens, the state and capital constantly try to contain their ‘living labour’ using the 
existing control regime. Having seized the opportunity to turn the newly released-
from-the-land farmers into waged-labour in the early age of capitalism, capitalism 
always attempts to subordinate labourers to capital. Subordination, including formal 
and real subordination, follows containment or is the ultimate aim of containment 
and it always attempts to control people’s mobility. On the other hand, labourers 
always try to escape from the containment of the control regime and insubordinate to 
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capital. Strategies of subordination are constantly being upgraded and adjusted in 
order to respond to the resistance of workers. This chapter discusses subordination as 
a control regime of mobile labourers and then provides a pathway to understand the 
subordination of Chinese migrant workers to capital, in other words, the making of a 
new ‘proletariat’. It also reveals how the escape of migrant workers shapes and 
reshapes the control regime and the socio-economic transformation process in China.  
 
4.2 Trends in labour disputes after the 1980s in China 
 
There have always been acts of resistance by migrant workers during the reform era 
and their form continues to change. The number of protests and strikes by migrant 
workers in the private sector has grown significantly while state-sector workers’ 
protests declined between 2000 and 2010. The Honda auto parts workers’ strikes in 
mid-2010 epitomized the escalating struggle by migrant workers (Lin, 2015). 
Although basic labour rights remain at the core of migrant workers’ protests, better 
wages and working conditions, as well as political representation, have become a 
focus of the strikes and protests. Migrant workers are more likely to engage in 
collective actions to protect and fight for their rights and their strategies and tactics 
have developed as they accumulate more experience. The information technology 
innovation has also provided a new and grassroots platform for migrant workers to 
organise activities, share information and experiences, request help from the media 
and generally draw public attention to their struggles.  
 
4.2.1 Labour Disputes 
 
Official statistics from various departments attest to the pervasiveness and 
intensification of labour unrest throughout the country since the early 1990s. Initially, 
labour disputes were concentrated on basic economic interests such as wages. As 
discussed above, to maintain a competitive advantage in the global production chain, 
the salaries of migrant workers were kept unreasonably low. There is a paucity of 
data on the pay of migrant workers at the beginning of the reform era and scholars 
have had to rely on secondary data in different databases. As shown in Figure 16, 
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Lu’s (2011) research indicates only a slow growth in the wages of migrant workers 
from 1995 to 2010. It is also not uncommon for migrants to experience delayed wage 
payment, another major cause of labour disputes, especially in the construction 
industry.  
 
Figure 16 China’s migrant workers’ wages from 1995 to 2010 
 
Source: Lu, F., 2011. Numerical Estimation of China's Migrant Workers' Wages. 
Beijing, China Centre for Economic Research, Peking University. 
 
Recently, the average pay of migrant workers has gone up significantly (see Figure 
17). However, when comparing the growth rate of wages and the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI),
22
 it is clear that migrant workers have not enjoyed the fruits of 
economic development.  
 
                                                 
22
 The Chinese Consumer Price Index shows the change in prices of a standard package of goods and 
services which Chinese households purchase for consumption. In order to measure inflation, an 
assessment is made of how much the CPI has risen in percentage terms over a given period compared 
to the CPI in a preceding period. If prices have fallen this is called deflation (negative inflation) 
(Online: http://www.global-rates.com/economic-indicators/inflation/consumer-prices/cpi/china.aspx). 
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Figure 17 Migrant Workers' Average Monthly Wage and Growth Rate, 2008-2014 
 
Source：NBS, 2014, 2015 
 
Since 2000, more labour disputes have turned to multi-requirements, such social 
insurances, changes to contracts, ability to renegotiate or terminate contracts, 
confirmation of contracts, economic compensation, and occupational injury 
compensation. What is more, the changing patterns of labour disputes are closely 
related to establishment of dispute-handling legal institutions in China. Government 
authorities have designed a series of institutions and procedures to handle the 
increasing labour disputes, creating a sophisticated hierarchy of institutions and 
procedures for the resolution of labour disputes, namely mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication. In 2008, the new labour contract law was enacted to improve and 
perfect the labour contract system, a manifestation of the CCP’s desire to create the 
legal framework necessary for stable economic growth. The trend in labour disputes 
can be partly explained by examining the number of labour disputes accepted and 
settled by the mediation, arbitration and adjudication system set up. 
 
Before 1993, most disputes were handled by enterprises themselves through their 
internal mediation mechanisms. It was estimated that out of a total of one million 
labour disputes in China between 1986-1992, 710,000 were settled in internal 
mediation committees. However, from 1996 to 2001, the reported numbers of labour 
disputes mediated within enterprises declined sharply as a result of the 
transformation of China’s state economy (Fu & Choy, 2004). Although market 
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exchange gradually replaced planning and the economic reform was deepening after 
1984, enterprises, especially SOEs, still accepted the responsibility to take care of 
their employees’ whole life, including housing, health care, primary and secondary 
schools for employees’ children, and vocational schools for employees. Employees 
still trusted trade unions in enterprises. After 1991, the reform of SOEs speeded up, 
and the CCP decided to ‘hold the big, release the small’. Many state and collective 
enterprises were sold, reorganised or liquidated. Most of them drastically reduced 
their workforces and about 40% of the public enterprise workforce lost their jobs 
(Andreas, 2008). At the same time, mediation committees were abandoned by SOEs, 
and newly established enterprises have either been slow to establish their own 
mediation committees or have simply refused to do so (Fu & Choy, 2004). Those 
mediation committees that did exist lacked the credibility and ability to mediate the 
conflict between workers and their employers. The framework for enterprise 
mediation was union-centred and union leaders play the principal role in organising 
and participating in labour dispute mediation. The role of union leaders in the 
process as designed by the Labour Dispute Regulations was not to represent the 
workers but to be an intermediary between employees and their employer, aiming to 
protect the interests of all –the state, the enterprises and the workers (Xu, 1997). 
However, in practice, union leaders and the enterprise mediators under them were 
effectively ‘captured’ by the management and the union leaders usually served as 
senior administrative personnel of the enterprise concerned.  
 
Since 1997, the sharp decline of enterprise mediation has been accompanied by a rise 
in cases handled by arbitration. Arbitration committees accepted 184,116 cases in 
2002, an almost 66-fold increase over the 10,326 cases accepted in 1989 (Fu & Choy, 
2004); this figure increased to 684,379 in 2009 (see Figure 18).  
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Figure 18 Number of Arbitration Cases and Number of Labourers Involved, 1996-2009 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2010 
 
The number of collective labour disputes handled through official channels increased 
dramatically from 3,150 in 1996 to 19,241 in 2004. It then declined gradually to 
around 13,000 during 2005-2009, with the exception of a blip in 2008 which saw 
21,880 collective cases (Figure 19). The decline was almost entirely due to the 
common practice of dividing collective cases into individual ones and handling them 
separately.  
 
Figure 19 Number of Collective Labour Disputes and Labourers Involved, 1996-2009 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2010 
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According to Fu & Choy (2004), the government’s published annual statistics on 
labour arbitration suggest that China’s growing labour disputes are concentrated in 
the coastal regions, reflecting the fact that they are closely related to migrant workers 
and that they have become more antagonistic. Statistics show that over the years 
there has been a gradual decline in cases settled through mediation by the arbitration 
committee, and both parties have become less willing to compromise through 
mediation (Fu & Choy, 2004). Another interesting finding is the visible gender 
disparity in complainants. Although the majority of migrant workers are female, they 
rarely take their employers to arbitration. Also, arbitral awards predominantly favour 
labourers over employers. The figures also reveal that sector plays a factor; labour 
from the private sector, for example, has a better chance of succeeding than those 
from public bodies or SOEs. 
 
Salary issues are the most common form of dispute experienced by migrant workers, 
with employers refusing to pay wages, paying only a portion of workers’ premised 
salary, or failing to pay overtime (Becker, 2014), especially in the construction 
industry. This issue had been ongoing for decades until, in 2003, Premier Wen 
personally intervened in an unpaid wages case; this led to the introduction of new 
policies making all levels of government responsible for dealing with such issues. It 
is difficult to trace statistical data regarding unpaid wages during the 1980s and 
1990s, but as each Chinese New Year approached, it was common to read news 
reports on the subject (People.cn, 2004).
23
 Since 2001, according to the statistical 
data, remuneration issues have accounted for around one third of the total labour 
dispute cases registered (NBS, 2012). The issue of wage arrears deeply harms the 
migrant workers, which triggers countless protests by migrant workers. Some of the 
measures taken are extreme –suicide, threatened suicide, and the kidnapping of 
bosses. As a national issue, migrants’ wage arrears have been mentioned 
prominently in the central government’s policy documents, especially since 2003. In 
2003, former Premier Wen Jiabao was on an inspection tour in Yunyang County in 
Sichuan. A local woman, Xiong Deming told Wen that her husband was a migrant 
worker in the construction industry and he was owed RMB 2000 in unpaid wages. 
Soon after this meeting, her husband and his workmates received their arrears. This, 
                                                 
23
 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/8198/30572/30574/index.html  
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however, was not the end of the story. As the issue of wage arrears had begun to 
significantly influence economic development and social stability, the central 
government started to invest significant government resources and increased public 
attention on the subject over short bursts of time and soon issued a flurry of policy 
documents and legislation. As summarised by Becker (2014:67-70), in September 
2003, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS) and the Ministry of 
Construction jointly issued the ‘Circular on Resolving Migrant Worker Wage 
Arrears Issues in the Construction Industry’, which required local labour bureaus to 
establish an information system in local enterprises to verify the disbursement of 
wages (Ministry of Labour and Social Security and Ministry of Construction, 2003) 
which was followed by the State Council’s ‘Circular of the General Office of the 
State Council on Settlement of Delinquent Construction Project Costs in the 
Construction Business’ (Circular no.93) the next year (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2003). In February 2004, the Ministry of Construction issued ‘An 
Urgent Circular on Stepping Up the Resolution of the Issue of Migrant Labour 
Wages’. September 2004 saw a joint circular from the Ministry of Construction and 
the MoLSS entitled Joint Circular on Provisional Methods for Managing Wage 
Payment to Peasant Workers in the Construction Sector. In 2006, the most 
comprehensive migrant labour policy document to date was published, ‘Some 
Opinions of the State Council on Resolving the Problems Faced by Migrant 
Workers’ (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2006). Between 2003 
and 2006, the central government stressed the importance of resolving the wage 
arrears issue, by providing legal and rhetorical cover for migrant workers. The 
achievement was noticeable. According to an investigation conducted by Wang 
Meiyan (2006) who compared data from 2001 and 2005 in Shanghai, Wuhan, 
Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xi’an, the incidents of wage arrears declined significantly, 
from 12.1% in 2001 to 2.38% in 2005. The results of these policies can also be seen 
in the amount of owed remuneration paid to migrant workers. In 2006, 2.8 million 
migrant workers received outstanding wages of RMB 1.31 billion with the help of 
the trade union at various levels (Guangmingwang, 2006).
24
 According to the 
MoLSS, in 2010, 1.5 million migrant workers received nearly RMB 3 billion in back 
                                                 
24
 National Trade Union helps Migrant Recover 1.3 Billion Wages (Quanguo gonghui wei 
nongmingong zhuihui tuoqian gongzi 13 yiyuan全国工会为农民工追回拖欠工资 13亿元) 
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2006-12/27/content_527801.htm    
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pay with the help of different levels of governments (Xinhuanet, 2011).
25
 In 2011, 
the trade union again helped almost one million migrant workers retrieve around 
RMB 2.2 billion in wages over the first seven months of 2011 alone (Xinhuanet, 
2011).
26
 However, the problem of wage arrears has not been solved completely as 
the informal and diffuse employment structure provides ample opportunities for 
exploitation. Also, the system of contracting and subcontracting still exists in the 
construction industry (Pun & Lu, 2009). Therefore, the wage arrears issue remains at 
the centre of labour disputes cases. In 2014, 0.8% of migrant workers were owed an 
average of RMB 9511 per worker (NBS, 2015).  
 
4.2.2 Strikes and Protests 
 
There are an increasing number of undocumented strikes and large-scale labour 
protests. Most are dealt with by the authorities in a spontaneous and ad hoc manner: 
local governments seek to intervene and resolve them as quickly as possible. 
Government officials often seek to initiate dialogue and negotiation between 
employers and employees, putting pressure on the workers to abandon the strike and 
on employers to make concessions: these activities are not included in the total 
number of labour disputes mentioned above. A report conducted by the China 
Labour Bulletin (2012:15-28) identifies several characteristics of modern worker 
protests. First, protests occur in profitable companies, especially wholly foreign-
owned and joint venture companies in the manufacturing sector. This is because 
workers cannot share in the profits of these firms while senior and mid-level 
managers can, leading to lingering resentment and a sense of injustice. The second is 
that strikes are clustered in specific industries and regions. Indeed, there were 
reportedly more than 20 strikes in auto parts suppliers in the Pearl River Delta area 
alone in the two months from May 2010 to July 2010. These industry- and region- 
specific strikes tend to have near identical demands and grievances: workers from 
different companies in the same industry learn from each other about strikes, both 
                                                 
25
 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security: Migrant Worker Wage Arrears Phenomenon 
Effectively Curbed (Renli ziyuan yu shehui baozhangbu: nongmingong gongzi tuoqian xianxiang 
dedao youxiao ezhi,人力资源与社会保障部：农民工工资拖欠现象得到有效遏制 ) 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-03/22/c_121217474.htm  
26
 National Trade Union System of Wage Arrears Helps Migrants Recover 2.2 Billion (quanguo 
gonghui xitong qian 7 yue wei nongmingong zhuihui tuoqian gongzi 22 yi yuan 全国工会系统前 7月
月为弄明追回拖欠工资 22 亿元 ) http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-08/17/c_121873501.htm    
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tactics and demands. Third, isolated incidents can trigger broader industrial action, 
highlighting the stressful and fragile labour relations in many Chinese workplaces. 
Longstanding resentment over low pay, welfare benefits, working and living 
conditions can very easily blow up into public protest precisely because the workers 
have no other means of resolving their grievances. Fourth, higher wages remain the 
principal goal as many labour-intensive enterprises have sought to cut costs by either 
laying off workers or reducing salaries and eliminating bonuses, allowances and 
welfare benefits because of the global economic crisis. Workers also refuse to accept 
the huge disparity between their pay and that of top management. These strikes also 
show that workers have lost confidence in enterprise unions and union officials, and 
also developed a stronger sense of their collective identity. Workers want to elect 
their representatives from frontline workers to lead them in negotiations with 
management. 
 
The rise of labour dispute cases shows that migrant workers are increasingly 
challenging capitalist super-exploitation and the state has developed a body of laws 
and regulations in response. It attempts to absorb the turbulence of industrial 
relations into a controlled legal framework, to draw the migrant workers on the street 
back to arbitration and the courts. However, this has not been entirely successful, 
partly because the legal framework of labour relations is framed more to protect the 
stability of the development environment, rather than migrant labourers’ rights. 
Additionally, decentralisation has created tensions between the central and local 
governments. While the central government is trying to raise the bar via new legal 
standards on contracts and labour dispute resolution procedures, the local 
governments are reducing it back down to what they deem a manageable height 
(Pringle, 2011). Therefore, there has been a ‘normalisation’ of strikes. Migrant 
workers accept the fact that strikes are by far the quickest and most effective way to 
obtain labour rights (Pringle, 2011). The collective actions, along with the daily 
activities of migrant workers, have forced the state and capitalists to make 
compromises in individual cases and adjustments in the labour regulation regime and 
even administrative institutions. The emerging new labour movement inspires us to 
think about Chinese development from the perspective of migrant workers, rather 
than from the top-down structural perspective. The following sections examine 
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current migrant workers studies and explain why we need to study migrant workers 
from a new perspective.   
 
4.3 Studies of Migrant Workers in China  
Research on migrant workers has grown rapidly in recent years and scholars have 
tried to explain the phenomenon of migrant workers in different ways. According to 
Xu Fayin (2015), there are four main paradigms in the study of migrant workers in 
China. Of course, the research questions in these four paradigms overlap and are 
syncretic, as various key factors of social-economic background, policies, and 
institutional regime are common to the centre of the study of migrant workers, such 
as the hukou system, labour contract law, and so on.  
 
The first paradigm mainly studies migrant workers as ‘migrants’, focusing on 
migrants’ behaviours before, during and after migration (Fan, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; 
Fan & Sun, 2008; Gallagher, 2011 Zhang, 2001). The research questions include 
cost-benefit calculations, family structure, rural land renting, social networks, land 
system reform, hukou system reform, urban-rural income gap, labour market supply 
and demand, the social insurance system and disparities between different regions. 
They try to answer two key questions: the motivation behind and the background to 
migration, including the social, economic, historical and political spheres. The 
suggested answrs are developed around popular migration theories, the push and pull, 
neoclassical and dependency theories (detailed in China as the dual labour market 
theory) and so on. Migrant workers are pushed by structural forces, such as the 
division of urban-rural dualistic structure and the disparities of regional development 
(Lu, 2003; Whyte, 2010; Huang, 2011), inherited from the previous planned 
economy system. Domestic migration in China is mainly rural to urban, from less-
developed inland provinces to coastal areas, from the central and western regions to 
the eastern. The rapid developing provinces, such as Guangdong, Beijing, and 
Tianjin, are the most popular destinations, while the south-central and south-western 
provinces, such as Hunan, Sichuan, and Guizhou, which are among the poorest 
regions in China, emerged as the most prominent sources of migrants (Fan, 2005).   
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Although the explanation of the motivation of migration varies from individual level 
to household level (household strategy), migrant workers here are seen as rational 
agents, influenced by the outside socio-economic environment and structure. The 
migration perspective research provides us with general features of domestic migrant 
workers in China. The collection of statistical data on migrant workers can reveal the 
general trends in migration, how their characteristics differ across generations and 
the institutional factors closely linked with their everyday lives, thus supplying us 
with a top-town perspective of the migration regulation regime. However, the study 
of migrant workers should not be limited to this litany of statistical data and 
structural factors. Migrants are not just rational individuals/families who calculate 
whether or not to migrate based on benefits and costs, nor are they impotent objects 
of economic development structures and policies. Also, it should not be forgotten 
that migrant workers’ lives are not only about the production process, but also about 
their reproduction process. Hence, the migration paradigm should be expanded to a 
broader context. 
 
The second paradigm studies migrant workers from the perspective of citizenship 
(Chan, 2009, 2010; Huang, 2011; Solinger, 1999), i.e. in the sociological sphere. 
Urbanisation in China is ‘incomplete’; it allows “‘temporary’ migration (of a 
‘floating population’) to cities but den[ies] the migrant access to urban welfare and 
many other benefits” (Chan, 2010:66). The urbanisation and citizenisation of migrant 
workers in China cannot be isolated from hukou system which, in effect, acts as the 
principal mechanism by which migrant workers are excluded from the entitlements 
of urban citizenship. This exclusion reduces the cost and speeds up the process of 
urbanisation. The hukou system, as an efficient tool, always serves the purpose of 
national industrialisation in China. Of course, urbanisation and citizenisation are 
influenced by macro factors, such as demographic structure transformation, 
technological innovation and the labour market but from the micro perspective, they 
focus on the living conditions of migrant workers in urban areas, as well as their 
‘subjective identity’ of citizenship. ‘Living conditions’ does not just refer to housing, 
but involves the whole social reproduction process of migrant workers and their 
families. Subjective identity emphasises how they integrate into the citizen (urban) 
society, looking at physical space, social, and cultural aspects.  
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This second paradigm implies a foundational hypothesis that citizenisation is the 
destination for migrant workers, based on modernisation experiences in Western 
developed countries. It assumes that all migrant workers should be citizenised and 
should be entitled to be ‘citizens’, blaming the grievous situation of migrant workers, 
(working in the secondary labour market - mainly in labour intensive industries-, low 
wages, unstable employment, long working hours, appalling working conditions, 
lack of social insurance, living in the ‘village in city’ and lack of public services for 
families), on their lack of entitlement of ‘citizenship’. Again the migrant workers in 
this paradigm are considered as one social group, ‘outliers’ to the urban areas and 
without the representation and rights enjoyed by urban residents. In this paradigm, it 
is the government which takes charge of the initiative to citizenise migrant workers, 
by reforming the hukou system or making innovations in administrative capacities 
and the migrant workers’ own actions are partly ignored. The diversities within the 
group of migrant workers are also neglected and the production process of migrant 
workers is invisible as this paradigm attempts to provide a ‘one size fits all’ solution..  
 
The third paradigm echoes the appeal of scholars that use class in their analysis of 
migrant workers. The core of this paradigm focuses on the transformation process 
from ‘class in itself’ to ‘class for itself’, that is the making of the migrant working 
class and the rise of class consciousness of migrant workers. According to Shen 
(2006), the class formation of migrant workers can be analysed by following the 
Marx-type labour unrest model, which refers to, as Silver (2003:20) put it, “the 
struggles of newly emerging working classes that are successively made and 
strengthened as an unintended outcome of the development of historical capitalism 
are being unmade”. Silver (2003) also believes that the rapid industrialisation and 
proletarianisation China has been experiencing has led to the increase in industrial 
labour unrest and that in the future China will become the global centre of labour 
unrest. Workers in different industries have varying amounts of bargaining power, 
with those in core industries (such as car manufacturing) possessing more than, for 
example, those in service or retail. Exploitation is at the heart of Marx’s class theory, 
accompanied by commodification and proletarianisation: however, as migrant 
workers in China still have rights of land use in rural areas, the proletarianisation of 
migrant workers is still ongoing (Lee, 2007; Friedman & Lee, 2010; Huang, 2014; 
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Pun & Lu, 2010). Migrant workers, especially the young generation migrant workers, 
are found to be disembedded from the rural and urban society.  
 
The rising of class consciousness through collective struggles of migrant workers is 
is mainly studied through analysis of their collective actions. As China abandoned its 
planned economy system where workers in SOEs had priority status over other 
social classes, especially peasants in rural areas, the effects of privatisation and 
liberalisation were first felt by the ‘iron rice bowl’ system, resulting in protests by 
the laid-off workers. Attempting to protect production, and therefore the economy, 
the state had technically designed a re-structure of the SOEs which prohibited non 
laid-off workers from striking in support of the laid-off worker and this severely 
limited the power and duration of the laid-off workers’ protests. At the same time, 
scholars “contrasted the scattered, street-based ‘protests of desperation’ of SOE 
workers in ‘rustbelt’ industries with the ‘protests against discrimination’ of migrant 
workers denied the same rights as urban workers” (Pringle, 2015:197). The struggles 
of migrant workers are considered to be citizenship-based, i.e. fighting for equal 
rights with urban workers (Lee, 2007). Based on case studies of migrant workers’ 
strikes and struggles, some scholars argue that they show that migrant workers are 
also fighting as ‘workers’, not only as ‘migrants’ and their struggles have shown a 
degree of class consciousness within a capitalist structure, albeit they are still 
without institutional class organisations. This may be explained by the significant 
shifting of trends in collective actions by migrant workers. Firstly, migrant workers 
have been able to move from defensive protests targeting government officials to 
strikes aimed directly at employers. Secondly, their demands go beyond the 
minimum standards stipulated by labour law; they want better working conditions, 
higher salaries and better welfare. Thirdly, migrant workers are increasingly likely to 
prefer strikes, protests and sit-ins instead of going through the legal channels, as they 
believe that collective actions are more efficient than the judicial process. These 
collective actions also extend beyond the walls of individual factories. Workers in 
the same industrial zone, company group or sector band together to struggle based on 
their collective interests. Also, with the rise of the young generation of migrant 
workers has come a better understanding of the factory system and the laws. 
Widespread access to information and communications technology has helped 
migrant workers to understand both their strong bargaining position in the global 
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production chains and how to organise labour actions more effectively (Chan, 2009, 
2010; Chan & Pun, 2009; Pringle, 2010, 2015; Pun et al., 2009; Pun & Lu, 2010; 
Ren & Pun, 2006,).   
 
The last paradigm is the now increasingly valued concept of labour or factory regime 
(which is also present in the previous three paradigms). The labour regime takes us 
into the factory plants to examine the interaction between the politics of production 
process and the working class struggles. It also emphasises the apparatuses of the 
state which strongly influence the shaping of factory regimes. The factory regime, as 
Burawoy (1985) stated, is about the political practices and ideological assumptions 
embedded in the labour process and related aspects of production are shaped by, and 
shape, the experience of labour on the shop floor and the development of working 
class struggles within capitalist societies (Burawoy, 1985, cited in Smith, 1990:367). 
The process of production is understood as a political regime. The character of 
factory regimes shows the institutional relationship between the factory apparatuses 
and the state apparatuses. Lee (2007) linked Burawoy’s notion of ‘labour regime’ 
with the study of migrant workers in China, as, 
 
[It] is a powerful analytical tool linking state regulations of labour 
(through legislation on contracts, minimum wage, social insurance, 
collective bargaining, and the like) and the social reproduction of 
labour power (i.e. means of subsistence, daily and generational 
reproduction of the capacity to labour) to workplace control and 
workers’ capacity for resistance. (Lee, 2007:21-22)  
 
For migrant workers, the rural household registrations endow them with land use 
rights, which can be an asset or a liability. The rural household registration 
reproduces the labour power of migrant workers while compeling their participation 
in waged employment. The state, conspiring with the factories, shapes the dual 
identities of migrant workers as peasants and workers. The labour regime not only 
shapes the production process within factories, but also shapes workers’ sense of 
personal identification. It makes the migrant workers accept the ‘dagong’(打工 
‘selling labour to the bosses’) as a way of life (Lee, 2007:204).  
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The class based paradigm and the labour regime paradigm both consider the labour 
process of migrant workers. They provide a comprehensive understanding of labour 
relations between the state, capital and the migrant workers. Against the background 
of neoliberalisation and globalisation, the Chinese state, at both central and local 
levels, dedicates itself to promoting economic growth. Migrant workers are subjected 
to super-exploitation by capital, by the fundamental mediation of the state. Their 
identity is framed based on not only the institutional structure but also the factory 
regime. Facing this super-exploitation, migrant workers increasingly engage in 
collective actions and labour disputes to fight for their labour rights. Through their 
participation in these activities, migrant workers have begun to realise their 
collective interests and their collective power. As marketisation deepens, so does the 
conflict between capital and migrant workers. Reasons for labour disputes are 
becoming more complicated and workers are demanding more. Additionally, some 
migrant workers wish to settle in urban areas, but the urban and rural household 
registration systems’ regulations rule out their ever gaining equal social status with 
urban residents and so they will continue to fight for better-working conditions, 
higher payment and better welfare. Although the series of strikes that took place 
since 2000 were informal and unorganised, they taught migrant workers the power of 
collective action and honed their claim tactics. Successful strikes led to higher wages, 
better working conditions and more generous welfare benefits and the accumulation 
of experience and young generation migrant workers’ gradual maturity allowed them 
to be more active and better organised. Trade unions have also been stimulated to re-
evaluate their functions.  
 
These studies are valuable but only partially explain the relationship between 
migrant workers and development in China. They assume that effective development 
of the political power of labour begins when labourers are transformed into workers, 
that is, when the whole of the conditions of society confront them as capital. Capital 
comes first and the migrant workers follow. The struggles of migrant workers take 
place in the framework of the existing capitalist production system and capitalist 
power has a real domination over society in general. Migrant workers are subject to 
the labour regime rather than the producers of the regime. The conduct of the labour 
regime is decided by the state and capital, and influenced by the socio-economic and 
political environments. It should also be noted that the resistances of migrant 
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workers also contribute to the shaping and reshaping of labour regimes and control 
regimes. They do not passively accept the edits of the regimes but actively push 
them to adjust and change. Also, the class-based perspective and labour regime 
theory literature both view migrants through the lens of citizenship. Migrants are 
always reflected in the mirror of citizen workers, described in terms of something 
they are or something they are deprived of. It appears that what migrant workers lack, 
rather than what they are, makes them struggle in the above mentioned literatures. 
The dichotomist view of migrants-as-passive and workers-as-active needs to be 
overcome. These literatures describe a transformation of migrants from improper to 
proper social agents by taking on the image of a citizen. ‘Fixity not mobility as the 
source of activism’. They argue that migrant workers fight or resist because they are 
not citizens. And when migrant workers achieve citizenship, then the struggle has 
succeeded and the process is finished. It views the struggles of migrant workers as a 
fixed process, not a dynamic one, the struggle’s only goal attaining citizenship. 
These limitations in the literatures on migrant workers in China are all embedded in 
mainstream theories on migration. In next section, I discuss two mainstream 
migration theories and their shortcomings, revealing why they are limited in their 
explanations of the migration in China.  
 
4.4 Critiques of the Mainstream Migration Theories 
 
The shortcomings in studies of China’s migrant workers are largely due to the 
limitations of existing migration theories. This section mainly discusses two of the 
most influential migration theories, neo-classical migration theory and dependency 
theory. The neo-classical theory ignores the migrant’s agency, treating migration as a 
reflection of economic disparities, without considering the preconditions and 
structural factors of these disparities, whereas dependency theory (also known as the 
structuralism approach) emphasizes the structural factors. 
 
Migration of people to other countries and regions in search of employment has 
occurred throughout history; it is by no means a new phenomenon. In recent years, 
the movement of labour has exhibited distinctive features within an increasingly 
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globalised and interconnected world. At the beginning of the 21st century, migration 
continues to attract attention from mass media, different communities and policy 
makers, as well as scholars. During the past decades, the patterns of movement, 
namely, the countries of origin and countries of destination have changed 
dramatically. After World War II, only a few industrialised countries were ‘countries 
of destinations’ and, equally, only a few countries were ‘countries of origin’. 
Nowadays, most countries can be identified as countries of origin, transit and 
destination. Meanwhile, there has been a diversification of migratory behaviours 
including short-term relocation, longer-term temporary assignments, permanent 
migration, and multi-stage migration itineraries, which eventually lead back to the 
point of origin. These new patterns of migration are influenced by economic 
transformation and new forms of political crises.  
 
Although migration experiences may differ across the world, there are several 
common characteristics nowadays (Massey et al., 1998:6-7). Firstly, most 
immigrants come from countries with “a limited supply of capital, low rates of job 
creation and abundant reserves of labour”. The imbalance between labour supply and 
demand results “not only from a relative scarcity of capital and investment but from 
a disarticulation between demographic conditions and economic limits that in earlier 
periods had constrained them”. Secondly, today’s immigrant-receiving societies are 
“far more intensive in capital and much less intensive in land” than past destination 
countries and regions. Today’s technology allows farms and factories to be more 
productive with less labour, resulting in job losses in many sectors in industrialised 
countries. ‘International migrants are now filling marginal niches within a labour 
market that is highly segmented’ (Piore, 1979, cited in Massey et al. 1999:6). 
Receiving societies treat immigrants as a “social and political problem [which has] to 
be managed” and restrictively controlled. The last significant characteristic is the 
sheer size in the disparities that exist between sending and receiving societies – in 
wealth, income, power, size, growth, and culture (Massey et al., 1999).  
 
Human migration has a long history and has attracted numerous scholars to the field 
who, initially, attempted to explain the phenomenon more or less abstracted from its 
specific manifestation. However, the diverse human behaviours involved in the 
migration process mean that migration cannot be explained by a single theory. The 
 112 
 
‘law of migration’, developed by Ernest George Ravenstein, is the beginning of 
modern thinking about migration. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and even into 
the early 1980s, the causes and consequences of migration were heavily emphasised. 
Two models prevailed: the ‘neo-classical explanation’ and ‘the historical-structural 
theory’ (Massey et al., 1998), (also known as ‘voluntarist’ and ‘structuralist’) 
(Papastergiadis, 2000). 
 
The neo-classical explanations for migration are based on familiar tenets from neo-
classical economics, such as rational choice, utility maximisation, expected net 
returns, factor mobility and wage differentials. Migration is explained as a 
combination of the micro-perspective of individual decision-making and the macro-
counter part of structural determinants. The most influential theory of neo-classical 
explanation is the ‘push-pull’ model, which states that migration is caused by two 
counterbalancing forces: people being ‘pushed’ out of their original areas and 
‘pulled’ towards more developed destinations. At the micro level, migration is 
caused by individual decisions made by rational actors who seek to improve their 
well-being by moving to places of higher wages than at home which are sufficient to 
offset the tangible and intangible costs involved in the move. It is, therefore, an 
individual spontaneous and voluntary act, which results from the comparison 
between the present situation of the actor and the expected net gain of moving, and 
arises from a cost-benefit calculus (Tadaro, 1969, 1976). At the macro level, spatial 
redistribution of the factors of production responds to different relative prices (Ranis 
& Fei, 1961; Todaro, 1976). Migration is caused by the uneven geographical 
distribution of labour and capital. Workers tend to go from countries or regions with 
abundant labour and lower wages to labour-scarce countries with higher wages, 
which leads to the redistribution of production factors and the equalisation of wages 
between countries and regions in the long run. 
 
However, the neo-classical explanation is not reflected in reality. It cannot explain 
why so few people move despite the huge income difference between regions and 
nations. Although migration is clearly related to differentials in income, economic 
disparities alone are not enough to explain it. Migration is treated as a homogeneous 
and static process in the neo-classical explanation, which assumes that migrants are 
homogeneous in taste and risk – and so it is unable to explain the diversity of 
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migration in different countries or regions with similar structural conditions. Also, it 
only explains migration in one dimension, ignoring other important aspects, such as 
the political dimension, personal characteristics and non-economic influences. Worse, 
the neo-classical perspective treats labour as a factor of production driven by the 
market, ignoring the exploitation of migrant workers during the migration process.  
 
Dependency theory (or ‘historical-structural theory’ as defined by Massey, and 
‘structuralist’ as defined by Papastergiadis) sees migration as a flight from misery 
“caused by global wide capitalist expansion and is therefore inherently unable to 
resolve the structural conditions that cause migration” (De Haas, 2010). The 
revolution of capitalism has given way to an international order composed of core 
industrialised countries and peripheral agrarian ones linked by uneven and 
asymmetrical relations and this leads to the growing developmental, demographic 
and democratic disparities which provide migrants with powerful incentives to move. 
Within the high-income economies, there is increasing segmentation of labour 
markets. Migrant workers are considered as mobile labour potential or the ‘reserve 
army of labour’, which keep labour costs low and fill the ‘dangerous’, ‘dirty’ or 
‘difficult’ positions refused by indigenous workers. Migrant workers accept these ‘3-
D’ jobs mainly because they are excluded from other workspaces, while 
unemployment has increased or remained at a stable but high level in large parts of 
the developing world.  
 
Additionally, there is a selective migration of talented and educated people from 
poor to wealthy countries which means the poor countries lose the healthiest, most 
dynamic and productive members of their society, depleting their already meagre 
supplies of skilled manpower (Papademetriou, 1985). By attracting the most 
productive workers from developing countries, core countries obtain the critical 
human resources for future economic growth, while developing countries bear the 
social costs. Developing countries are doubly undermined: not only do they lose the 
most dynamic members of their labour force, but they are not compensated for the 
‘reproduction costs’ incurred by these migrants as they grow up (Massay, et.al., 
1998).  
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“The agency of the migrant was largely seen as subordinate to, and determined by, 
the structures of ‘state-capitalism’” (Papastergiadis, 1999:32). However, the 
dependency approach overstates “the role of structure – the constraining or enabling 
general political, institutional, economic social and cultural context in which 
migration takes place” and ignores “the limited but real capacity of individuals to 
overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure” (De Haas, 2005, n.p., 
emphasis in original). Its proponents consider migrant workers as passive victims, 
who are unable to respond organisationally to the market forces assigned to them, 
thus ignoring the workers’ contribution to both their ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ 
society, and the transformative role of migration.  
 
Post 1980, migration theories have increasingly acknowledged the heterogeneous, 
non-deterministic nature of migration and turned towards more pluralist, hybrid 
approaches, simultaneously taking agency and structure into account. These newly 
emerged theories include new economics of migration, dual labour market theory, 
world-system, social networks, etc. These theories either focus on empirical research 
or present an eclectic theoretical model combining the neo-classical explanation and 
dependency approach. Even though these migration theories have different basic 
assumptions and analysis of the driving factors of the migration process, they all 
affirm that it is the “imbalances, either in wages, opportunities, social structures, 
levels of capitalist penetration, and so forth”, which cause the migration (Bakewell, 
2007:12). Papastergiadis (1999) criticises most contemporary theories of migration 
for still focusing on single major factors and track the consequences of dominant 
structures. He points out that there has been a fundamental shift away from 
traditional destinations, an expansion in the types of people who migrate and the 
imposition of increasing restrictions on conditions of entry settlement. “In the 
absence of structured patterns of global migration, with direct causes and effects”, he 
writes, “turbulence is the best formulation for the mobile processes of complex self-
organisation that are now occurring” (Papastergiadis, 1999:4). These migration 
theories all treat migration as derivative of social, cultural and economic structures. 
They describe migrants as bystanders or byproducts of social changes or, at best, 
economic participants in social changes (ibid., 1999: 3-21). Therefore, they have 
limited energy to explain the multi-layered relations between development and 
migrants.  
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Migrants are not purely passive victims of the structure or purely rational individuals 
pursuing benefits maximisation, without any subjectivity. Their mass protests and 
general strikes across the world have prompted scholars to link the emerging forms 
of subjectivity to mobility (Andrijasevic & Anderson, 2009). Migrants’ crossing of 
borders and their protests and strikes in Europe, the United States and Australia have 
led to scholars rethinking the relationship between migration, labour and citizenship. 
The migrants’ mobility is a form of energy to escape existing disciplines and rules. 
When employing the lens of citizenship to study migrants, mainstream studies often 
contend that migrants want to become citizens and their struggles target citizenship. 
However, when looking through the lens of the autonomy of migration, the migrants 
– regular or irregular – act as citizens and insist that they are already citizens. Actors 
of citizenship, the migrants make practices and claims for justice, using the already 
existing legal and political framework (Isin, 2009). Also, although it is generally 
believed that is difficult for migrants to form traditional unionized format 
organisations as they are segmented and informalised in the labour market, migrant 
workers can produce a new form of political subjectivity through their informal 
networks. These informal networks are embedded in their daily life, expansions of 
specific subjectivity. Therefore, the study of migrants’ struggles for free movement 
and labour rights should involve a political reading, rather than just dismissing these 
struggles as disordered mass incidents caused by economic desperation and 
individuals’ destitution. The reading of collective migrant subjectivity does not 
conceive mobility in terms of coercion, but focuses on its real political dynamics and 
on the ruptures it produces within the existing order (Andrijasevic & Anderson, 
2009). The theory of autonomy of migration provides us a different perspective to 
analyse the migration process. It emphasises that the agency of migrants should not 
be ignored, as it is a fundamental force of social, cultural and economic 
transformation (Mezzadra, 2010). The next section discusses this approach in detail.  
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4.5 The Autonomy of Migration Approach 
 
4.5.1 Introducing the Autonomy of Migration  
 
The autonomy of migration approach focuses on contemporary migration 
movements and state policies that attempt to regulate such movements. It also 
follows migrants’ practices and subjective demands that express themselves over and 
above the ‘objective causes’ that determined them. What distinguishes it from an 
‘economistic’ perspective and a ‘dependency’ approach is its emphasise on the 
subjectivity of living labour as a constitutive and antagonistic element of capital 
relations (Mezzadra, 2010). 
 
The theory of autonomy of migration (Mezzadra, 2010) treats “migration as a 
constituent creative force which fuels social, cultural and economic transformations” 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2008:xviii). Migration has been (and continues to be) an 
elemental power throughout the formation of modern polity. The exodus from the 
zones of misery is understood as political articulation and genuine social struggle 
when seen from the perspective of the autonomy of migration. Moreover, “the 
refusal and subversion of imperceptible subjectivities trigger social transformation 
first, and any conversion of the state follows this social change” (Papadopoulos et al., 
2008:13). Mitropoulos argues that viewing, 
 
migrants as subjects deprived of rights and citizenship means that 
they are presented as indicators of a political exclusion, as well as a 
sign of the inexorable necessity of the nation-state…[t]he concept 
of autonomy of migration is an insistence that politics does not 
need to be the property of the state and those who – however 
implicitly and by dint of a claim to belong to it, as the subject that 
is proper to it (its property) – can claim to reserve for themselves 
the thought and action that is deemed to be properly political. 
(2006:10, emphasis in original)  
 
According to the autonomy of migration approach, migration is a strategy 
undertaken in and against the cramped spaces of the global political economies of 
work, gender and desire. The flight from devastation can be akin to a strike for 
higher pay and the withdrawal of one’s labour from impoverished layers of the 
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market. It “adapts differently to each particular context, links unexpected social 
actors together, absorbs and reshapes the sovereign dynamics targeting its control” 
(Papadopoulos & Tsianios, 2007:226). Tsianios (2007) considers that mobility and 
exit play the role of protagonist in challenging and forcing each particular historical 
configuration of social and political control. Papadopoulos, et al. (2008:xviii) 
understand migration as “a force which evades the policing practices of subjectivity”. 
Mezzadra (2010) stresses the importance of considering migratory movements and 
conflicts in terms that prioritize the subjective practices, desires, expectations and 
behaviours of the migrants themselves, i.e. focusing on the subjectivity of migrants. 
 
Hence, the autonomy of migration theory differs from other migration theories in 
that it seeks to understand migration itself as a social and political movement in the 
literal sense of the works, not as a mere response to economic and social malaise 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2008:202). Migrants use their knowledge of mobility, 
infrastructure of connectivity, diverse forms of transnational communities of justice, 
and politics of care to build a mobile commons. The ‘mobile commons’ refers to the 
common sense of ‘we’, recognized by migrant workers. The identity of ‘we’ links to 
“the world of knowledge, of information, of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of 
social relations, of services exchange, of solidarity and sociability that can be shared, 
used and where people contribute to sustain and expand it” (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 
2013:190). Migrants utilize the spaces of the camps and of migrant neighbourhoods, 
as well as virtual spaces such as chatrooms, Facebook and email to stay mobile, 
collect information about routes, possibilities for survival and learn tactics of 
existence (Panagiotidis & Tsianos, 2006, cited in Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 
2013:190). This knowledge and information can help migrants to remain mobile, 
thus continuing to expand and circulate this knowledge for future migrants. The 
mobile commons is assembled and materialised in everyday life (Papadopoulos & 
Tsianos, 2013), from their subjective practices, desires, expectations, behaviours and 
daily struggles. Moreover, the migration regime is constantly reshaped under the 
pressure of labour movements and struggles (Mezzadra, 2011). It opens the 
possibility of analytically and practically connecting various struggles within the 
context of migration and for understanding the social transformation.  
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4.5.2 The Autonomy of Migration and Capitalism  
 
Looking through the lens of autonomy of migration, we can see a structural tension 
for capitalism between the entirety of subjective practices of migration and the 
attempt by capital to despotically control them. Labour mobility is a historical 
compromise design to integrate the newly released, disorganised and wandering 
workforce into a new regime of productivity (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007:233; 
Tsianos, 2007:161). Mobility becomes the first and primary area of control and gives 
birth to the system of the labour market (based on free wage labour). Wage labour is 
more an ordering principle of the surplus of workers’ freedom than a mere 
mechanism of oppression (Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos, 2008). The 
freedom of wage labour comprises two elements. Firstly, labourers are no longer part 
of the means of production themselves, so they are ‘free’ of any direct proprietorial 
rights exercised over them. Secondly, they no longer own their own means of 
production and subsistence and, therefore, are unencumbered by their own tools or 
land. They are free, but they have to sell their labour in the market in order to acquire 
necessities (Cohen, 2006). Wage labour transformed its freedom to be mobile into a 
fixed and stable workforce market. Later, capitalism transformed the force of the 
freedom of mobility into competitively organised upward social mobility 
(Papadopoulos, et al., 2008:204). The establishment of the wage labour system 
attempted to translate the freedom of the transient masses into a productive, 
utilisable, and exploitable workforce.  
 
Marx shows that the ‘industrial reserve army’ or ‘surplus working population’ is not 
only the necessary product of capital accumulation and the associated increase in 
labour productivity, but also at the same time “the lever of capitalist accumulation”, 
and “a condition of existence of capitalist mode of production” (Marx, 1990:784). 
Capitalists accumulate capital by bringing ever more workers into the production 
process, using the industrial reserve army to keep wages down and profits up and 
they increase working hours and working intensity wherever possible to increase 
surplus values. This super-exploitation of capital production always meets resistance 
from labourers. Labour movements in western countries, post World War II, forced 
capitalist system to aim for continuous expansion and full employment at any price 
(Castles & Kosack, 1980). Hence capitalism has to find a substitute for the 
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traditional form of reserve army, for without it capitalist accumulation is impossible. 
The unemployed masses of developing areas form a ‘latent surplus-population’ or 
reserve army. One of the reasons for the employment of immigrants is to make 
considerable savings in the costs of labour and the social reproduction of the 
workforce. Immigrants employed in core areas are primarily young and productive. 
It is possible to avoid paying the costs of ‘rearing’ workers and the maintenance 
costs after the end of their working lives. Restrictive immigration policies mean the 
majority of immigrants are single and so capital avoids paying the costs of 
reproduction of families. In addition, the conditions of reproduction of the 
immigrants themselves, as well as any families accompanying them, are below the 
average standards of indigenous workers.  
 
The mobility of the sellers of labour power is the greatest threat to capitalist 
development. It is why mobility has been such a concentrated target of state 
regulation and state intervention (Tsianos, 2007). Historically, the control of 
mobility was a reaction to the escape of the masses from enslavement and 
indentureship. The freedom to move is the largest source of productivity and the 
main target of control. Escape here refers to people’s mobility, which is a “betrayal 
of existing forms of representation, forms of representation that regulate everyday 
life through the co-option and domestication of people’s struggles” (Papadopoulos, 
et al., 2008:xv) and is “primarily imperceptible” (ibid.:xiii). It is a mode of social 
change which can challenge the present configuration of control elusively and 
forcefully. The escape of people comes first before the response of control regime. 
Capitalism transformed the force of the freedom of mobility into competitively 
organised upward social mobility (Papadopoulos, et al., 2008). There is no 
capitalism without migration. The regime which attempts to control labour mobility 
plays a strategic role in the constitution of capitalism and class relations. The control 
of mobility affects the movement of migrant workers as well as the totality of labour 
relations. The movements and struggles of irregular migrants, as well as the politics 
of control which targets them, are associated with the flexibilisation of the labour 
market and the ‘precarisation’ of labour. The process of illegalisation or 
irregularisation of migrant workers is linked to the exploitation of migrant labour. 
Neo-liberalism is the market-driven institutionalisation of insecurity; it leads to the 
decline of normal wage labour and constant expansion of zones of insecure 
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employment relations. The flexibilisation of the labour market generates a 
multiplication of insecure and non-standardised forms of employment. Jobs 
increasingly become contract-based, part-time or short term, many of them product-
oriented and paid by the quality of the product the worker delivers. Additionally, it 
tries to exit the framework of social welfare and to avoid the responsibility of social 
reproduction. The precaritisation of labour also dismisses the attempts by workers to 
associate and to unionize. The illegalisation or irregularisation is an effective 
institutional tool to make the migration flow controllable. Immigration policies are 
used to restrict the status, rights and entitlements that migrants can claim once they 
are within national states. The growing number of migrants without legal documents 
are forced to work in the secondary labour market. Because they are excluded by the 
existing legal and political framework, migrant workers are normally employed in a 
‘clandestine’ manner within the informal economy. The labour market is broken 
down and stratified. Migrant workers are assigned to a hierarchy of status categories. 
The economic conditions for ‘irregular’ migration are consolidated in industrialised 
countries in order to facilitate the supply of cheap, flexible and compliant labour 
(Mezzadra, 2010). Moulier Boutang (1997, cited in Tsianos, 2007) compared the 
mobility of labour to slavery. The contractual agreements are no different to non-
economic violence, which forces slaves to work, and they make labour dependent on 
the process of production of capital. Capitalism supplies freedom to workers to enter 
a dependent labour relation, rather than to leave such a relation freely. The 
valorisation and containment of labour mobility, as well as the specific form of 
subjectivity which correspond to practices of mobility, result in the structural tension 
of capitalism (Mezzadra, 2010).   
 
The mobility of labour has always been a contested field in historical capitalism. 
Historically, capitalism has always attempted to impose a ‘despotic’ control over the 
ensemble of subjective practices through which the mobility of labour expresses 
itself, by means of the fundamental mediation of the state (Cobarrubias, Cortes & 
Pickles, 2011). These subjective practices are responses to the continuous 
overturning of traditional social structures brought about by capitalist development. 
The dominance and exploitation relations in capitalist society are shaped by the 
management of mobility. Capital’s solicitation of labour mobility has always gone 
hand-in-hand with manifold attempts to filter, curb and even block it. As discussed 
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above, after absorbing the escaping rural peasants into the waged labour regime, 
capitalist production system continues to absorb the energy of escape of labourers, 
by subordinating them under capital. Subordination of living labour under capital 
follows the containment of labour mobility, and this plays a strategic role in the 
constitution of capitalism and class relations. The next section discusses the 
containment of labour mobility through the strategy of subordination.  
 
4.6 Subordination of the Working Class under Capital  
 
The establishment of the early capitalist mode of production was not only founded 
on the production and circulation of commodities and a new system of labour 
productivity, but also on the necessity of turning itinerant bodies to wage labour. At 
the beginning, manufacturing and proto-capitalist production followed the transient 
masses, who had escaped the feudal system. Then the peasants were squeezed from 
the land to form the new “free proletariat” (Marx, 1990:896) and were disciplined 
and absorbed by the new regime of control – the wage labour system. Free labourers 
sold their own labour power, as a commodity, to the owners of money in the market, 
earning wages to support the reproduction and maintenance of themselves and their 
families. A ‘free’ wage labour has a double meaning, that “as a free individual he 
can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity”, but also “he has no other 
commodity for sale” (Marx, 1990:272).  
 
4.6.1 Formal and Real Subordination 
 
Exploitation of wage labourers, according to Marx, forms the foundation of 
capitalism system. One portion of the labour process of labourers is to produce the 
value of means of subsistence, i.e. to maintain the existence of the labourers. The rest 
of the labour process is no longer necessary labour, (termed by Marx as surplus 
labour), and is extracted by owners of the production means to create surplus value. 
Exploitation of wage labourers is based on the extraction of surplus labour, 
sometimes referred to as unpaid work. The rate of surplus value is the amount of 
time the worker puts into reproducing the elements of her wages compared with the 
amount of time the worker devotes to enriching capitalists. “The rate of surplus-
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value is, therefore, an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labour-power 
by capital, or of the labourers by capitalist” (Marx, 1990:326). Capital has one single 
life impulse that is to create value and surplus value, absorbing the greatest possible 
amount of surplus labour. To raise the rate of exploitation, that is increasing the 
surplus labour, the owners of production means can make the workers work more 
hours to extract an absolute surplus value. When the excessive length of working 
hours meets resistance from workers, capitalists change their strategy to extract the 
surplus labour by improving the general productivity and increasing the intensity of 
work for more relative surplus value.  
 
Capitalist class project of proletarianisation is the centre of Marx’s theory of class 
development. For Marx, it occurs by the subsumption or subordination of labour 
process under capital’s valorisation process and the subordination of labour to capital. 
When looking through the lens of the autonomy of migration approach, it is clear 
this subordination process is the control regime of labour mobility, with the aim of 
containment of labour into capitalist production system. There are two stages for the 
subordination mechanism, formal and real subordination, which are closely 
associated with those of absolute and relative surplus-value. The first stage, formal 
subordination, refers to the process in which labourers turn to wage labour. People 
lose their independent means of subsistence and become sellers of the temporary use 
of their labour capacity. The labour process, which remains the same as before from 
the perspective of the technological point of view, becomes subordinate to capital. 
Capital extracts surplus value from the labour process with its given productivity of 
labour. The formal subordination of labour process to capital does not affect the 
character of the actual labour process, the actual mode of working (Marx, 
1990:1021), hence it can only acquire absolute surplus value by an absolute 
extension of the social working day. 
 
The second stage is real subordination, which relies on the increase in labour 
productivity. Higher productivity means that less labour is required to produce the 
necessaries of subsistence, allowing capitalists more unpaid working hours to extract 
surplus value. It can be achieved by cooperation and division of labour within 
workshops, the use of machinery, and, in general, by the transformation of 
production by the conscious use of the sciences, mechanics and technology, and 
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through the enormous increase of scale corresponding to such developments, which 
is the entire development of the productive forces of socalised labour (Marx, 
1990:1024). The real subordination of labour process under capital is for 
reproduction of the real surplus value. Additionally, “with the real subsumption of 
labour under capital a complete revolution takes place in the mode of production 
itself, in the productivity of labour, and in the relation-within production-between 
capitalist and the worker, as also in the social relation between them” (Marx, 
2002:n.p.).  
 
Through formal subordination, labourers are transformed to be dependent and 
exploitable by capital. Formal subordination entails a coercive workplace discipline 
to control and suppress the labour’s power, autonomy and resistance. It leads to the 
widespread existence of the wage labour system. Through real subordination, 
labourers are dehumanised and deskilled, reduced to ‘living appendages’ of 
machines. The process of real subordination does not simply revolutionise the 
organisation of work within the factory, but extends the power and control of capital 
over society. It is not only simply extending the exploitative relations of the factory 
into society: ‘the social factory’ (Negri, 1988), but is the reconstitution of all social 
relations in the form of society (Dinerstein & Neary, 2002a:237). Real subordination 
is a real qualitative social change in which not only does capital become the 
totalizing and the process intrinsically capitalist, but labour becomes the constituent 
source of its domination (Postone, 1993, cited in Dinerstein & Neary, 2002a:237). 
Under the coercive concept of the power of subordination, labour is forced to sell its 
labour power to survive, and its everyday movement is controlled, even outside the 
workplace. The formation of a well-formed and circumstantially homogeneous 
working class is the result of ‘real subordination’ driven by industrialisation (Neilson, 
2007). The formal subordination process draws people together from different class 
origins over a long historical period. It meets resistance from these people. The 
project of real subordination follows up with the uneven pattern while also meeting 
ongoing struggles. Secondly, in historical practice, the projects of subordination vary 
and proceed unevenly across time, space, sector and function. Additionally, the 
dynamic economic and political environment, accompanied by dynamic labour’s 
resistance and movement limits the spread of subordination projects.   
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4.6.2 Subordination and Mobility 
 
When briefly introducing the historical stages of subordination, corresponding with 
the emergence and development of capitalism, we can see the tension between 
labour’s mobility and the attempt of containment. It started with the decreasing 
requirements for agricultural labour because of the increase in agricultural 
productivity. These rural surplus labourers were then absorbed by workshops and 
factories. In the manufacturing sector, craftsmen and small capitalists were 
overwhelmed by the newly emerging production process of large-scale 
industrialisation and increase in global trade. With the loss of their means of 
production, and with only their labour force left, they became wage-dependent 
labour. The expanded reproduction of capital leads capital continuously to destroy 
the livelihoods of petty commodity and subsistence producers (Clarke, 2002). The 
rise of capital production leads to supremacy and subordination in the process of 
production, which supplant ‘independence’ (Marx, 1990:1028). Additionally, the 
formal subordination not only extends the waged labour system to the labour process, 
but also tries to undermine people’s will and capacity to independently and directly 
meet their needs through their own unwaged activity by ensuring that the mobility of 
labourers was controlled so that they remained in the waged-labour system. Even 
though the mobility of labour still exists, it is limited within the expanding capitalist 
production process. The labour can choose to work in this factory or in that factory, 
but he cannot escape the vicious circle of selling out his labour power to survive. As 
discussed above, the mobile workers were disciplined and forced into the strictly 
regulated system of wage labour. The formal subordination is introduced as a new 
regime of control, responding to the escape of workers, which appropriate their 
energy and transform it into a new manageable social subjectivity. The discipline of 
migrants to be waged labour is about control of mobility. The labour process of 
workers is directly subordinated to capital. But at this stage, capital “has not yet 
succeeded in becoming the dominant force, capable of determining the form of 
society as a whole” (Marx, 1990:1023).  
 
Capitalism’s attempt to make labour formally subordinate to capital met constant 
resistance from labour. The workers gathered to fight against the extension of 
working hours. Also, as the jobs had not yet been reduced to homogenous pieces, 
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skilled workers and craftsmen organised strikes and protests against capitalists. 
Stopping work implies a refusal of the command of capital as the organiser of 
production.  
 
In order to destabilise the organisation of workers, capitalists introduced ‘scientific 
management’ and mass production. The competition-driven development and 
refinement of capitalist large-scale production impelled capitalists to improve their 
tactics to acquire more surplus value. Machinery was introduced to increase 
productivity, work tasks were reduced and equalised to an identical level and wages 
reduced to a standardised low level. The differences between workers’ work, skill 
and lifestyle were obliterated. The US-Taylorism system is a typical example of real 
subordination: work was deskilled and real subordination intensified as jobs became 
“rigorously determined by the configuration of the machine system” (Aglietta, 
1979:118). Moreover, neo-Fordist Taylorism, pioneered by Toyota, continued down 
this path by further reducing complex tasks to substitutable and interchangeable ones. 
Work is reduced to abstract labour power and workers’ every bodily movement is 
controlled and subordinated to the production machinery. Differences of lifestyle 
outside the factories are also obliterated as the various interests and conditions of life 
within the ranks of the proletariat become equalized, as machinery obliterates all 
distinctions of labour (Marx, 1952:54, cited in Neilson, 2007:96). Taylorism and 
neo-Fordist Taylorism, mediated by the ‘welfare state’ and Keynesian social and 
economic policies, including full employment, institutionalized bargaining power, 
and full covered social welfare, not only control workers’ bodily movements, but 
also require the mental involvement of self-regulation and commitment by workers. 
Trust is a key disciplinary device to ensure workers channel their mental energies as 
well as their bodily energies towards the productivity goals of the firm. Immobility is 
the heart of the Fordist regime. Mature Fordism is simply institutionalised 
insubordination.  
 
However, Fordism declined and went into crisis in the 1970s. Explaining the fall of 
Fordism, we can see that, firstly, within the Fordism system, workers are expected to 
be involved in the labour process both physically and mentally. To gain workers’ 
trust, companies need to guarantee full employment, employee welfare and security, 
however some believe that these undermine workplace discipline and to drive 
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continuing nominal wage increases (Armstrong et al., 1984, cited in Neilson, 2007). 
Under pressure from global intensification of inter-firm competition, companies are 
forced to pay more attention to multiple dimensions of competitiveness, including 
costs reduction. Secondly, the increasing use of subcontracting companies generates 
flexibility and reduced wages. The subcontracting companies are often located in 
newly industrializing countries, with low-wage labourers as their competitive 
advantage.  
 
Attempts to overcome the crisis of the Fordist production system and re-capture the 
escaping bodies of workers, led to the opening up of the space for capital’s 
neoliberal counter-revolution. The wide spread of national neoliberal projects, 
accompanied by the wave of globalisation, have facilitated capital’s global mobility 
and fuelled the labour division in the global market. The neoliberal projects and 
globalisation have successfully undermined wage increases and intensified 
competition and segmentation between and within nationally located workforces. 
Nation states are increasingly committed to the subordination projects in their desire 
to gain competitiveness over other nation states. Through the competition 
mechanism, national states and their workforces are deeply subordinated to the will 
of capital (Petit, 1999). These nation states have implemented a series of strategies to 
directly facilitate the renewal and deepening of labour’s subordination to capital. 
Capitalists made the simple calculation that it was more profitable to locate 
industries where labour was cheaper, political culture was most compliant, and 
environment responsibilities were minimal. Capitalism does not define labour cost 
according to local needs but from the position of the lowest global cost. It tries to 
reduce its contributions to the social income of workers employed by particular 
companies and to the social reproduction fund generally through taxation and 
government spending on social provision (Silver & Arrighi, 2000).  
 
The labour market is increasingly informalised and liberalised, in both well-
developed capitalist countries and developing countries, which implies increased 
formal subordination by more and more of the world’s population. Particularly in the 
newly industrialised countries, formal subordination is even more intense, and the 
forms of real subordination have tended to be pre-Toyotist. Although the more 
established newly industrialised countries have moved towards more fully fledged 
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lean production systems, this is countered by the free mobility of capital to search for 
even lower-wage workforces in even newer industrialising countries (Neilson, 2007). 
On the international level, the emergence of an international structure of industrial 
proletarian segmentation continues to differentiate the workforces of the advanced 
capitalist economies from the low-wage workforces of newly industrialising 
countries. On a national level, in advanced capitalist economies, the security of the 
core is declining and the flexibility of the labour market increasing. More and more 
of the workforce are involved in the service sector, a sector that is inherently difficult 
to industrialise and is not directly amenable to mass-production techniques. In the 
newly industrialising countries, the various projects of subordination lead to the 
stratification of the proletariat. There are informal workers, self-employed workers, 
short-contract workers, and workers in production systems closer to Fordism or 
‘bloodier’ forms of the machine system without social protection. Subordination of 
migrant workers to capital is a control regime by capital to capture labour mobility. 
 
 
4.6.3 Escape and Insubordination  
 
Based on the review of subordination strategies, it is clear that within capitalist 
society, the proletariat has never stopped escaping and subverting the exploitation 
relations. As mentioned above, escape is a betrayal of existing forms of control 
regimes of the mobility of people. Escape of labour take different forms, the actual 
escape and insubordination. The actual escape can be understood as a fight against 
the formal subordination or protests against the attempts to turn the living labour into 
wage labour during the formal subordination. Actual escape also includes the escape 
from the certain containment system of living labour. The subordination of labour 
under capital is the continuum of containment, therefore, the insubordination of 
labour is a form of escape. The insubordination, unlike actual escape, takes place 
more within capital relations: labour refuse to work for capital on its terms, that is, 
profitable terms (Cleaver, 2011:58). Extreme manifestations of escape include 
suicide, autotomy, unemployment and vagrancy; an extreme radicalised 
manifestation might even go so far as revolution. The conflict between subordination 
and insubordination is reflected in the escape of labour from the existing control 
regime and their hot pursuit of it within capital system. The resistance and agency of 
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the oppressed obstruct existing ruling relations and force the elaboration of new 
strategies of ruling (Kinsman, 2004). The workforce should not be reduced to an 
object of capitalism, but acknowledged as an active subject making the internal 
transformation of capitalist. The struggles of workers are the dynamic, initiating 
social forces of production. Capitalists often develop technological transformations, 
management technology innovations and global financial systems in response to 
working class struggles and attempt to weaken or absorb the energy of struggle. 
Initially, capitalists lengthened the working day to increase their exploitation rate, 
but were blocked by the struggles of working class. Hence, they were forced to 
develop technology, invent machines, and formulate new forms of ‘scientific 
management’ to increase productivity to exploit more relative surplus value. The 
working class struggle is within and against capital and carries the possibility to 
break it. The working class is in a dynamic process of remaking itself and being 
remade. Large scale factory production and scientific management (disrupted the 
power of the organisations of craft workers, and then reformed them into the mass 
and industrial workers. In response to strong trade unions and association power of 
mass and industrial workers, neo-liberalism has been brought in to informalise and 
fragment the working class. The control of capital did not stay within the factories 
but came out to organise and shape the community and everyday life through state 
and social relations. Workers are led to real subordination to capital. As mentioned 
above, escape, is used by workers as a powerful strategy to fight back against the 
existing control regime, which in turn forces capital and state to follow (Kinsman, 
2004).  
 
4.7 Application in China-Subordination and Insubordination of 
Migrant Workers  
In their book, Escape Route, Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos (2008) see the 
escape of people as an act of struggle, subversion, desertion, sabotage, and a refusal 
to accept existing political structures of power. It forces the existing control regime 
to respond to the new situation which escaping people create. Capitalism has been 
reintroduced to China. Rural labourers have been transferred into the secondary and 
tertiary industries. Along with the deepening of reform and opening up, education, 
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medical care, housing and other reproduction resources have been marketised and 
involved in the monetary payment system. Peasants are no longer able to survive in 
their land and have no choice but to become wage-dependent proletarians. At the 
state level, economic development has been considered as top priority. Migrant 
workers, concentrated in labour-intensive industries, have fuelled the economic take-
off. At the factory level, capital utilises lengthening of working hours and improving 
productivity to exploit more surplus value. It is not only attempting to control 
migrant workers in the labour process, but also in their daily life. Capital is creative 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001); it follows escape, using it as the engine of its development 
(Tronti, 1966). Based on different pre-conditions for capitalist development, 
subordination strategies vary from place to place in the coastal areas of China, 
leading to the various stages of proletarianisation of migrant workers. The escape of 
migrant workers is followed by the innovation of subordination strategy and control 
regime. The escape taking place now in China by migrant workers includes two 
forms, one is the actual escape from containment and insubordination. The escape 
from containment, historically, includes escape from the bonds of people’s commune 
system and the hukou system. The insubordination of migrant workers in China is 
more within capital relation, which is fighting against complete subjection to 
capitalist production process. It is the workers who are the living and inventive force 
within capitalism, not capitalists. The composition of the working class is deeply 
influenced by the different strategies of subordination. Hence, it is feasible to 
analysise the formation of the migrant working class in China using analysis of the 
strategies of subordination projects in different historical periods and geographic 
locations.  
 
Although capitalism seeks to subordinate everyone’s life to work, from the 
traditional factory proletariat to peasants, housewives and students, also it should not 
be forgotten that all these people’s struggles involve both resistance to this 
subordination and efforts to construct alternative ways of being (Cleaver, 2011:54). 
The hukou system is considered as an effective tool, allocating representations and 
rights to different groups of people based on their birthplace. Urban residents are 
automatically granted ‘citizenship’ and the rights that go with it, while rural peasants 
are excluded from such rights. The hukou is operated like a de facto passport within 
China. When rural peasants move away from rural areas to urban areas, their 
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mobility becomes the target of the control regime. The state and the emerging 
capitalist market economy utilise the hukou system to maintain the supply of low-
cost labour, which in turn fuels the development of the export-oriented economy. 
However, migrant workers are not obedient and submissive objects of such control 
regime. When we look at the Chinese context, we can see how the escape of rural 
peasants to urban areas as migrant workers triggers adjustments in the hukou system. 
Their mobility and daily activities are the most powerful weapon to force the state to 
make changes as evidenced by the recent loosening of the hukou system. Before the 
launch of reform and opening up, peasants had already actively moved across the 
rural-urban borders, even under the strict mobility control regime. Within the SOEs, 
subject to tight recruitment controls by the state, 8.5% of employees were recruited 
from rural areas purely because they could be paid less than urban employees. Since 
1978, economic reform has stimulated the demands of low-cost rural migrant 
workers. Faced with the migrant workers’ strong desires to move from rural to urban 
areas, the prohibition on moving gradually loses its power. Facing the surge of 
migrant workers, urban administrators realised that the rigid planned economic 
institution was no longer adequate to prevent the floating of the rural population. To 
cope with the migrant worker tide, a new administrative framework was gradually 
built up across different government departments. However, as the new framework 
was more of a ‘stop-gap measure’, the interests of various government departments 
were not unified, and the responsibilities of different government departments were 
not clarified. This allowed migrant workers to make use of regulatory loopholes to 
their own benefit. The administration was not efficient enough to prevent the moving 
bodies of migrant workers. For example, while the labour bureaus control the 
recruitment of migrant workers in formal enterprises, they cannot control the migrant 
workers working in the informal labour market, domestic workers, peddlers, 
carpenters, and so on. Although the state attempted to keep migrant workers under 
the purview of some government departments, as they had with the ‘urban citizens’, 
it failed to do so. The disadvantages of not being ‘urban citizens’ sometimes became 
an advantage of ‘freedom’ from the ‘gaze’ of control regime.  
 
Of course, the state still held a powerful instrument to absorb these energies of 
mobility: the hukou system is still a very effective tool of ‘exclusion’. However, it is 
gradually changing. Along with the deepening of socio-economic transformation and 
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the daily activities of migrant workers, it has adjusted to maintain its function of 
control. Recently, the ‘points-based’ system, implemented in several cities and 
metropolises including Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, shows the new trend in 
reform of the hukou system. However, it is unthinkable that the state will give up 
such an efficient tool in the foreseeable future. It is more likely that the seesaw battle 
between the mobility of migrants and the state will carry on. The hukou system is a 
typical example of the control regime of migrant workers in China. Analysis of the 
autonomy of migrant workers in other aspects of the interactions between the control 
regime of the state, such as the legal institutions (the construction of a regulatory 
labour relations framework), and the control regime within factories, and the 
attempts of migrant workers to escape capitalist domination can provide us with a 
more comprehensive view to understand the relations between Chinese development 
and migrant workers.  
 
In the next three empirical chapters, covering Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
respectively, we can see how the different pre-conditions of capitalist development 
lead to different strategies to subordinate migrant workers to capital, and how 
capital’s subordination project meets resistance from migrant workers. It should be 
noted that although capitalist development of China in the reform era has taken place 
under the umbrella of neo-liberalism, the subordination projects in these three 
different coastal areas actually are more of a mixture. As discussed above, neo-
liberalism has greatly facilitated the mobility of capital, and so to its relocation and 
further divisions of labour worldwide. In China, the subordination of migrant 
workers began with formal subordination but was even more intensive. Along with 
the development of capitalism along different pathways in different provinces, there 
is evidence of upgrading to more fully fledged lean-production systems. This 
tendency shows real subordination of migrant workers to the global capital. 
Therefore, the different stages of subordination of migrant workers encounter 
different forms of escape of migrant workers. Capital’s subordination projects and 
the state’s apparatuses, such as the hukou system and legal institutional regime, have 
been deeply influenced by the mobility and agency of migrant workers. In the next 
three chapters, the relationship between the development in different provinces and 
migrant workers is presented and analysed in detail before going to reveal how the 
pattern of capitalist development was determined by working-class negativity 
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(blocking and forcing changes) and attempts of capital to stem and cooperate with 
these struggles in different contexts.  
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Chapter 5 One Step Ahead Development, One Step Ahead 
Labour Relation 
5.1 Introduction 
Since 1978, Guangdong has been used as a test area for reform and opening up. The 
economic miracle of Special Economic Zones proved the efficiency of the export-
oriented development strategy. This export-oriented development then spread to the 
Pearl River Delta, where its success became known as the ‘Pearl River Model’. The 
Pearl River Model (PRM) is characterized by the combination of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), local resources and the processing trade.
27
 Alongside this 
development strategy, another key factor in Guangdong’s success has been capturing 
an enormous amount of low cost labour or migrant workers. The subordination of 
rural migrant workers, who escaped the previous strict urban-rural migration control 
regime, to capital, has fuelled the development of capitalism in Guangdong.  
 
The inflow of foreign investment has to be understood in light of the global division 
of labour: the spread of neo-liberal projects stimulated the relocation of global 
capital in the developing world. The subordination strategies applied in Guangdong, 
especially in PRD, are mixed. Firstly, the manufacturing industry in PRD is closely 
related to ‘subcontracting’. Migrant workers in subcontracted firms are experiencing 
production systems closer to US-Taylorism, or even earlier and ‘bloodier’ forms, but 
without the social protections associated with the Fordist era. They are facing 
intensive formal subordination related to the extraction of absolute surplus value. 
The subcontracted firms may be foreign direct invested companies or private 
                                                 
27 Processing trade refers to “the business activity of importing all or part of the raw and auxiliary 
materials, parts and components, accessories, and packaging materials from abroad in bond, and re-
exporting the finished products after processing or assembly by enterprises within the mainland. It 
includes processing with supplied materials and processing with imported materials. Under processing 
with supplied materials, the imported materials and parts are supplied by the foreign party which is 
also responsible for selling the finished products. The business enterprise does not have to make 
foreign exchange payment for the imports and only charges the foreign party a processing fee. Under 
processing with imported materials, the business enterprise makes foreign exchange payment for the 
imported materials and parts and exports the finished products after processing” (China-trade-
research.hktdc.com, 2015). 
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enterprises which rely on foreign orders. An increasing number of giant transnational 
companies (for example, in the auto and electronics industries) are integrating their 
activities in the PRD into their lean production strategies. They have relocated their 
production bases to the PRD, to benefit from the low-cost and disciplined migrant 
workers and the investment-friendly environment. These production bases are no 
longer sites of the earlier bloodier machine system but neoliberal versions of 
Toyotism; the tasks are deskilled and homogenized, while the wage relation is 
flexibilised, resulting in migrant workers’ real subordination to capital.  
 
The one-step-ahead capitalist development in this region goes in parallel with one-
step-ahead labour relations. The rapidly developing socioeconomic environment has 
shaped labour relations. Equally, the constantly changing relations between the state, 
labour and capital have led to significant social transformation in Guangdong. 
Subordination strategies are constantly resisted by migrant workers as evidenced by 
the increasing number of labour disputes, as well as strikes and protests. Migrant 
workers, especially the young generation migrant workers, are increasingly aware of 
their rights. The unceasing fights and struggles have not only forced capital to 
change its exploitation mechanisms, but also compelled the state to adjust its labour 
regime. Through struggling and fighting, migrant workers study the secret of the 
production process, accumulate struggle experiences, learn new strategies, build 
social networks, and create new tactics. Political, social and economic factors shape 
their actions as these actions shape the external environment. They are a constituent 
part of Guangdong’s social transformation and a creative force which fuels the social 
transformation.  
This chapter examines the socioeconomic development of the Pearl River Delta 
(PRD) in which the rise of labour movement is embedded. The development path of 
the PRD reveals the process of subordination of migrant workers to capital. The 
practice of subordination process in Guangdong is also closely related to the 
mediation of the state apparatus. The local state plays an important role in facilitating 
capital’s capture of the energies of escape of migrant workers and so the reform and 
adjustment taken by the state is also discussed. After tracing the escape pathway of 
migrant workers, the current situation of younger generation migrant workers is 
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considered. Migrant workers are struggling with the socio-economic environment. 
Since the dawn of the new century, several significant strikes and labour movements 
have had profound influences. This chapter uses two of them as case studies in order 
to analyse the interaction between control and escape of migrant workers. It then 
goes on to address the question of how the subordination of migrant workers by 
capital and the state, and the insubordination of migrant workers shape and reshape 
each other in the concrete context of the PRD area. 
 
5.2 The Rapidly Changing Social-Economic Circumstances in the 
Pearl River Delta since 1978 
1978 was the first year of reform and the opening-up era in China. Guangdong, 
where numerous unprecedented innovations have subsequently sprung up (e.g., the 
first export-oriented economy development area, the first Special Economic Zone-
Shenzhen, the first san lai yi bu (三来一补 Three Import and Compensation Trade)
28
 
enterprise, the first implementation of labour contract system and foreign exchange 
swap, etc), fully embodies the achievements and profound impacts of reform and 
opening-up policy. Following in the footsteps of the Asian Tigers, the PRD provides 
a Chinese-style development-model for economic take-off. It not only includes the 
world-famous ‘Shenzhen Speed’, but also different development patterns based on 
different regional advantages and characteristics. Dongguan, Shunde, Nanhai, and 
Zhongshan were named the ‘Guangdong Tigers’ after the four ‘Asian Tigers’ to 
indicate their rapid economic achievements. The location of these cites/areas can be 
seen in the map in Figure 20. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 The enterprises that process raw materials according to clients' requests, assemble parts and process 
according to client samples, and engage in compensation trade. Compensation trade is a form of trade 
where foreign businessmen provide the equipment and technology, and commit to buying back from 
the Chinese party a certain amount of products for export. The cost of equipment and technology may 
either be paid back in instalments or with other products. The compensation trade formula is applied 
to both processing and assembly operations (The Office of Taiwan Affairs of Tianjin Municipal 
Government, 2015). 
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Source: Author made based on online source: 
http://www.58pic.com/tupian/zhongguoditushiliangtu.html  
 
 
5.2.1 The Achievement of Development in Guangdong since 1978 
 
Distinctive geographic and environmental advantages (being adjacent to Hong Kong 
and Macau), special preferential policies enacted by central government, export-
oriented development strategy and a continuous supply of cheap labour, are the 
foundation and condition of all the above development models. The development 
strategy fuelled the PRD economy’s take-off. As shown in Figure 21, from 1979 to 
1990 the Guangdong GDP annual growth rate averaged 12.7%. From 1991 to 2002 it 
was 14.6% and from 2003 to 2012, 12.2% (Guangdong Statistics Bureau, 2013). 
Moreover, Guangdong has had the biggest regional economy in China since 1989, 
accounting for around one tenth of the Chinese economy.  
Figure 20: The Pearl River Delta area (blue circle), and Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shunde and Nanhai (red circles) 
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Figure 21 Guangdong's GDP and its Real Growth Rate (1978-2012) 
The growth of per capita GDP has been impressive (Figure 22), with an average 
growth rate of 16% from 1978 to 2012. It is gradually approaching the standard of a 
middle income country ($10,000). 
Figure 22 Guangdong’s per capita GDP and its real growth rate (1978-2012) 
 
The industrial structure of Guangdong has also experienced significant 
transformation (Figure 23). Primary industry has been in a constant decline, from 
48.7% in 1952, to 29.76% in 1978, and to 4.99% in 2012. Meanwhile the secondary 
and (especially) tertiary industries continue to grow. Since the 1970s, the secondary 
has replaced the primary industry as the leading force of economic growth, 
contributing one half of the GDP. The tertiary industry has almost doubled from 
23.63% in 1978 to 46.47% in 2012. 
 
Resource: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2013) Statistics Bureau of Guangdong.  
 
 
Source: Guangdong statistical yearbook (2006-2013) Statistic Bureau of Guangdong.  
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Figure 23 Industry Trends from 1978 to 2012 in Guangdong. 
 
The PRD has played an important role in Guangdong’s economic development, its 
contribution rate reaching a peak value of 81.3% in 2001 (Guangdong Statistics 
Official Website, 2006) (shown in Tables 8&9). 
 
 
 
Table 8 Contribution Ratio of Top 4 Cities to Guangdong’s Economic Growth, 1990-2005 
City Rank Contribution ratio (%) 
Shenzheng 1 21.4 
Guangzhou 2 20.6 
Foshan 3 11.5 
Dongguan 4 10.0 
Total  63.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource: Guangdong statistical yearbook (2006-2013) Statistic Bureau of Guangdong.  
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Table 9  Contribution of Different Areas to Guangdong’s Economic Growth 
Year 
Pearl River Delta 
(%) 
East (%) West (%) Mountain (%) 
1990 71.5 7.3 13.9 7.4 
1995 70.4 13.2 11.2 5.1 
2000 80.9 6.0 8.0 5.1 
2001 86.4 1.9 6.9 4.8 
2002 84.6 4.4 6.2 4.8 
2003 84.3 4.8 5.7 5.2 
2004 83.8 4.7 6.3 5.2 
2005 81.3 5.8 6.7 6.2 
 
Source: Guangdong Statistic Bureau, 2006 
 
The implementation of reform and opening-up policy certainly benefited from the 
central government leaders’ decisions and strong desire for development. However, 
in fact, China had no alternative as it was facing harsh socioeconomic conditions and 
tense international political relations. From 1958 to 1978, urban residents’ per capita 
disposable income increased by less than RMB 4, while rural residents gained a mere 
RMB 2.6 over 20 years. Social commodities were in short supply and enterprises 
lacked vitality (Wu, 2007:28). Guangdong was even poorer. Agricultural 
development in Guangdong lagged behind the national average and 20% of its 
population were starving. Poverty and starvation naturally created discontent among 
the population and the huge gap in living standards between Hong Kong and 
mainland China triggered a large amount of human trafficking. Statistics from 1954 
to 1978, record 565,000 attempts to escape to Hong Kong, of which 146,800 
succeeded. This workforce exodus resulted in 90,000 mu
29
 of agricultural land being 
abandoned, exacerbating the already low agricultural production (Liu, 2010). In 
1978, two important events signalled the beginning of reform: a discussion on the 
‘standard of truth’ and high-level central government officials visiting Western 
developed countries to learn new techniques. On March 26, 1978, the People’s Daily 
published a series of articles about the standard of truth which kick-started an 
                                                 
29
 Chinese units of measurement, 1 mu ≈666.66 ㎡. 
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extensive discussion and debate which eventually concluded that “the standard of 
establishing truth is practice rather than ideology, and even Maoism needs to be 
tested by a yardstick of practice” (Lin, 2008:39) and Hua’s principle of ‘Two 
Whatevers’30 was seriously criticised. The discussion enabled people to liberate their 
thoughts and subsequently personal individual thinking has become active in China 
(Song, 2013). ‘Practice establishes truth’ became the principle of reform and opening 
up and Guangdong was its first experiment. 
 
5.2.2 Special Economic Zones  
 
If the rural household contract responsibility system reveals the bottom-up reform 
force, the establishment and development of Special Economic Zone (SEZs) reflects 
the huge influences of central government’s preferential policies. On 31 January 
1979, the first economic development zone was established in Shekou, Shenzhen. In 
July, central government authorized the Guangdong government to implement 
special policies and flexible measures. This included Guangdong’s keeping any 
foreign exchange and fiscal revenue above a certain amount, which was set every 
five years; appropriate market regulation on materials and commodities based on the 
guidance of central government; autonomous rights of authority regarding economic 
planning, commodity prices, labour wages, enterprise management and foreign 
economic activities (Duan, 2008). In May 1980, four special exporting zones, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen were designated as SEZs. Shenzhen is the 
most significant and successful SEZ in China.  
 
Shenzhen SEZ used to be the county seat of Bao’an County which, in 1978 had a 
GDP of only RMB 60 million. In 1979, the Hong Kong China Merchants Group 
used one square kilometre of wasteland to build the first export-oriented economy 
development area in Shekou with 23 factories and a wharf linked directly to Hong 
Kong. The following year, funded by RMB30 million of bank loans and local 
government’s financial funds, the Guangdong Provincial Committee for the 
                                                 
30
 A principle of guidance stated by the previous Chairman Hua Guofeng. “Whatever decisions made 
by Chairman Mao, we should implement” and “Whatever instruction is given by Chairman Mao, we 
should follow with determination”. (Song, 2013:134, 300) 
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Administration of Special Economic Zones built tourist accommodations and 
financial and commercial facilities for foreign investors over almost a square 
kilometre in Luohu District. Profits earned from this initial development were 
utilized to further develop the area’s infrastructure (Duan, 2008).  
 
The development of the Luohu special zone was crucially driven by four 
governmental decrees: the construction funds were based on foreign investment; 
foreign investment companies were the main body of economy; economic operation 
was based on market regulation; and products were mainly designated for export. 
Over the past 35 years the Pearl River Delta development model has been based 
mainly on the export-oriented strategy. In the Shenzhen SEZ, the government 
enacted a series of policies preferential to foreign investors. Companies’ operation, 
taxation, land utilizing, employment system, foreign exchange management, 
products sale and immigration administration were all released from state control (Li, 
1996): 
 Taxes were low with several preferential reductions and exemptions.  
 Land was rented to foreign investors for long periods at low fees with 
minimal administrative interventions.  
 Enterprises were allowed to retain foreign exchange from their exports and 
the operational income. Additionally, foreign businesses could obtain foreign 
exchange at the Shenzhen Centre for Foreign Exchange Adjustment.   
 Foreign business could arrange their own means of export or employ agents 
to export their goods in accordance with government regulations.  
 The SEZ was independent in terms of its own revenue and expenditures.  
Reforms and innovations were experimented with first in these Special Economic 
Zones. Once proved useful and efficient, they were then promoted in the entire Pearl 
River Delta and then across the country. For instance, the land utilisation fee was 
first introduced in Shenzhen. In 1982 Shenzhen SEZ began to charge the land 
utilisation fee, its rates set according to different quality and location; this separated 
the ownership of land and the right to use land. The right to use land would no longer 
be administratively allocated by state nor would it come free and for an unlimited 
period of time. The change to a paid for and time-limited right meant that land could 
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now be counted as capital. Furthermore, following the State Council permission for 
‘paid transfer of land use right’ in April 1987, Shenzhen sold a 50-year lease of a 
5000m
2
 area in September. The income generated from land leases has been the most 
important portion of local governments’ fiscal revenue (Duan, 2008)..   
 
These experiments successfully pushed the development of the manufacturing 
industry. As Figure 24 shows, the growth rate of secondary industry in Shenzhen is 
higher than that of the general GDP, generally over 80% despite the development of 
SEZs dropping dramatically from 1985-1987 due to the mismatch between built 
infrastructure and slower attraction of factories to the zone. Figure 25 shows the data 
from 1987 to 2012. Although the growth rate is lower than in the previous period, it 
remained at around 20%. Factoring in the ever increasing economic aggregate, the 
growth rate of 20% is surprisingly rapid. 
  
Figure 24 Shenzhen's Growth Rate of GDP and the Secondary Industry, 1979-1985 
 
Sources: Shenzhen Statistic Yearbook 2013, Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 
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Figure 25 Shenzhen's Growth Rate of GDP and the Secondary Industry, 1987-2012 
 
Sources: Shenzhen Statistic Yearbook 2013, Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 
 
The success of the experiments in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone proved the 
feasibility of integration of global inflowing capital and cheap peasant workers in 
China. The export-oriented development strategy soon spread to the PRD area, with 
the boom in manufacturing in the labour-intensive light industry.  
 
5.2.3 Foreign Capital and Foreign Invested Enterprises of Three Import and Compensation 
Trade and Three Kinds of Foreign-Funded Enterprises 
 
Export-oriented development strategy is the key factor of the Guangdong economic 
success. By processing materials and designs and assembling components all 
supplied by foreign clients, and engaging in the compensation trade (san lai yi bu 三
来一补), joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, wholly foreign ventures and leasing 
business (san zi 三资), the Pearl River Delta attracted a large-scale flow of foreign 
capital to fuel its economic growth. Guangdong, especially the Pearl River Delta area 
is extremely dependent on foreign investment. Figure 26 clearly shows the difference 
in foreign trade dependence degree of Guangdong and the rest of China: Guangdong 
is nearly three times as reliant. Figure 27 shows that the net export of Guangdong 
province has increased constantly since 1987 apart from a small fluctuation in 2009 
due to the global economic recession.  
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Figure 26 Guangdong and China’s foreign trade dependence, 1987-2012 
 
Figure 27  Guangdong's net exports, 1987-2012 
 
The inflow of foreign capital flow has played a very important role in the growth of 
Guangdong’s economy and manufacturing industry. From 1978 to 2012, the average 
annual GDF growth was 13.35%, and the average annual industrial added value 
13.44%. Taking statistical data in 2005 as an example, the gross industrial 
production of foreign invested enterprises accounted for over 60% of all above 
designed size enterprises
31
 in Guangdong. In Huizhou, the rate reached 90% in the 
same year (Liang & Chen, 2013). 
 
                                                 
31
 “Above-designed size” enterprises here refers to certain industrial enterprises fitting the following 
criteria. From 1998-2006: non-state owned enterprises whose revenue from principal business was 
less than 5 million Yuan; from 2007-2010, those whose revenue from principal business was above 5 
million Yuan; and, since 2011, above 20 million Yuan. Small industrial enterprises are excluded from 
the above criteria (National Bureau of Statistics, China). 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau. 
Net Export=Export-Import 
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau; National 
Statistical Yearbook (1996-2013), National Statistics Bureau. 
Foreign Trade Dependence Degree = (Export+Import)/GDP 
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Figure 28  Actual foreign capital utilisation in Guangdong, 1979-2012 
 
 
The largest source of foreign investment is Hong Kong, from where an annual 
average of 55% of the whole FDI comes (Figure 29). Cheap labour and land costs 
and other preferential policies attracted numerous Hong Kong manufacturers to 
Guangdong, especially to the Pearl River Delta area. From 1979 to 2012, the 
cumulative actual Hong Kong capital utilisation in Guangdong was USD 184.7 
billion, 61.81% of the total capital utilisation.  
Figure 29 Foreign capital utilisation in Guangdong, 1979-2012 
 
Capital-utilizing mode of ‘having stores in front and factories behind’ (qian dian hou 
chang, 前店后厂) is the main business methods used in Pearl River Delta. The concrete 
forms of this mode include san lai yi bu（三来一补）– ‘Enterprises of Processing 
Industries and Compensation Trade’ and san zi（三资）– ‘Three Kinds of Foreign-
Funded Enterprises’. ‘Enterprises of Processing Industries and Compensation Trade’ 
means these enterprises process materials supplied by foreign merchants, use designs 
supplied by foreign merchants, assemble components supplied by foreign merchants, 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau. 
 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau. 
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and engage in compensation trade. Foreign merchants provide the raw materials and 
take charge of production and sales. In theory, Chinese enterprises or Chinese 
shareholders of enterprises provide the plants, machinery equipment and technicians, 
but in practice the machines and technical support are also provided by foreign 
merchants as the simplest way to utilize foreign capital. It was an experiment in the 
beginning of the reform and opening-up era. During the Mao period, Guangdong was 
not a key industrial site and had neither support nor attention from the central 
government. There was little industrial development in the area and so it was a weak 
foundation for the export-oriented manufacturing industry. ‘Enterprises of 
Processing Industries and Compensation Trade’ is a primitive form of this and is not 
well-organised: it only charges processing fees, which only account for 8% of the 
total processing value (Fang & Luo, 1999). Moreover, it is so dependent on the skills 
and technologies brought in by foreign merchants that Chinese business owners have 
no incentive or motivation to improve their management skills and marketing 
capacities. Later it has gradually been replaced by ‘Three Kinds of Foreign-Funded 
Enterprises’ – joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign ventures. 
Three kinds of foreign-funded enterprises has brought in advanced management 
experience and improved techniques, while providing a large number of jobs since 
the 1990s. The vast majority of Guangdong’s export trade comes from its processing 
trade (Figure 30). Similarly, the three kinds of foreign-funded enterprises, compared 
with other forms of ownership, make up the majority of the export trade in 
Guangdong (Figure 31).  
Figure 30  Composition of Guangdong’s exports, 2000-2012 
 
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau. 
The processing trade includes processing materials supplied by foreign merchants, processing with designs 
supplied by foreign merchants, and assembling components supplied by foreign merchants. 
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Figure 31 Sources of Guangdong’s exports, 2000-2012 
 
Foreign-invested enterprises have made large contributions to the economic 
development of Guangdong. In reality, the success of foreign invested enterprises is 
the combination of profit-seeking capital and unorganized low-cost unskilled 
migrant workers from rural areas of Guangdong or other inland China provinces. 
Profit-seeking capital is also attracted by the cheap raw materials and rent and 
capital-friendly policies. FDI mainly flows into labour-intensive industries, located 
at the low-end of global value chains. Enterprises operate on very narrow profit 
margins and small changes in production costs result in big changes in profits. The 
majority of processing enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises are characterised 
by no brand, low added-value, and weak bargaining power which, to avoid risks, 
tend to rely on technological imitation rather than innovation and creation. This 
reliance on the comparative advantage of cheap labour and land has delayed any 
industrial upgrading of the region. Narrow profit margins force factory owners to 
strictly control labour costs, which leads to a ‘race to bottom’ of working conditions 
and wages. Consequently, a large number of young migrant workers are doing harsh 
and repetitive work for extremely long hours in terrible working conditions for very 
low wages in these enterprises. In addition, the processing trade’s tight ties to 
exports make the economy vulnerable to the ups and downs of the global market. 
Since the economic recession in 2008, the decreasing demands of traditional export 
markets (such as the United States, Europe and Japan), increasing production costs, 
and the adjustment of export trade policies have resulted in some serious challenges 
to economic growth. Under-production and even closure can result from a drop in 
orders. Underpayments, wage arrears and runaway factory owners have triggered an 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), Guangdong Statistics Bureau. 
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increasing number of labour disputes and collective actions: according to a labour 
activist in Guangdong, over 60% of entities involved in labour dispute cases are 
Enterprises of Processing Industries and Compensation Trade and Three Kinds of 
Foreign-Funded Enterprises (Chinanews, 2008).  
 
5.2.4 Decentralisation in Guangdong 
 
The impacts of decentralisation have been embodied in the economic miracle in 
Guangdong. Administrative decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation went side by 
side. The administrative decentralisation was implemented level by level gradually. 
At the beginning of the reform and opening-up period, the central government 
permitted different preferential policies for three SEZs (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shantou) and other regions of Guangdong. Compared with other regions, SEZs have 
more preferential policies and flexible measures. As the SEZs proved the feasibility 
of the experiments, central government extended the special policies to more regions 
in Guangdong (Jiang, 2009). There are three levels of decentralisation in Guangdong: 
provincial government delegates powers to prefecture-level cities; prefecture-level 
cities to districts and counties; and districts and counties to towns. Thus the 
prefecture-level cities are participants in, organisers of and decision-makers in 
important economic activities. The most direct and efficient way to decentralize is to 
upgrade the administrative levels and adjust administrative divisions. After the 
decision was made in 1985 to open up the Pearl River Delta area, Guangdong added 
two county-level cities: Dongguan and Zhongshan. With this promotion, local 
governments acquired more authority over flows of funds and city infrastructure 
funds, and received more funding for government officials. They also had more 
opportunity to gain special projects and special funds from provincial governments 
and reduce their administration constraints. The city level governments also enjoy 
more preferential tax policies, customs, and quarantine and land utilisation than 
county level ones, which facilitates the attraction of foreign investment. Furthermore, 
Dongguan and Zhongshan were upgraded again to prefecture-level cities, gaining 
even more autonomous rights.  
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The prefecture-level cities and counties delegate power to township level 
governments, which in turn have played an important role in promoting the 
development of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) which combined the interests 
of enterprises and local governments: TVE managers were directly appointed by 
local governments; county-level governments directly guided and monitored their 
direction of development; and the distribution system of TVEs was decided by local 
governments The township-level governments were the owners and operators of 
TVEs. The fiscal revenue brought in by TVEs was the main source and major 
motivation of local governments to develop local economy. The township-level 
governments are the most widely distributed local governments and their combined 
efforts led to the rapid economic development in the Pearl River Delta area. Every 
village and household was involved in building up TVEs and pushing economic 
growth. This is the most important pattern of economic development and 
institutional reform in the Pearl River Delta area and all levels of local governments 
in Guangdong have thrown themselves into development with great enthusiasm. It 
also shows the thoroughness of the decentralisation – from central government to 
village.  
 
Guangdong was part of the unitary fiscal system like other provinces in China until 
the launch of the reform and opening-up policy. After the central government began 
to delegate power to Guangdong, the province proposed the ‘da bao gan’ (大包干) 
fiscal system reform six months before the national fiscal system reform. It was 
approved by the State Council in 1979, allowing Guangdong to retain all fiscal 
revenues collected from provincial sources over and above the remittance of an 
annual sum of RMB1.2 billion for a period of five years. Compared to the national 
fiscal system reform of 1980, Guangdong’s 1979 fiscal reform was much more 
aggressive. Moreover, the remittance sum was subsequently reduced to RMB1 
billion in 1980, then further to RMB778 million from 1985 to 1987. In 1988, the 
system was adjusted from ‘da bao gan’ to a fixed base figure with an annual 
percentage increase in order to extract more revenue from Guangdong to central 
government (Li, 1998:97). Although the fiscal system was slightly modified between 
1980 and 1993, the fiscal responsibility system was the driving force behind 
Guangdong’s economic development. It has broken up the state-monopolized 
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revenue and expenditure system and aroused the enthusiasm of local development. 
Local governments have autonomy local economic activities and measures to 
accelerate local economic growth. The fiscal revenue of Guangdong was RMB3.625 
billion in 1979, which increased to RMB20 billion in 1992. ‘Da bao gan’ allowed 
the Guangdong government to shoulder the wage, price and other costs involved in 
this reform (Xie, 2009). Even though the tax-sharing system reform in 1993 re-
centralized fiscal power, Guangdong local governments still have a large degree of 
administrative and fiscal autonomy.  
 
The socioeconomic environment in Guangdong has changed and developed rapidly 
since 1978. The decentralisation of administrative and fiscal power stimulated 
enthusiasm to develop the local economy and reshaped the central-local government 
relationship. Fiscal administrative decentralisation and tax-sharing system reform 
resulted in much land being leased for manufacturing purposes, and commercial 
housing and commercial sectors, leading to land urbanisation and the avoidance of 
the social responsibility of people without local hukou. Millions of migrant workers 
are not the target of the social care provided by local governments. Guangdong, 
especially the Pearl River Delta area, is the pioneer of reform and opening-up, the 
experimental guinea-pig of economic development, as well as institutional reform 
and political reform. Export-oriented economic development strategy not only guides 
economic growth, but also shapes labour relations in the Pearl River Delta.  
 
5.3 The Making of Migrant Workers to Capital in Guangdong 
Socio-economic development in contemporary China, out of which new institutions, 
policies, development strategies and cultures emerge, continues to influence different 
stages of the migratory experience. The very early stage of migration in the Pearl 
River Delta showed the pattern of ‘leaving the land without leaving the home land’. 
Peasants were directly employed by Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs); for 
instance, the Tai Ping Handbag Factory, was the first ‘san lai yi bu’ (三来一补) factory 
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in Guangdong and had mainly employed local workers from Humen
32
 from 1978 to 
1986. In the late 1980s, TVEs were rapidly developing in Guangdong’s coastal area 
and SEZs had started being constructed, both of which required a large number of 
workers. To meet the requirements of capital, central government encouraged the 
movement of migrant workers to SEZs: they were allowed to enter cities as long as 
they were self-sufficient in food. In the 1990s, millions of migrant workers from 
other provinces and cities started flowing into factories in the Pearl River Delta, 
unlocking the largest domestic rural-urban migration in the 20
th
 century. The 
relaxation of migration control led to an excess of migrant workers in urban areas 
and Guangdong found itself unable to absorb so many migrant workers. In 1991, the 
State Council issued an emergency announcement to control rural-urban migration 
and stop the unofficial migratory flow. The amount of migrant workers dramatically 
declined during this period, but however tightened, migration control could not 
completely stop the flow of migrants.  
 
In 1992, Deng’s tour of Southern China (南巡) made the Pearl River Delta into the 
busiest construction site in the world. Tens of thousands of migrant workers from 
other provinces rushed into Guangdong and, at the time, it was common to see huge 
number of migrants gathered at railway stations, coach stops, and harbours. Factory 
work was the job of choice in those years, as it came with free food and 
accommodation. However, the food and accommodation supplied was of the lowest 
standard and the only jobs offered to migrant workers were those refused by urban 
workers. The division of the rural-urban household registration system shunted rural 
migrant workers into the secondary labour market and onto the margins of urban 
societies. Living in the accommodation supplied by employers reduced living costs 
and minimised the upward pressure on their wages but their time, both working and 
non-working, was easily controlled and arranged by factories. Although the Chinese 
Labour Law (1994) stipulates that working hours should not exceed eight hours per 
day and workers should have at least one day rest per week, factory owners rarely 
complied with the labour laws. The only choice migrant workers had which factory 
to work in, although almost all had the same working conditions and wages. During 
                                                 
32
 Humen Town is under the jurisdiction of Dongguan, in Guangdong.  
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the 1990s, migrant workers in foreign invested and private factories were 
acknowledged as the major labour force. Migrant workers were also subject to 
control by the local states. They were required to obtain temporary residence permits 
(暂住证) in order to work in cities or face the possibility that they would be arrested, 
repatriated and deported to their home town by the police. The top two worries of 
migrant workers in those days were wage arrears and repatriation. The temporary 
resident permit system and the ‘shelter and repatriation’ system caused migrant 
workers numerous harms until they were abolished in 2003.  
 
Although the shortcomings of the statistical data available in China makes it difficult 
to estimate the exact number of migrant workers working in Guangdong, research 
has shown that there was a clear upward trend between 1982 and 2010 (Zhang, Li & 
Zhao, 2011).  
Figure 32 Number of floating population in Guangdong, 1982-2010 based on the estimation of Zhang, Li and 
Zhao. 
 
In real terms wages increased only slowly during the reform and opening-up period. 
Employers in Guangdong tried every possible method to keep their labour costs low: 
records from one special industrial park which was the recipient of Japanese 
investment (Lu, 2011) from 1988 to 2002, wages only increased from 170 yuan in 
1988 to 460 yuan in 1994, fell to 330 yuan in 1999 and only then began to climb 
slowly again. 
 
 
Source: Zhang, J., Li, N. & Zhao, X., 2011. The Impacts of the Floating Population Changes on the 
Births in Guangdong. South China Population, Volume 26, pp. 56-62. 
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Figure 33 Wages of fresh migrant workers in one of Shenzhen’s industrial parks from 1988 to 2002 based on the 
data collected by a Japanese entrepreneur, Mr Ishii. 
 
As real salaries are based on the minimum salary standards stipulated by local 
governments, the data of minimum wage standards of different cities shows the 
general trend of sluggish wage increase (Table 10).  
Table 10 Minimum wage in Guangdong Province, Guangzhou City, Shenzhen City and Dongguan City 
Year Guangdong 
Shenzhen 
Guangzhou Dongguan 
Guannei Guanwai 
1992 
- 
245 245 - 
- 1993 286 286 250 
1994 338 300 
320 
1995 190-320 380 300 
350 
1996 
220-380 
398 310 
450 
1997 420 320 
1998 430 330 
1999 
250-450 
547 419 
400 
2000 547 419 
2001 270-480 574 440 
450 
2002 
280-510 
595 460 
2003 600 465 510 
2004 
352-684 
610 480 
684 
2005 690 580 574 
2006 
450-780 
810 700 
780 690 
2007 850 750 
2008 530-860 1000 900 860 770 
Source: Lu, F., 2011. Numerical Estimation of China's Migrant Workers'Wages. Beijing, China Center 
for Economic Research, Peking University. 
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2009 1000 900 
2010 660-1030 1100 1100 920 
2011 
850-1300 
1320 1300 
1100 
2012 1500 1300 
2013 1010-1550 1600 1550 1310 
Sources: Labournet.com.cn, 2005. China minimum wage; Chen, M, 2011. Dongguan minimum wages; 
Laodongfa120.com, 2012. Shenzhen minimum wages; Guangzhou Local newspaper, 2012. 
Guangzhou minimum wages 1993-2012. 
 
The subordination of migrant workers to capital in Guangdong is mainly driven by 
the export-oriented development strategy. The influent FDI not only brings in 
investment, technologies and management methods, but also the extension of global 
production chain. Capital internationally segments its operation in order to take 
advantage of differentials including different labour-force characteristics, such as 
skills, price, compliance and flexibility (Neilson, 2007). Guangdong Province, 
‘virgin territory’ for global capital, is very attractive to the internationally moving 
capital, with its ‘unlimited’ supply of rural surplus labour, incomplete legal 
institutions especially labour law, cheap raw materials and the support of the state. 
The central state and the local states have deliberately tried to create and maintain an 
‘investment-friendly’ environment which directly facilitated the deepening of 
migrant workers’ subordination to capital’s requirements.  
 
Migrant workers firstly escaped from rural China, from the restrict control of 
mobility of the previous planned economy, to the coastal areas, searching for new 
opportunities. The mobility of migrant workers then became the target of the 
cooperation of capital and the state. They were captured into the factories, becoming 
low-cost labourers. The first generation of migrant workers in the PRD faced 
intensive formal subordination under capital, with extreme long working hours and 
bad working conditions. The oversupply of labour was a leading cause of the 
ignoring of labour rights and none or late payment of wages (Chan, 2010a, 2010b; 
Golley & Meng, 2011; Knight et al., 2011; Wang, 2010; Zhang et al., 2011): 
business owners felt that Guangdong had an unlimited source of migrant labour 
supply. .   
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Along with the building up of the industrial system in PRD there have been more 
and more transnational cooperation relocating their production base to the PRD. 
Local private enterprises are forced to improve their competitiveness, competing 
with companies in other Chinese locations and other countries. An increasing 
number of factories in the PRD have moved to a lean-production system as a new 
strategy of real subordination. The newly introduced lean-production system not 
only attempts to control the migrant workers’ life within factories, but also attempts 
to control their daily life. The migrant workers’ bodies are tightly bonded with the 
production process. In next section, I will trace the agency of migrant workers, 
namely their attempts to escape the existing system of containment, and how this 
insubordination forces the state and capital to adjust their control regimes. It will 
discuss one of the landmark strikes-Naihai Honda strike in 2010. The strike is 
considered a sign of the workers’ movement reaching a critical juncture (CLB, 2012). 
Based on the study of this case and the interviews in the field, the next section will 
reveal the escape of migrant workers in the PRD and the adjustment of the local 
state’s and capital’s control regime.  
 
5.4 Insubordination of Migrant Workers and Reshaping of Control 
Regime in Guangdong 
 
Under the subordination process, migrant workers in Guangdong are not passive. 
They actively escape from the containment and insubordinate to capital relation. 
Migrant workers’ agencies of insubordination have reshaped labour relations and 
control regimes, as well as the developmental strategies in Guangdong. A strong 
indicator of this can be seen in the labour shortage of migrant workers in the PRD 
area since 2004. In this section, I will analyse the agency of migrant workers in 
Guangdong and how it shapes and reshapes the development strategies and control 
regimes.  
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5.4.1 Migrant Workers’ Agency and Its Influence on Control Regimes 
 
It was only from 2004 that Guangdong began to suffer from a shortage of migrant 
workers. Nearly one third of factories in the region were under-staffed and operating 
at less than full capacity and recruitment advertisements were posted all around the 
streets and labour markets (Chinatimes.cc, 2010).
33
 The shift in supply and demand 
in the labour market also influenced the patterns of labour disputes. For many years 
it was thought that there was an unlimited supply of migrant workers. However, on 
the premise of stabilizing a low fertility level, China will soon achieve a gradual 
transition from a low population growth rate to zero growth, and finally negative 
growth. China is experiencing what is known as the ‘demographic transition’ – the 
transition from a largely rural agrarian society with high fertility and mortality rates 
to a predominantly urban industrial society with low fertility and mortality rates. 
Because of its ‘one child policy’, fertility rates fell, leading to fewer young mouths to 
feed. During this period, the labour force temporarily grew more rapidly than the 
population dependent on it, freeing up resources for investment in economic 
development and family welfare. Other things being equal, per capita income grew 
more rapidly too (Lee & Mason, 2006).  
 
In the early 2000s migrant workers began to vote with their feet (用脚投票), exercising 
their structural power. As the working conditions were bad and wage increases low, 
increasing numbers of migrant workers chose not to go to the PRD. Also, there are 
more and more job opportunities created in in-land China. Increasing number of 
factories and companies locate themselves in the provinces, like Sichuan, Hunan, 
Shanxi, which provide the most amount of migrants.
34
 Migrant workers preferred to 
work near their hometown for several reasons. Firstly, the wage in PRD was not as 
attractive as before, because the low wage increases meant that the wage level in 
factories near their hometown was more or less the same. Secondly, the living cost in 
PRD was high. It is not only about the prices of daily necessities, housing and other 
                                                 
33
 The shortage of migrant workers may trigger the wave of closures of factories in PRD 
(Yonggonghuang huozhi zhusanjiao xian qiye daobichao 用工荒或致珠三角企业现企业倒闭
潮)http://www.chinatimes.cc/article/12276.html  
34
 See: Why the labour shortage appears frequently in PRD? (zhusanjiao weihe lvxian 
yonggonghuang?珠三角为何屡现用工荒？) http://www.chinanews.com/tbch/cj/2010/02/89.shtml  
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living expenses for migrant workers themselves, but also the living cost of their 
children and parents. Working in factories nearby is easier for migrant workers to 
take care of their family members. Also, it is more convenient to access to public 
service, as they have local hukou. As two migrant workers explained: 
 
There are factories building in towns near my home village. A lot 
of villagers didn’t come out this year. They go to work in factories 
in town and also plan to buy flats there. It is good for the education 
of their children. They can stay with the children and take care of 
them. I am single and I want to see the world outside. But I think I 
will go back when I have children.
35 
 
Now a lot of factories are closing. I know several leather products 
factories that are secretly removing their equipment and machines. 
I heard that they want to move to Moming,36 or even to inland 
provinces. Factory owners said they couldn’t afford the increasing 
wages. And a lot of migrant workers I know choose not to come 
here to find jobs. They can get jobs in their hometown or near their 
hometown. And some of them go back home to do farming. The 
wage here is not attractive at all.
37
 
 
The labour shortage forced factory owners to increase wages and improve working 
conditions. It also undermined the interest-based relationship between local 
governments and capital; and local governments shifted their attention to migrant 
workers’ livelihoods and working conditions. This was reflected in semantic changes 
as well. As an official of sub district administration organisation of Xiagang Street 
illustrated: 
 
Now we don’t use the term of ‘dagongzai’ ( 打 工 仔 ), or 
‘nongmingong’ (农民工) to call migrant workers. We use wai lai wu 
gong ren yuan (外来务工人员) or ‘xin guang zhou ren’（新广州人）to 
call them. We want to build an environment that make them feel 
that they are at home. Migrant workers now can apply to get the 
hukou here. Although they cannot share the same benefits as local 
                                                 
35
 Interviewee No.: GD-06212013-1, worker in Luogang district, Guangzhou 
36
 Maoming is a city located in western Guangdong, with relative slow economic development 
compared to PRD.  
37
 Interviewee No.:GD-02112013-1, Labour NGO official, Guangzhou 
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residents do, they can enjoy at least some extent benefits. They can 
buy houses here. 
38 
 
The shortage of migrant workers lasted until the financial crisis in 2008. However, it 
remains debateable what kind of a shortage the term ‘labour shortage’ should denote. 
Based on my research in Guangdong,
39
 it became evident that there was not so much 
a shortage of migrant workers per se, but rather a shortage of migrant workers that 
would not exceed a certain labour cost. As the owner of a factory in Luogang District 
in Guangzhou explained: 
 
I cannot hire enough workers these years. They require higher 
wages. Nowadays is not the same as before. They (migrant workers) 
would rather not work if the wage is not as good as they expect. 
There are a lot of migrants around this area. And they also ask me 
questions about the food, the living conditions, and bonuses and 
allowances. They require more than before. It is not good for us 
(factory owners).
40
 
 
That is, there was a mismatching of the demands of migrant workers and the 
requirements of jobs. Workers’ demands are no longer limited to basic economic 
rights, such as receiving their full due wages. Their demands are based on labour 
laws and their own analysis of their entitlements and interests, which have extended 
to cover diverse issues such as compensation, overtime payment, paid holidays and 
social insurance schemes. Furthermore, migrant workers have begun to express 
political demands, such as the right to directly elect workers’ representatives in 
enterprise trade unions and the release of workers’ representatives who have been 
arrested because of collective actions (CLB, 2011). The young generation of migrant 
workers has higher expectations of salary and less patience with poor working 
conditions. A young migrant worker in Foshan explained:  
 
                                                 
38
 Interviewee No.: GD-10262012-1, official of sub district administration organisation of Xiagang 
Street, Luogang District, Guangzhou 
39
 Summarized from interviews conducted in Guangdong Province between October, 2012 and July, 
2013.  
40
 Interviewee NO.: GD-10282012-1, factory owner, Guangzhou 
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When I was a child, I lived with them [his parents] where they 
work. I am more familiar with life in cities than with life in my 
hometown. I want to live in city in the future. I want to find an 
appropriate job with good pay and clean working conditions. I can 
wait before I get the job I like. If it is too hard to get such kind of a 
job, then I will consider to go back to school or get some training.
41
 
 
The young generation of migrants are very aware that their parents’ generation have 
found it very difficult to obtain work as they got older, hence they are more focused 
on personal development and skills training in order to further their career prospects. 
 
I want to learn some skills. But the factories that are desperately 
looking for workers can only offer jobs with low skills. It is a waste 
of time to work there. I can learn nothing. ... I am an only child – 
my parents can support me while I am looking for jobs.
42
 
 
Therefore low-paid manual jobs are failing to attract enough applicants. Positions 
with high pay and good working conditions are also remaining unfilled because 
applicants lack the skills required. The Pearl River Delta area is suffering from 
structural unemployment. The young generation of workers are active and have a 
positive attitude, but they have high expectations. Hence, factory owners often 
complain that it is difficult to manage young migrant workers. A factor owner in one 
Shenzhen industrial zone 
43
complain that  
 
[W]orkers are not disciplined, obedient or responsible; that 
they[migrant workers] refuse to work overtime even when offered 
double or triple pay; that they are selfish and individualistic with no 
sense of ‘dedication’ or ‘collective sense of honour’; if they decide 
they do not like their working conditions they simply leave. 
 
Another factory owner in Guangzhou
44
 also complain that: 
                                                 
41
 Interviewee NO.: GD-06212013-1, worker, Foshan 
42
 Interviewee NO.: GD-06212013-2,worker, Foshan 
43
 Interviewee NO.: GD-06272013-1, factory owner, Shenzhen  
44
 Interviewee NO.: GD-10282013-1,factory owner, Guangzhou  
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It is difficult to recruit workers to do dirty and difficult jobs, such 
as in rubber products factories; even high salaries cannot attract 
workers. The choice made by migrant workers forces us to increase 
salaries, improve working conditions and reduce compulsory 
overtime. 
 
Besides the labour shortage, the rising labour disputes cases, strikes, and protests of 
migrant workers also push the local state to adjust their control regime and 
development strategies. As shown in Figure 34, we can see a dramatic increase of 
labour disputes cases in 2008. This is largely due to the Labour Contract Law having 
been enacted that year, which initiated a steep increase in labour disputes being 
addressed through legal channels. But we should be aware that the introduction of 
new laws merely channels existing conflicts into legal frameworks rather than the 
opposite, i.e. the introduction of labour laws triggering more conflicts.  
Figure 34 Number of Labour Disputes Cases in Guangdong from 2000 to 2012 
 
 
Strikes in Guangdong have become increasingly obvious since 2000. Migrant 
workers increasingly chose to take collective action in order to protect and fight for 
their rights. In 2010, the Nanhai Honda strike was considered a milestone for the 
labour movement in China, triggering a series of adjustments of the control regime 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook (2000-2012) 
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of migrant workers in Guangdong. I will analyse this case in next section in detail. In 
this section, I will mainly discuss the reactions of the state and the factory owners to 
the strikes and the influences of strikes to the development in Guangdong. The 
labour dispute cases in Guangdong not only rise in terms of number, but also in 
terms of the complexity of demands of migrant workers. As a migrant worker 
explained： 
 
Before I went to the labour bureau and Arbitration Court, I went to 
the legal assistant. I wanted to know how much I could claim back. 
I also read the labour contract law. I have claimed everything that I 
can claim.
45 
 
An official at the arbitration court confirmed this situation:  
 
The complexity of the labour disputes is increasing. Before, 
migrant workers did not claim allowances for work at high 
temperatures (over 35°C), or for overtime pay for work on 
weekends. Now migrant workers are more familiar with the labour 
law and labour contract law. The labour law system is not complete 
– there are always new situations. We need to explore this by 
ourselves, as Guangdong is the frontline of practices of labour law. 
We do not have previous examples to follow.
46
 
 
Of course, the rising of number of labour disputes cases and strikes is caused by the 
interaction of migrant workers’ struggles and the changing external environment. 
The economic recession and financial crisis reduced the scale of production in most 
factories, many of which had to suspend production or simply close down. When 
economic recession occurs, factories are forced to reduce or stop their production 
line, which causes an inversion in the balance of demand and supply of labour 
market. The rapid increases in production costs, tighter regulations on labour law 
execution and the implementation of the ‘Dual Track Transformation’ strategy47 
have forced labour-intensive factories move out of the Pearl River Delta area to 
                                                 
45
 Interviewee NO.: 07032013-1, worker, Shenzhen  
46
 Interviewee NO.: 07262013-1, official of arbitration court of labour disputes, Dongguan 
47
 The ‘Dual Track Transformation’ strategy fosters industrial upgrading with the relocation of low-
end and high-polluting manufacturing activities away from the PRD and replacing them with high-
value added industries, the so-called ‘empty the cage for new birds’ (腾笼换鸟) strategy in Chinese. 
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Central and Western China, areas such as Chongqing, Sichuan, Henan, Jiangxi and 
Anhui which used to be the source of migrants, and in some cases, even to Southeast 
Asia. Hence, at some point, the gentle measures of Guangdong’s local governments 
in dealing with labour disputes and those collective actions which are limited to 
economic demands may be considered as a strategy to drive up the cost of 
production in the PRD in order to force low-end labour intensive factories out in an 
attempt to finally ‘empty the cage for the new birds’ (teng long huan niao). 
Interviews with local officials reflected this attitude of local labour bureaus to labour 
unrest and disputes. An official of the Dongguan labour arbitration department 
claimed the following:  
 
The labour disputes and collective actions which target economic 
rights and interests would be resolved as pure labour-capital 
conflicts. The risk of arrest for workers taking part in collective 
actions is declining. The labour disputes that go through the legal 
procedures are usually put forward by migrant workers after acts of 
infringement have occurred. Previously, complaints about 
compensation and unpaid holiday were generally not fully 
supported by the arbitration committees or courts – but this has 
now changed. Also demands for back pays of social insurance are 
emerging.
48 
 
However, for cases in areas with more high-tech, high value-added companies, 
things are different. For example, an official in the labour arbitration department of 
Tianhe District in Guangzhou, where many companies have located their corporate 
headquarters, stated that: 
 
When labour disputes involving transnational groups, big 
businesses or high-tech companies occurred, we would not have the 
autonomous power to solve the labour disputes, because superior 
level government leaders would intervene. These bigger companies 
are ‘favourites’ of the Guangdong government, often having been 
‘courted’ by senior government leaders to establish their business 
in the province. Hence, it is difficult to ensure complete 
impartiality to deal with the labour disputes.
 49
 
                                                 
48 Interviewee No.: GD-06242013-1 Labour Bureau Officials in Dongguan.  
49 Interviewee No. :GD-10252012-1 officials of Arbitration Court of Tianhe District, Guangzhou 
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At the beginning of the reform era, factory owners in the PRD tried their best to 
reduce labour costs in order to control production costs and take any opportunity to 
avoid their responsibilities under the labour law. Hence when labour disputes happen, 
factory owners tend to resolve the labour disputes privately. Of course, their first 
reaction normally is to reject the migrant workers’ demands. Even when involved in 
legal procedures, factory owners utilize their close relationship with local 
governments’ officials to disrupt the mediation and arbitration process. They also 
utilize legal procedures to delay agreed reimbursements to migrant workers. 
Although the Labour Contract Law has existed for over five years, the majority of 
factories in the Pearl River Delta area are still violating its regulations. The best 
working conditions are usually only up to the minimum standards. But the constant 
struggles of migrant workers and the changing economic environment forced factory 
owners to change their attitudes and strategies.  
 
With the expansion of economic system reform and advances in marketing, 
competition is increasingly intense. Factory owners start to pay more attention to 
improving market competitiveness and to ‘the establishment and maintenance of 
relationships with business partners and clients’.50 In interviews, factory owners 
said that ‘although we are still devoting time to our relationship with governments, 
our priorities are expanding business, improving product quality and developing 
new products.’51 
 
Factory owners have also adjusted their strategies to deal with the rise in collective 
actions. In the past, local governments stressed ‘maintenance of stability’ and they 
continue to be extremely sensitive to mass incidents including strikes and other 
labour collective actions. Factory owners are familiar with the ‘rules of the game’ 
and have attempted to utilize the ‘maintenance of stability’ as leverage to force local 
governments to resolve these collective actions. Mass incidents bring conspicuous 
pressure on and political risks to local governors in whose jurisdictions they take 
                                                 
50 Interviewee NO.: GD-06252013-1,factory owner, Dongguan 
51 Interviewee NO.:GD-01032013-1, factory owner, Guangzhou 
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place. Local governments attempt to put an end to mass incidents as quickly as 
possible and exert significant pressures on both the workers taking part in the 
collective actions and the factory owners to make concessions. In addition, some 
local governors are investors in the affected factories and so natural allies of the 
owners. However, socioeconomic circumstances have changed. The industrial 
upgrading strategy has introduced factors of disharmony into the close relations 
between local governments and factory owners. In addition, the central government 
has turned its attention from rapid economic development to the improvement of 
people’s livelihoods. The central government also defines the nature of labour 
collective actions as ‘labour disputes’ but not as ‘factors affecting social stability’. 
The rise of new media and social networking software, like weibo (Chinese Twitter), 
QQ (instant chat software), etc. have increased the moral and credibility risks 
attached to local governments’ actions to protect capital. Local governments are 
becoming increasingly cautious in their dealings with labour disputes and collective 
action (CLB, 2013) and asking them to intervene is no longer the most efficient 
solution. Therefore more and more factory owners are willing to sit down and 
negotiate with workers when strikes and collective actions occur. The migrant 
workers’ association and the workers’ increasing bargaining power force factory 
owners to make concessions in order to resume normal production. A labour lawyer 
working for a grassroots labour NGO, summarised that  
  
Factory owners accept collective bargaining because above all, 
they want to avoid any disruption in the factory production. 
Workers are not going to make requests which are beyond factory 
owners’ ability to deliver. The collective negotiation regime is 
beneficial for factory owners inasmuch as it allows them to keep 
production stable and reduce the costs of strikes, sabotage, or other 
collective actions. Local governments and trade unions have 
promoted the collective negotiation regime to every factory in the 
Pearl River Delta area and many factory owners have accepted 
suggestions and assistance from labour lawyers and grassroot 
NGOs regarding collective negotiation and collective bargaining.
52
 
 
We can also see local states shifting their mobility control policies. To recruit 
desirable migrants for the ‘Dual Track Transformation’ development strategy, who 
                                                 
52 Interviewee NO.: GD-06212013-1, Labour NGO official, Shenzhen 
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are educated, have a stable employment history and are willing to work for the 
salaries offered, and exclude unwanted migrants, Guangdong local governments 
have experimented with a succession of new hukou policies, including the point 
based system (see Chapter 3). Guangzhou, for example, offers migrants who have a 
bachelor’s, master’s or doctoral degree 80, 90 or 100 points respectively in the 
education attainment and skills category, while those who only completed junior or 
senior high school receive a mere 5 or 20 points.
53
 The system is based on 
‘qualification’ and ‘quota’ (of qualified people) controls (Zhang, 2013). The new 
policy features a credit system to evaluate the quality of migrant labour instead of 
applying restrictions to certain professions. Migrant workers who accumulate a 
certain score can file an application for a local hukou. However, in reality it only 
accepts killed and well-educated applicants: migrant workers rarely qualify for an 
urban hukou and even if they do, they do not receive the same social welfare as local 
people. In Xiangxue Community in the Luogang district of Guangzhou,
54
 migrants 
who qualified for a local hukou were nevertheless denied the necessary certification 
to access the free education and medical care available to holders of ‘natal’ hukous 
as the social welfare is supplied by the collective economy. Obstacles such as these 
inhibit the settlement process and further development.  
 
5.4.2 The Nanhai Honda Strike  
 
In 2010, workers staged a strike at the Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing Ltd (CHAM) 
in Foshan; this went on to be considered an iconic event in the labour movement in 
China. It was one of a wave of strikes taking place (Chan, 2010, 2014; Chan & Hui, 
2012; CLB, 2012; IHLO, 2010). Honda entered China in 1992, initially with 
technological cooperation and later manufacturing motorcycle parts with the state-
owned company, the Dongfeng Motor Corporation (IHLO, 2010). The development 
of Honda was stimulated and facilitated by the support of governments and the 
expansion of the auto market in China. It gradually built up a closed supply network, 
with a high in-house sourcing ratio. CHAM workers (more than 2000) are mostly 
                                                 
53 For more details see Zhang (2013), ‘Citizenship in urban China: the case of points systems’ 
Presented at the Day-Long Conference on China’s Domestic Challenges, Shanghai. 
54 Summarized from interviews conducted in Xiangxue Community, June 2013, Guangzhou, 
Guangdong. 
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migrant workers originating from the inland provinces and less developed areas in 
Guangdong. The expansion of business and high profit margins did not, however, 
benefit the Honda workers. Wages were low and grew only slowly, based on the de-
skilling and low-cost labour in lean production. Interns’ wages interns were even 
lower even though they were doing the same jobs. Interns were mainly students from 
vocational secondary schools who usually went on to work in labour-intensive 
industries. To further reduce their production costs, CHAM increased the labour 
intensity, brought in longer working hours and made wide use of interns and 
temporary workers. It also used the income gap between management and 
production line workers, as well as between Chinese and expatriate workers to 
segment workers within the factories. It utilized a combination of intensive formal 
and real subordination strategies to make higher profits.  
 
The strike began in May 2010. Begun by student workers from the transmission 
assembly division, it quickly spread to over 1,900 workers, including permanent full-
time workers and vocational school interns. The strike lasted 19 days. Even though 
the demands of the strikes developed through the strike duration, there were two core 
demands. The first was for a wage increase of RMB 800 per month for all workers. 
‘We want equal treatment. You cannot just increase the managers’ wage’.55 Workers 
also demanded a democratic reform of trade unions, as the existing ‘trade unions did 
not represent our interests’. 56  In fact, during the strike, 200 members from the 
district trade union attacked the striking workers. In the beginning, the company 
refused to negotiate with the workers. It threatened them, fired two activists, and 
pushed student interns to sign a document undertaking that they would not lead, 
organize or participate in any strikes and mobilized their teachers to pressure them. 
This was their first strategy to recapture escaping and insubordinate migrant workers 
back to the tight control regime. However, migrant workers, who had realized their 
power and position in the ‘just-in-time’ and zero inventory system (Chan & Hui, 
2012), continued the strike to ‘force the company to negotiate with us’.57 In the end, 
workers’ wages were increased from RMB 1544 to RMB 2044. The request for the 
                                                 
55 GD-06212013-1, worker involved in Nanhai Strike, Foshan 
56 GD-06212013-1, worker involved in Nanhai Strike, Foshan 
57 GD-06212013-1, worker involved in Nanhai Strike, Foshan 
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reform of trade union elections also received a response from the Guangdong 
Federation of Trade Unions (GDFTU). The vice president of the GDFTU revealed 
there were plans to organise union elections and collective bargaining in the auto 
industry (Hui & Chan, 2015).  
 
Strikes not only have direct consequences for migrant workers; they create further 
opportunities for labour agency (Chan, 2014). The flurry of strikes that included the 
Honda strike forced the government to increase significantly the minimum wage rate. 
Also, the strikes had forced the state to take the issue of trade union reform more 
seriously. In June, 2010, the ACFTU issued a document, ‘Further Strengthen the 
Building of Workplace Trade Unions and Give Them Full Play’ (cited in Hui & 
Chan, 2014:662). The state and the trade union attempted to introduce a legal 
framework for workplace collective consultation. Current institutions and traditional 
ideas have restricted the function of trade unions in China to representation only. 
Basic level trade unions, those found in factories and companies, in effect play the 
role of management assistant and provider of entertainment and employee welfare. 
Faced with the increasing number of labour disputes, collective actions and 
expansion of workers’ demands, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
has seriously rethought a change in function of trade unions at all levels. However it 
is still conservative to act as workers’ representative. Guangdong, the site of the 
majority of labour disputes and collective actions, has begun, to a certain degree, to 
react positively to migrant workers’ demands. The leaders of the Guangdong and 
Guangzhou ACFTUs have been heavily involved in this trade union reform, pushing 
for it to return to its original function, representing and protecting workers. The 
pressure of increasing labour disputes and collective actions as well as top-down 
reform have pushed the trade unions at city, district/county and town level to change 
their traditional ideas. Trade union officials have started to actively participate in 
protecting workers’ rights and to play an important role in collective negotiations 
and bargaining: they stand by the workers’ side. This is just the beginning of the 
trade union reform and is heavily influenced by the leaders’ knowledge and working 
style: when active and positive leaders leave the trade union, it is unlikely that their 
working style and ideas will be carried on by their successors. However, the trade 
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unions have started on the path to reform, encouraged by both bottom-up and top-
down sectors.   
 
 
In the Honda case, the insubordination of migrant workers to the containment of 
control regime broke the intensive formal and real subordination of capital. Capital 
and the state had to face the pressure brought about by the strikes and continual 
resistance from migrant workers; they were forced to make compromise in order to 
maintain production and reduce the losses incurred because of these struggles. 
Migrant workers utilized the advantages of their position in the lean production 
system, accompanied by an upgrading of struggle strategies and tactics, using 
electronic communication technologies, such as smart phones to access the internet, 
QQ (a Chinese instant messaging software) and blogs, as well as seeking external 
support from the media and local and international civil society in the form of 
scholars and labour NGOs (Chan & Hui, 2014). Labour NGOs in Guangdong have 
played an important role in assisting the resistances of migrant workers and this is 
discussed in detail in the next sections.  
 
Beyond the instant compromises aimed at relieving the anger and recovering the 
production lines, capital and the state have to adjust their control regime to re-
capture escaping labour. The company, after the strikes, had taken a series of 
adjustments to avoid further strikes and to tighten monitoring and control over 
workers. As one line-manger in Honda, who used to participate in the strike, said: 
 
We now have collective negotiation twice each year. The 
representatives of managers, the representatives of trade union and 
representatives of workers all participate in the negotiation. We 
have trade union groups in each plant, and I am the leader of our 
group. I take responsibility to collect the opinions and suggestions 
of production line workers, and then present this information to the 
trade union. But this information doesn’t affect the negotiation 
process. The monitoring of workers has also been tightened.  There 
was one worker attempt to stop the production line, like in the 
previous strikes (he refers to the strike in 2010). The managers 
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immediately found out and fired that worker. It even did not last 
more than half a day. The managers also make great effort to divide 
the workers, as we have different ranks between workers. They 
target the first level workers (first level is the lowest), telling them 
that strikes are illegal. And the company is keeping on recruiting 
workers to replace the ones that have partaken in a strike. The wage 
of our company is better, much better than at other private 
companies. They can easily recruit workers.
58
 
 
The state, both the central and the local states, also try to adjust the institutional 
regime to absorb the grievances and resistances of migrant workers. The experiments 
of the election of workplace trade union committees, emphasis on ensuring effective 
implementation of the Labour Code, trade union law and the labour contract law in 
business, as well as the introduction of legal frameworks for workplace collective 
consultation are attempts to guide and channel the turbulent collective actions of 
migrant workers into a controllable institutional frame. Additionally, as civil society 
had played an important role in the strikes, the state started to tighten its control over 
media reports on strikes, and the organisation and operation of labour NGOs (Chan 
& Hui, 2014).   
 
5.4.3 Grassroots labour NGOs
59
 
 
In the Pearl River Delta area, grassroots NGOs have played an increasingly 
important role in labour rights protection and gathering of migrant workers. From the 
late 1990s, grassroots labour NGOs (‘NGOs’ in the following) began to appear in the 
public arena. They emerged first in South-Eastern China, which had attracted the 
majority of migrant workers at that time. NGOs provided migrants with social 
networking support in their search for jobs and accommodation, and also offered 
emotional support and legal assistance. NGOs in the coastal area mainly provide 
humanistic care, occupational training, entertainment and legal assistance. Different 
NGOs focus on different areas based on the actual situation. In recent years, some 
NGOs in the Pearl River Delta area have changed from offering individual legal 
                                                 
58
 Interviewee NO.:GD-06262013-1, production group leader of Naihai Honda, involved in the strike, 
Foshan 
59
 Summarized from interviews with labour NGO officials in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Foshan and 
Dongguan between October 2012 to July 2013.  
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assistance and personal living services to participation in collective actions and 
collective bargaining. Service-oriented NGOs provide entertainments, community 
life, training, legal advocacy and pastoral care for workers, for example, visiting 
those who have suffered an occupational injury in hospital to provide practical help 
and assistance. Rights-protection-oriented NGOs attempt to assist workers to protect 
their labour rights. They provide legal consultancy and assistance services and both 
concrete and emotional support for workers going through the legal procedures. 
These NGOs attempt to improve the legal consciousness and rights protection 
consciousness of migrant workers. Labour movement oriented NGOs assist migrant 
workers to fight and struggle for labour rights not covered by the labour laws. They 
target all migrant workers as the working class in order to improve the whole class’s 
social status and economic status. Hence they not only offer individual migrant 
workers training or assistance, but also collective bargaining training and assistance, 
and advice on the election of worker representatives, guidance of labour collective 
actions and protection of labour representatives (Li & Duan, 2014). 
 
The fieldwork survey revealed that NGOs play different roles in assisting migrant 
workers: 
 Coach: training migrant workers in different areas, such as labour law, legal 
procedures, labour control regime, government functions, computer skills, 
occupational training, security training and other useful skills. There is no 
training system for migrant workers before migration or once they have 
secured a job.   
 Discoverer: discovering occupational injuries and other infringements 
through visiting hospitals and communicating with migrant workers 
 Legal assistant: directly involved in labour dispute cases, both individual and 
collective, acting as legal agencies of migrant workers and providing the 
necessary legal assistance 
 Coordinator: building communication platforms for workers; arranging 
meetings for workers involved in collective actions and collective bargaining; 
generalizing and summarizing the common demands of workers in order to 
formulate reasonable and acceptable requests for collective bargaining; 
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coordinating relations among workers and workers’ representatives; 
encouraging workers to elect representatives, training representatives in 
bargaining skills and building self-confidence. 
 Information collector: collecting information necessary for collective 
bargaining and labour dispute cases, such as average industrial salaries, 
factory production arrangements and industrial profit margins. 
 Guide: infusing the concepts of class and class consciousness, assisting 
migrant workers to realize their class situation, class interests and class 
position; catalyzing the process of formation of class consciousness;  
 Emotional supporter: providing emotional support to migrant workers when 
they have frustrations and difficulties struggling and fighting; 
 Innovator: actively involved in promoting labour policies, labour regime and 
labour law reform, and innovation. 
 
The development of grassroots NGOs are influenced by the changing demands of 
migrant workers, but they are also restricted by the institutional environment. The 
NGOs in the Pearl River area are born and developed at the request of migrant 
workers. The old generation of migrant workers of the 1980s were only interested in 
how much they could earn: they considered cities as places of work, but not as places 
to live, as their roots were in rural communities. Their consumption levels were of 
the bare minimum, with no expenditure on entertainment, shopping or learning. They 
considered their stay in cities as temporary and purely for the sake of work; they had 
no desire to change and improve their working and living conditions and so did not 
fight or struggle for labour rights protection. The only issue that caused a reaction 
was if their wages were withheld. The NGOs had no survival soil to grow out. By the 
1990s, along with the implementation of the Labour Law, migrant workers had 
become more aware of their labour rights and resolved to resist their exploitation and 
terrible working conditions. Their search for assistance resulted in the birth of labour 
NGOs. In recent years, the young generation migrant workers have been actively 
involved in the rise of the labour movement in the Pearl River Delta area. They do 
not confine themselves to areas covered by the labour law acts but pursue higher 
level labour rights and more opportunities. The growth of the young generation 
migrant workers’ rights consciousness is also causing the transformation of NGOs as 
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they fight and struggle for labour rights. They are also more likely to take collective 
action like strikes and demonstrations to declare their interests and struggle for rights. 
The formation of this new generation of migrant working class and the growing class 
consciousness has motivated the labour NGOs to change from service-oriented 
NGOs to labour-movement-oriented NGOs.  
 
The promulgation of the Labour Law in 1994 and the Labour Contract Law in 2008, 
and the changing attitudes of central government to grassroots NGOs have had an 
enormous impact on the development and possible activity space of NGOs. Local 
governments have proposed integrating grassroots NGOs into current institutions in 
order to regulate and monitor their functions. Meanwhile, local governments have 
also encouraged the development of social workers and outsourced various public 
services to registered NGOs. Registered NGOs are those who have governmental 
permission and certification to provide social and public services and this is rarely 
given to grassroots legal assistance and labour-movement-oriented labour NGOs. 
Government constantly improving labour legislation, labour law enforcement and the 
administration of justice so as to better protect migrant workers’ labour rights, as 
well as provide legal advocacy and assistance in an attempt to encourage migrant 
workers to solve labour disputes through legal channels. Compared with the 
grassroots NGOs, the public services provided by governments certainly appear to 
have greater effectiveness and credibility. Migrant workers tend to trust the local 
governments and registered NGOs more than non-registered NGOs: the increasing 
investment in registered NGOs is beginning to squeeze the living space of the 
grassroots labour NGOs.  
 
Labour NGOs’ development is also entwined with their geographic location. The 
Pearl River Delta is close to Hong Kong and the inflow of capital from there has also 
spurred inflows of rights consciousness and citizenship consciousness. Labour NGOs 
based in Hong Kong have actively participated in the process of relocation of Hong 
Kong capital, which inspire the development of labour NGOs in the Pearl River 
Delta area. Hong Kong based NGOs have also taken on the responsibilities of 
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training and supervising labour NGOs. Hence the importance of Hong Kong based 
NGOs should not be ignored. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
Guangdong, especially the PRD, is at the frontline of opening up and the 
experimental site of reform policies. This is partly due to its geographic location –
close to Hong Kong and Communist Party due to its historical conditions – and its 
weak state-owned industrial basis. With the fall of the Fordist system and the rising 
of neo-liberal projects, large amounts of capital were invested in the PRD to take 
advantage of its cheap raw materials and low cost workers. Migrant workers, initially 
from inland China and less developed areas of Guangdong, also congregated in the 
PRD to find jobs and earn money. They became the targets of capital and the local 
state who attempted to drive the migrant workers into the wage labour system, 
forcing them to sell their labour power and become reliant on wages for their 
livelihood. The beginning of the subordination projects started with intensive formal 
subordination, that is long working hours, low wages, despotic workplace discipline 
and the ability to hire and fire at will. Migrant workers, excluded by the hukou 
system, had to remain in the secondary labour market, enduring super exploitation 
from capital. Additionally, along with the development of the PRD, the deepening of 
reform and opening up and the spread of neoliberalism, increasing numbers of 
transnational companies relocated their production base to the PRD. Also, because of 
the intensive competition for investment and markets, capitalists were driven to 
innovate and automate. This led to the implementation of the real subordination 
project. The new production lines reduced jobs into deskilled and exchangeable 
pieces and workers were deskilled and subordinated to the machines. The auto 
industry, for example, embraced the lean production system to further reduce costs 
and raise profits. The lean production system not only subordinates migrant workers’ 
labour power but also controlled the migrant workers’ lives as they were chained to 
factory production schedules. However, the formal and real subordination of migrant 
workers to the wage labour system was and is resisted by the escape and 
insubordination of migrant workers as they organised constant resistance in 
workplaces. The migrant workers shortage in the 2000s revealed the power of the 
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mobility of migrant workers and their collective actions applied strong pressure on 
the state and capital to adjust their subordination strategies.  
 
Based on the analysis of the Nanhai Honda strike, considered one of the most 
important events in the Chinese labour movement, we see how the insubordination 
of migrant workers forced capital and the state to make compromises. The lean 
production system tightly controls the bodies of migrant workers, but the ‘just-in-
time’ system also ‘empowers’ the migrant workers insubordination, as any 
disruption in the supply of transmissions will seriously affect the production chain of 
Honda automotive factories. Migrant workers utilized their advantage, forcing the 
company to negotiate with them. Responding to the struggles of migrant workers, the 
company and the local government made several adjustments to the control regime. 
At the company level, a tighter supervision and administration system was instigated 
to monitor the workers: as soon as there was any hint of a strike being organised or 
complaints being voiced, the new special resolution system would immediately 
swing into action. Honda is considering plans to expand its production chain to 
inland China or even Southeast Asian countries, where labour costs are lower and the 
investment environment is more relaxed. At the local state level, firstly it tried to 
introduce the legal framework of collective bargaining in order to absorb the 
insubordination of migrant workers into a controllable institutional channel. 
Secondly, it increased the minimum wage to improve the conditions of migrant 
workers to relieve the grievances of migrant workers and maintain social stability. It 
also tried to squeeze the spaces of the media and the labour NGOs, who have played 
an important supportive role in the insubordination of migrant workers. We can see 
that the insubordination of migrant workers has significantly influenced the 
development strategies of Guangdong, with following of capital and the state. They 
try to drag migrant workers back into capitalist production system and to obtain their 
surplus values. The adjustments to the control regime have only inflamed the 
subordination of migrant workers to capital. The battle between subordination and 
insubordination will continue in the future.  
 
 175 
 
 
Chapter 6 Endogenous Development, Harmonious Labour 
Relations and Collective Consultancy in Zhejiang Province  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The development of Zhejiang Province is characterized by “a heavy reliance on 
private initiatives, a non-interventionist government style in the management of 
firms, and a supportive credit policy stance toward private companies” (Huang, 
2008). Zhejiang economy is mainly based on family-run firms (Zhang & Fu, 2009). 
The ‘Wenzhou Model’, first noted in 1986 by Fei Xiaotong, China's most prominent 
sociologist, is probably the most famous product of the Zhejiang development model. 
Wenzhou is a city in the south of Zhejiang that today accounts for a disproportionate 
share of wealthy entrepreneurs, asset owners, and China's manufacturing prowess 
(Huang, 2008). Fei summarised the Wenzhou Model as ‘Small Commodities, Big 
Market’, indicating the structure of Wenzhou's production and distribution model; 
thousands of family firms relying on specialised markets (Fei,1986, cited in Wang, 
2008:25). Hence, this kind of developmental model is endogenous, small-scale, 
family-based and domestic market, especially township markets, oriented. It not only 
leads to the comparatively equal distribution of economic growth outcomes among 
different social groups, but also illustrates the relatively balanced power relations 
among labour, capital and government in Zhejiang compared with other advanced 
development areas in China. The particular social-economic factors in Zhejiang and 
special patterns of capitalist development have had a significant influence in shaping 
labour relations. Moreover, migrant workers in Zhejiang, unlike in the PRD, mainly 
originate from rural areas of the province. Hence, labour disputes in Zhejiang also 
differ to those in other provinces. One of their significant features is the utilization of 
collective consultancy (ji ti xie shang 集 体 协 商 ).  Xinhe, a woollen sweater 
manufacturing town, successfully took and the initiative and implemented a sectoral 
collective agreement at the local level; this has been rapidly extended to the whole 
province, supported by the Zhejiang Labour Bureaus and Zhejiang Federation of 
Trade Unions.  
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In this chapter, Zhejiang’s reform path is analysed to trace capitalist development 
trajectory. It pays great attention to the Wenzhou Model. Migrants have made 
significant contributions to the province’s rapid economic growth, while at the same 
time facing harsh environments. The story of their background and current situation 
reveals the subordination project of local private capital to migrant workers. It is 
clear that the Wenzhou Model is based on the formal subordination of migrant 
workers to capital, with long working hours and low-paid jobs. But, the subversion, 
refusal and escape of migrant workers were born out of the existing political 
structure. Migrant workers take advantage of their position in the labour market to 
escape from the containment of capital and the local state and insubordinate to 
capital relation. The state and current ruling class attempt to disrupt the workers 
becoming a collective force. Zhejiang’s local trade union has implemented novel 
ideas in collective consultancy to solve challenges arising from increasing labour 
militancy. However, it should be noted that it is not the working class leads 
innovation in the trade union. Rather it is an upgrade of a regime of control, which 
continually attempts to absorb the energy of subversion, refusal and escape. The 
changing global economic environment and the deepening of capitalist development 
has brought and will bring new challenges.  
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6.2 Small Commodities and Big Market （小商品大市场） 
 
6.2.1 Living traditions of mercantilism?  
 
 
Figure 35: Map of Zhejiang in China 
 
Source: Author made based on online source: 
http://www.58pic.com/tupian/zhongguoditushiliangtu.html 
 
Zhejiang is located in the eastern coastal area in China. Traditionally, it was rich in 
rice, silk, tea and china, and one of the most prosperous areas, especially since the 
Song Dynasty.
60
 As well as having thriving agricultural and handicrafts sectors, 
Zhejiang was also known as being a prosperous domestic and foreign trade centre. 
Foreign trade in Zhejiang began during the Eastern Han Dynasty,
61
 grew during the 
Tang, boomed during the Song and Yuan and was banned officially during the Ming 
(1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. However, despite the official ban, 
foreign trade continued to take place ‘under the table’.  
 
A booming commodity economy and flourishing foreign trade greatly stimulated the 
development of the handicraft industry. From the Yuan Dynasty onwards, large 
numbers of craft workshops were established and began to hire dozens of labourers 
to work for them. The relationship between the merchants and the labourers was 
                                                 
60
 The Song Dynasty was an era of Chinese history from 960-1279; it included the Northern Song 
(960-1127) and Southern Song (1127-1279). 
61
 The Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220). The question of when foreign trade began in Zhejiang is still a 
debatable issue. Some scholars argue it started in the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.) while 
others argue that it was in the Han Dynasty (Lin, 2003). 
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comparatively loose, without personal reliability. These labourers were initially 
silkworm farmers. They were employed as full-time labourers and paid either by the 
day or by the job. During the Ming and Qing dynasties some workshops were so 
large that they hired hundreds of labourers. Hence there used to be a popular 
agreement that the seeds of capitalism sprouted in Zhejiang in this era.
62
 
 
This brief introduction to the commercial and handicraft industries and foreign trade 
of Zhejiang reveals the historical continuity of the developmental model in this area. 
Taking Wenzhou as an example, during the Mao era the collectivisation programme 
required people to remain on the land to farm, alienating craftsmen and long-distance 
traders. However, this did not stop specialized craft production and long-distance 
trade. By the end of Mao's era, rural Wenzhou had, by and large, returned to pre-
communist practices (Liu, 1992). As reported in Renmin Ribao (1977), in Wenzhou, 
collectivization had turned into private farming. Black markets emerged while 
collective enterprises collapsed. Collective enterprises were replaced by 
“underground factories” and “underground labor markets” (Xinhuashe jizhe, 1977; 
cited in Liu, 1992: 698) and this led to the economic ‘take-off’ of Wenzhou in the 
reform era. Zhang Renshou, who started to analyse the Wenzhou Model in the early 
                                                 
62
 However, since 2000, new debates have sprung up around whether the seeds of capitalism existed 
in China during the Ming and Qing dynasties (Cao, 2006, 2008; Li, 2000, 2001; Wu, 2006; Yang, 
2005; Zhong, 2003; Zhou, 2010). Scholars who disagree claim that even though the productive 
relations in these handicraft workshops shared the same patterns as the beginning of capitalism in 
England the fundamental differences between them should not be forgotten. In China, the ‘powerful 
state’ began during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770-256 BC) and was firmly established in the Qin 
Dynasty. Centralism of absolutism was headed by Emperor, administering politics effectively and 
maintaining the operation of the bureaucratic system, and necessary links to the bureaucratic system 
even the political system , showing intense vitality. The power of the state peaked during the Ming 
and Qing periods. During this time, there were no independent cities that could provide physical and 
political spaces for independent citizens and free labour (Zhou, 2010). Analysing from the perspective 
of productivity, Li Bozhong (2000, 2001) argues that the main driving force of economic 
development of Zhejiang in the Ming and Qing eras was the division of labour and specialization, 
known as ‘Smithian dynamics’, i.e. market pushes development. The scale of the market only 
determines the division of labour. Increase in the market also leads to increase in opportunities. 
Albert-Feuerwerker (1992) summarizes the characteristics of ‘Smithian Growth’ which is directed by 
‘Smithian dynamics’. In ‘Smithian Growth’, there is no technical breakthrough and innovation, which 
was the critical factor in the Industrial Revolution in England, the essential element of modern 
industrialization. Also, as E.A.Wrigley (1988, cited in Li, 2001) claimed, modern industrialization is a 
transition process from ‘advanced organic economy’ to ‘mineral-based energy economy’. A Wrigley-
defined industrial revolution should not take its raw materials and energy from the finite surface of the 
land, but should be based on coal and other ‘inorganic’ raw materials such as iron, steel and bricks 
(Bohstedt, 1990). Zhejiang is lacking in coal and other ‘inorganic raw materials’ and so it is unlikely 
that it would develop modern industrialization automatically. It was not until the late 19th century, 
after the intervention of western countries, that capitalist development began in Zhejiang. It continues 
to be superior in economic competition, and has become one of the heartlands of industrialization. 
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1980s, writes that there are four principal components of regional culture which 
impact on the formation of a regional developmental model (Zhang&Li, 1990). They 
are traditional culture, foreign cultures from western developed countries, culture 
formed under the planned economy system, and the culture that has developed under 
the market economy since 1978. Zhejiang is heavily influenced by its traditional 
commercial culture, which is different from traditional Confucianism and has shown 
robust endogenous creativity in economic development after its release from the 
planned economy system.  
 
6.2.2 Socio-economic Changes in Zhejiang since 1978 
 
During the Mao-era, Zhejiang received very little investment from the central 
government, partly due to its geographical location (it was considered that its 
proximity to Taiwan made it vulnerable to the threat of invasion) and partly due to its 
commercial tradition that was antithetical to collectivization and socialist enterprise. 
From 1950 to 1978, the state invested, on average, 600 RMB per capita, but only 240 
RMB per capita in Zhejiang (Chen, 2009). Consequently, economic development in 
Zhejiang was much slower than in surrounding areas such as Jiangsu and Shanghai.  
 
After the reform and opening up, Zhejiang was not as valued as the Pearl River Delta 
by the central government and was not offered the same preferential policy and 
investment. The province was also mainly ignored by foreign investment. Thus 
Zhejiang’s post-1978 development is mainly based on local people and local capital. 
With little investment from the state or foreign investors, Zhejiang has made 
impressive achievements in economic development. As Figure 36 shows, for the 
majority of the time in the period 1978-2013 Zhejiang’s growth rate was higher than 
the total growth rate in terms of GDP. Zhejiang’s GDP grew from 12.37 billion RMB 
in 1978 (3.39% of total GDP) to 3756.85 billion RMB (6.4%) (see Figure 37).  
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Figure 36 GDP Growth Rate of Total GDP and Zhejiang GDP 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China; Zhejiang Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics 
 
Figure 37 Proportion of Zhejiang’s GDP to Total GDP 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China; Zhejiang Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics 
 
The growth of per capita GDP is also sharp, sharper than the total growth rate most 
of the time before 2004 (Figure 38):    
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Figure 38 Per Capita GDP Growth Rate of Total and Zhejiang 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China Zhejiang Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics 
 
Rapid economic development is closely related to industrialization. Since 1978, 
secondary industry in Zhejiang has experienced rapid growth. It relies on the rapid 
development of the private economy based on family-based industrial plants. Rural 
labourers left their lands to work in factories or engaged in business. As shown in 
Figure 39, the contribution by primary industry has steadily declined; secondary 
industry has maintained its dominant position; and the contribution of tertiary 
industry to the whole economy, which creates even more jobs and profits, has 
increases sharply from less than 20% in 1978 to nearly 50% in 2013 (see Figure 6.5).     
 
Figure 39 Figure 6.5: Structure of Gross Domestic Product (1978-2013) 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistic Yearbook 2014 
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The rural reform stimulates the rapid growth of non-agricultural industries in rural 
areas, which increases rural family income dramatically and reduces the gap between 
urban and rural areas in Zhejiang. It shows that rural households also benefit from 
economic development. As illustrated in Figure 40, it is clear that the gap between 
urban and rural income in Zhejiang is lower than the national level during the reform 
period. The rapid development of the private sector in rural areas, especially TVEs 
and ge ti hu (individual entrepreneurs), has efficiently balanced the uneven 
development between urban and rural areas. However, it should be noticed that the 
gap increased slightly after 2000. The growth in the income gap in Zhejiang is 
influenced by changes in the social-economic environment. Since 2000, Zhejiang has 
become more integrated with global investment as FDI began to flow in, influencing 
the development of local private capital. The 2008 financial crisis cut demand from 
developed countries, and consequently China’s exports fell dramatically, slowing its 
economic development and income growth.  
 
Figure 40 Urban and Rural per Capita Income Gap 
 
Sources: China Statistic Yearbook 2014 and Zhejiang Statistic Yearbook 2014 
 
The explosive growth in Zhejiang’s economic production and trade since 1978 
attests to the historical and cultural habitus of its commercial and maritime culture 
(Yang, 2008). The commercial tradition stimulated the rapid growth of family-based 
industrial plants, which fuelled the take-off of Zhejiang. During the reform era, 
Zhejiang transformed itself from an under-developed province to one of the richest 
in China. The family-based industrial plants not only contribute to rapid 
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industrialization, but also improve the rural households’ lives. The income gap 
between urban and rural residents is narrowed down significantly. In the next section 
the details of Zhejiang’s development path are explored.  
 
6.2.3 Capitalist Development of Zhejiang 
 
Rural Reform 
 
 
A discussion of China’s reform and opening up is not complete without the 
mentioning of bao chan dao hu (包产到户) or the allocating of land to households and 
fixing output quotas on a household basis) which officially originated in Xiaogang 
village in Anhui in 1978. Although the family contract responsibility system (jia ting 
lian chan cheng bao 家庭联产承包) had been experimented with in Yongjia town (in 
Wenzhou) as a solution to problems caused by collective production groups in 1956, 
in the era of socialist reform in terms of the ownership of means of production, it 
seemed like swimming against the tide. Upper level governments disapproved and 
the system was abandoned. Even in 1979, the household responsibility system was 
still an amorpous concept, suspected by cadres and the masses. County-level 
government banned the practice in the production brigades of Jinyun Town (Lishui 
City) (Yang, 2010), but in Changchen Commune in Changxing Town (Huzhou City) 
it was implemented successfully and this came to be considered as the prologue to 
Zhejiang’s rural reform. By 1982, all 5001 communes and production brigades in 
Changxing Town had implemented the family contract responsibility system (Xinhua 
Net, 2008). 
 
Thus, the family contract responsibility system, which allocates land to separate 
families and fixes farm output quotas for each household, was an essential element 
of rural reform in Zhejiang, as in the rest of the country. It enhanced productivity per 
unit area: with a high population density and a long history of mercantile tradition, 
the rural people released from collective agricultures, began to raise capital based on 
their existing social networks, including family members, relatives and friends. This 
capital was immediately invested in family-based industrial plants. As the province’s 
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population were short on skills and money, it could only focus on labour-intensive 
and low-technology light industries. Initially, the products produced in Zhejiang took 
advantage of merchandise shortages in the domestic market caused by the planned 
economy (Wang, 2008), and utilised vast numbers of salesman teams and their 
corresponding business networks (Lu & Wang, 2008). In fact, rural people in 
Zhejiang were enthusiastic about commercial business even during the period of the 
People's Commune. Despite the danger, such as ge zi ben zhu yi wei ba (割资本主义尾
巴  purging all remnants of capitalism), they made every effort to follow their 
commercial traditions, by fair means or foul. Yiwu
63
 peasants were famous for ji mao 
huan tang (鸡毛换糖 exchanging sugar for chicken feathers; chicken feathers being 
used for further products, like brooms). This activity was judged as ‘tou ji dao ba’(投
机倒把 engaging in speculation), which was a serious economic crime in planned 
economy system until it was finally abolished in 1997. Unauthorised production was 
considered a crime because it (supposedly) damaged the existing economic order – 
the planned economic order during the Mao period. In Wenzhou, peasants forged 
official seals, fabricated introduction letters from dan wei (work units, which, in 
those days were all state-owned or collective owned) and left their household 
registered location without permission for business – all crimes at the time. There 
was an enormous black market economy, such as illegal construction teams, black 
market goods, long distance transportation and business, loan-sharking and 
contraband, etc. (Luo & Xu, 2006). Therefore, once the handcuffs were taken off, the 
Zhejiang people enthusiastically put their ideas and abilities to work in the open. 
 
The Growth of the Private Sector 
 
 
In 1978, the central government weakening of constraints on rural industry and 
commerce generated an increase in the number of both family-based industrial plants 
and self-employed individuals. The first self-employed individual license (ge ti hu) 
was issued to a peddler from Wenzhou named Zhang Huamei: by 1980, there were 
over 3000 self-employed individuals in Wenzhou. They were encouraged by the 
central government’s statement on private economy: ‘encourage and support 
                                                 
63
 Yiwu is in the middle of Jinhua City, which lies in the middle of Zhejiang Province.  
 185 
 
appropriate development of private and self-employed economy, diverse economic-
forms can compete on the same stage, all law-abiding individual workers should gain 
social respect’ (News of Communist Party of China, 2006). Boosted by emerging 
specialised markets, the dedicated family-based industrial plants also grew quickly. 
The largest ones in each industry were termed ‘da wang’(大王) or ‘king’, and so there 
were the King of Electrical Appliances, King of Screws, King of Miner’ Lights, King 
of Coils, etc. However, the lingering prestige of ideology of planned economy and 
working class had not completely faded, and it still subtly influenced Chinese society, 
from the government to private individuals: were these self-employed individuals 
and workshops ‘capitalism’? Based on a misunderstanding of Marx’s analysis of 
surplus value in Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1990:423) the dividing line 
between the exploiting class and the working class, capitalist and the ‘small master’ 
(ge ti hu) in China was absurdly set as if you employed up to seven workers you 
were a ‘small master’, while eight or more meant you were a capitalist. The 
respective passage reads: 
 
To live only twice as well as an ordinary worker and, as well as that, 
turn half of the surplus-value produced into capital, he would have 
to multiply the number of workers and the minimum of capital 
advanced by eight. Of course he can, like the man who is working 
for him, participate directly in the process of production, but then 
he is only a hybrid, a man between capitalist and worker, a ‘small 
master’.  
 
When The Fool’s Sunflower Seeds (sha zi gua zi 傻子瓜子), a snack company founded 
by Nian Guangjiu, a peasant from Anhui, hired 12 workers, people criticised him as 
a capitalist and this ultimately led to a national debate on ge ti hu. In 1981, 
government suddenly did a complete about-face from its previous economic position, 
and this rapidly slowed the construction of the private economy. Excoriated as Tou Ji 
Dao Ba,
64
 the booming growth of private economy was believed to be endangering 
economic orders and ‘pillaging’ the raw materials, sales markets and technicians that 
used to belong to state-owned enterprises. The ‘Kings’ mentioned above were 
                                                 
64
jia qiang shi chang guan li ,da ji tou ji dao ba he zou si huo dong de zhi shi (加强市场管理， 打击
投机倒把和走私活动的指示 Instructions for strengthening market management, cracking down on 
speculative trading and smuggling) and guan yu tiao zheng nong cun shedui qi ye gong shang shui 
shou fu dan de ruo gan gui ding (关于调整农村社队企业工商税收负担的若干规定 The Rules of 
adjustment of tax burden of commune and brigade run enterprises). 
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arrested and jailed or wanted by the central government. Consequently, industrial 
growth in Wenzhou suffered a severe setback, dropping from 31.5% in 1980 to -
1.7% in 1982. This economic turndown had the effect of making local governments 
more flexible and likely to approve local protectionism. Then, the industrial growth 
of Zhejiang had recovered to 35% in 1985.  Experimental and innovative systems of 
new ownership of enterprises were supported by local governments, including the 
rural shareholding cooperative enterprise in 1987.
65
 As the subjective interest 
shareholders, |local governments played an important role in facilitating and 
protecting the development of the private sector in Zhejiang.  
 
It is widely believed that the political environment influences economic growth 
(Petrakos, et al., 2007) – and economic development in China is inevitably 
influenced by the guiding ideology and policies of the central government. After a 
short period of recovery, the private economy again experienced turbulence in 1989. 
Factories were shut down for restructuring and the market was plunged into 
confusion: monetary squeeze, cooling consumption, underproduction, rising 
unemployment and increasing numbers of business failure, etc. A difficult external 
environment, the inherent defects of lack of investment, labour-intensive family-
based industrial plants and the extremely low quality of products from Zhejiang, 
caused a nationwide large-scale boycott and dragged Zhejiang into the economic 
doldrums. In an attempt to boost local development through the private economy 
local people again showed their ingenuity, ‘creating’ ‘red cap’ enterprises. ‘Red cap’ 
refers to the reputation and operational benefits a private enterprise enjoys by 
becoming attached to a government department and doing business in the name of a 
state-run or collective-run enterprise. Benefits include “lower tax rates, easier 
approval procedures, less restrictions on the size and operations of the business, and 
shelter against possible reversal in the political fortunes of the reformers” (Woo, 
Parker & Sachs, 1997:315). People used these businesses as a temporary method of 
taking advantage of the benefits on offer. As the reform developed further and central 
                                                 
65
 guayu nongcun gufen hezuo qiye ruogan wenti de zanxing guiding (关于农村股份合作企业若干问题的暂
行规定 Provisional Regulations On Several Issues: The Rural Shareholding Cooperative Enterprises) 
by People’s Government of Wenzhou Municipality, 1987. 
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government control relaxed and local governments increased their support,
66
 the 
private sector in Zhejiang returned to the fast track of development. 
 
In 1978, there were only 8,901 ge ti hu employing 8,690 persons in Zhejiang, and no 
private enterprises (si ying qi ye 私营企业 ). The number of private companies 
experienced a dramatic increase of 103.8% in the 1990s, from 87,712 in 1996 to 
178,771 in 2000. Of these, 14% were developed from ge ti hu, and 2.9% developed 
from foreign-invested enterprises. Also, the portions of private enterprises built in 
1990s, 1980s and late 1970s are 67.1%, 30% and 2.9% of the number in existence in 
2000 respectively. In 2001, the number of ge ti hu had increased to 1,580,300, 
employing 2,773,300 people, and 208,800 private businesses employed 3,471,100. In 
2006, 406,400 private enterprises and 1,798,000 ge ti hu created a gross output of 
1,254.7 billion RMB, revenue of 984.7 billion RMB, retail sales of consumer goods 
of 436.8 billion RMB and exports of 250.7 billion RMB. From 1978 to 2007, the 
GDP of Zhejiang increased from 12.4 billion RMB to 1,800 billion RMB, 70% of 
which was contributed by the private economy, including ge ti hu. Private economy 
is the outstanding characteristic of the Zhejiang Model; and it is the engine of 
Zhejiang economic development. In 2013, there are 25.9 million ge ti hu and 
936,000 private enterprises, responsible for 5.38 million and 12.23 million jobs 
respectively, or about one-third of the total number of jobs created in Zhejiang (see 
Figure 41).  
 
 
                                                 
66
 In 1993, the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the CPC and the Zhejiang Provincial Government 
jointly issued a document to Promote The Development Of Private Economy – ‘guan yu cu jin ge ti , 
si ying jing ji jian kang fa zhan de tong zhi’ (关于促进个体私营经济健康发展的通知 Notifications 
of promoting the development of private enterprises and ge ti hu). 
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Figure 41 Numbers of Private Enterprises and ge ti hu, and Numbers of Employed Persons in Private Enterprises 
and ge ti hu 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook 2014 and Zhejiang Statistic Yearbook 2014 
 
As shown in Table 11, the gross output created by non-state owned and non-foreign 
invested economy accounted for 60%-70% of GDP from 2000 to 2012. The 
contribution of the private economy experienced significant growth with the 
shrinking of the collective economy. In 2012, non-state owned and non-foreign 
invested economy (including individual and private enterprise, and collectively-
owned enterprises) created a gross output of 2,211 billion RMB or 63.8% of GDP. Of 
this, 2,010.7 billion RMB was created by private economy (individual and private 
enterprises) which accounted for 58% of GDP and played a significant role in the 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employe
d 
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Table 11 Private Economy in Zhejiang in 2000-2012 
 
Year 
Economic Value Added  
(¥100 million) 
Growth 
Rate 
GDP Proportion (%)  
Total 
Individual 
& Private 
Enterprise Collective Total 
Individual 
& Private 
Enterprise Collective 
2000 4250 2512 1738   69.2 40.9 28.3 
2001 4712 3118 1594 10.9 68.3 45.2 23.1 
2002 5346 3986 1361 13.5 66.8 49.8 17 
2003 6415 5221 1194 20.0 66.1 53.8 12.3 
2004 7629 6518 1111 18.9 65.5 56 9.5 
2005 8682 7533 1148 13.8 64.7 56.1 8.6 
2006 9887 8629 1257 13.9 62.9 54.9 8 
2007 11552 10217 1319 16.8 61.6 54.5 7 
2008 13121 11829 1292 13.6 61.1 55.1 6 
2009 14301 12876 1425 9.0 62.2 56 6.2 
2010 17210 15559 1651 20.3 62.1 56.1 6 
2011 20381 18516 1865 18.4 63.1 57.3 5.8 
2012 22111 20107 2004 8.5 63.8 58 5.8 
Source: Zhejiang Statistic Year Book 2014 
 
The development of the private economy in Zhejiang is impressive not only because 
of the numbers of ge ti hu and private enterprises, but also their high quality. In 2012, 
there 142 private companies from Zhejiang were listed in China’s top 500 private 
companies, with a total operational revenue of RMB 2123.2 billion (ACFIC,
67
 2013).  
 
Industry Cluster and Specialised Markets
68
 – Small Commodities, Big Market 
 
 
One of most significant characteristics of the Zhejiang Model is its agglomerated and 
clustered industries (Chen, L, 2002; Chen, Y, 2009; Lu & Wang, 2008; Luo & Xu, 
2006; Wang, 2008; Yang, 2008; Zhang & Lu, 2003). The original family-based 
                                                 
67
 ACFIC: All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce. 
68 tese shichang or zhuanye shichang 特色市场或专业市场，a place containing stalls and shops for 
marketing and production of particular and similar products.  
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industry and family enterprises, ‘yi cun yi pin, yi xiang yi ye’ (一村一品，一乡一业 – one 
village one product, one town, one industry) have become the primary economic 
pattern of the Zhejiang Model. The production process is not organised in one 
factory, but within one village or one town. Exploiting the tight ties between 
Zhejiang rural people of blood, geography and work, labour division and co-
operation is smoothly organised across millions of families. Small producers first 
worked in family-based workshops or factories, and subsequently in industrial plants, 
and then agglomerated within a village or township (Wang, 2006). In Datang Town, 
Zhuji City (a county-level city), there are at least ten thousand sock workshops and 
factories, each on average having two employees and eight hosiery machines. The 
town produced over 12 billion socks in 2006, accounting for two-thirds of China’s 
total output and one-third of global total production. Supporting the sock factories, 
are more than 1000 raw materials processing plants, 400 yarns warp knitting plants, 
300 seaming plants, 100 shape fixing plants, 300 packing plants, and machinery 
accessory plants, as well as 100 shipping service companies and 600 sale agencies as 
of the town (Figure 42). 
 
Figure 42 Organisation of Sock Production in Datang Town 
 
Source: Made based on the research of Wang, 2006 
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Similar production process organising can be found in other parts of Zhejiang, such 
as the feather and down industry in Xiaoshan, Hangzhou, chemical fibre and textile 
industry in Shaoxing, necktie industry in Shengzhou, leather industry in Haining, 
plastic industry in Yuyao, hardware industry in Yongkang, clothes, glasses and 
leather shoes industry in Wenzhou, etc. (Chen, 2002; Wang, 2008; Yang, 2008). The 
integration of family-based industrial plants, specialised markets, raw material 
suppliers and sales agencies have created the agglomeration and clustering economy 
in Zhejiang (Wang, 2008). 
 
The formation, growth and development of clustered industry in Zhejiang was tied to 
the development of specialised markets. Thus, the complementary relations between 
the specialised markets and the industrial clusters, combined with the developing 
private sector, determined the organisation of economic activities around family-
based industries and the commercial trade of daily necessities (Bellandi & Lombardi, 
2012; Lu & Yu, 2010; Sheng & Zheng, 2004; Wang, 2006, 2008). The specialised 
markets had existed for hundreds of years before the local industry cluster formed, 
the result of traditional commercial. Peddlers travelled together to trade agricultural 
goods in rural markets, even sometimes engaging in long-distance trade over China 
based on local collective support (such as merchants hui-kuan 会馆  in different 
destinations). Over time, inter-province connections were established based on 
merchant networks. Merchants also utilised the networks to collect information 
about high demand goods. Information about which goods were in high demand was 
passed to producers in their hometowns, to family-based workshops and factories, 
who then manufactured the goods. Merchants started their own businesses based on 
trade in these daily necessities (Bellandi & Lombardi, 2012). Along with the 
dramatic increase in family-based industrial plants, specialised markets also have 
experienced sharp growth. Local governments also involved in actively. In 1979, the 
ban of agricultural products’ trade was lifted in cities entirely by Zhejiang provincial 
government, leading to the development of urban and rural markets of agricultural 
goods. In 1982, Zhejiang government formally instituted specialised market. In 
response, Luqiao market (路桥市场), in Taizhou, became the first small commodity 
market of Zhejiang. At the same time, Yiwu Small Commodity Markets, Yongjia 
Qiaotou Button Market, Shaoxing Textile Markets all joined in. From 1982 to 1984, 
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the number of small commodities specialised markets grew from 58 to 252 (Sheng & 
Zheng, 2004). In 1986, ‘Small commodities, big market’, summarized by Fei 
Xiaotong after a detailed fieldwork in Wenzhou, made Wenzhou Model entering into 
the spotlight of the public stage. Since then, the development of the specialised 
market has been the significant role of economic development of Zhejiang, as well as 
catalysed institutional innovations to offset the lack of market institutions (Bellandi 
& Lombardi, 2012). In 1978, the number was 1051, then it experienced continuous 
growth, peaking at 4619 in 1998, then holding at around 4000 after entering the new 
century (see Figure 43). 
 
 
Figure 43 Number of Specialised Markets from1980 to 2013 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistic Year Book 2014 
 
Zhejiang owns the most specialised markets with the biggest volume of transaction 
value in China. It can be clearly seen in tables below: Zhejiang comes to the top 1 in 
number index.   
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Table 12 Basic Statistics on Commodity Exchange Markets of Transaction Value over 100 Million RMB by Region 
in 2013 
Region 
Number 
of 
Markets 
(unit) 
Transaction 
Value over 
100 Million 
RMB by 
Region 
Booths 
(Unit ) 
Area  
(10,000 
sq.m) 
Turnover 
(100 
million 
RMB) 
Wholesale Retail 
Total 5089 3488170 28868.33 98365.10 84628.3 13736.83 
Zhejiang 767 463648 2980.47 14840.33 12441.90 2398.43 
Shandong 558 390642 3890.30 9039.01 8040.21 998.80 
Jiangsu 547 351917 3294.69 16595.82 14532.82 2063.00 
Guangdong 364 214964 1962.10 5418.15 4697.39 720.77 
Hunan 327 185758 1058.73 3169.15 2367.06 802.10 
Source: Zhu Wenfeng， 2013，The Formation, Development And Transformation Of Specialised 
Market In Zhejiang, A Theoretical Review (zhejiang zhuanye shichang de xingcheng, fazhan yu 
zhuanxing, yige lilun pingshu 浙江专业市场的形成、发展与转型一个理论评述), Commercial Times 
(China), 2013 (12).  
 
Foreign Investment 
 
 
Since China joined the WTO in 2002, it has become common trends that local 
economy is integrating with global flowing capital. Zhejiang also began to pay more 
attention to foreign investment. Figure 44 shows the dramatic increase after 2000. 
The global economy recession also had a great impact on the utilization of foreign 
investment in Zhejiang; there was a sharp drop during the recession period.  
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Figure 44 Utilisation of Foreign Investment in Zhejiang, 1979-2013 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistic Year Book 2014 
 
The total trade volume of exports and imports has also grown dramatically since 
2000, from US2.8 million in 2000 to US33.6 million in 2013. Exports enjoyed a 
sharper growth than imports. Based on the flourishing light industry, general 
accounts for the majority of Zhejiang’s exports (80%). General trade is unlike the 
processing and assembling trade, which creates a technical spill over effect to drive 
economic growth in processing locations. The majority of Zhejiang’s export goods 
are daily necessities (clothes, shoes, plastic products, etc.), related to the industrial 
structure (Figure 45).   
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Figure 45 Zhejiang’s Exports and Imports, 1986-2013 
 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistic Year Book 2014 
 
In China’s economic reform era of the past two decades, the Wenzhou Model of rural 
development, based on small household industries, joint-stock firms, and restless 
entrepreneurs has expanded across the whole of China. Even before the official 
promulgation of the economic reforms in 1978, many parts of rural Wenzhou had 
already quietly and secretly de-collectivized agriculture. With virtually no state, 
foreign, or overseas Chinese investment, Zhejiang transformed itself from an 
underdeveloped province to an economically dynamic, prosperous, and rapidly 
industrializing and urbanizing region (Zhang 1998:1032; Yang 2008). The Wenzhou 
or Zhejiang Model is a different from the PRD and Jiangsu. From the perspective of 
relationship between government and market, Feng (2004) claims that the Zhejiang 
Model is a market model and self-organising model, in which governments are not 
playing an economic management role, but a promoting and supporting role. The 
state takes the responsibility to maintain the market order while minimizing 
interventions, which is the route followed by the Zhejiang governments at different 
levels since 1978. Lu and Wang (2008) have further elaborated on the Zhejiang 
Model in detail. In the early stage of reform and opening up, Zhejiang’s economic 
development was based on private entrepreneurship by a wide variety of social 
groups without relying on government investment and foreign capital. It is domestic-
market-oriented, mainly in the labour-intensive industry of small wares, textiles and 
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consumer goods. The formation of new industries and specialized markets are 
closely linked with the local traditional handicraft industry, culture and social 
networks (Lu & Wang, 2008).  
 
The implementation of subordination projects by local private capitalists and the 
local state is influenced by the particular path of capitalist development. The 
combination of local capital and local migrant workers, especially the ge ti hu, blurs 
the line between capitalists and workers to some extent. But, the industrial clusters 
and specialized markets encouraged the gathering of small-scale workshops and 
family-based plants concentrated in labour-intensive and low-tech industries. The 
local migrant workers, although they had social network links with local capitalists, 
still faced intensive formal subordination projects. The particular development path 
has a significant impact on the shaping of labour relations.  
 
6.3 The making of migrant workers in Zhejiang Province  
 
6.3.1 Migrant Workers in Zhejiang in the Reform era  
 
 
Inner provincial migration  
 
Peasants, during the planned economy period, as a social group were excluded from 
the assignment of rights and representation. They were tied to the land by the 
people’s commune system. However, even the strong mobility control regime 
embedded in the hukou system could not prevent people from moving. As discussed 
above, peasants in Zhejiang, with a long history of commerce and trade, continued to 
move out of their hometown to make a living in other places, both inside and outside 
China. The enormous underground black economy had started primitive 
accumulation of capital to a certain degree. As a large population with relatively little 
arable land, meagre natural resources, and a weak industrial base, peasants in 
Zhejiang have been displaced from their land and engaged in the private sector since 
1978.  
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The transfer of the rural labour force firstly occurred as local and inner-provincial 
transfers. Town and Village Enterprises, both collective and private, absorbed the 
majority of the rural labour force. As shown in Figures 46 and 47, the number in 
agricultural employment decreased from 12,732,500 in 1985 to 5,069,500 in 2013, 
while the proportion of primary industry employment has declined sharply from 
54.9% to 13.67% in the past 28 years.  
 
As discussed above, economic development is deeply influenced by the central 
government’s ideology and policies. So was the migration of rural labour in Zhejiang. 
From 1978 to 1988, accompanied by the rapid development of rural industry, the 
proportion of the agricultural labour force of the total rural labour force had dropped 
from 88.73% to 63.3% between 1978 and 1988 (Figure 46). However, in 1989, with 
political turbulence and tightened controls over migrant workers, the transfer 
stagnated. According to a rural household sample survey (Shao, 1994), four to five 
times as many migrant workers returned from the non-agricultural to the agricultural 
sector from 1989 to 1991 when compared with the previous period (Figure 46). 
There were only 837,000 out-provincial migrants, 38.1% of the total migrants, who 
had been born in Zhejiang in 1993, which means rural labour was primarily 
transferring locally (Shao, 1994). In 1995, 62.4% of total Zhejiang migrants 
transferred inside the province, increasing to 69.8% in 2003 and 70.3% in 2004 (Zhu 
& Huang, 2009). As the development of private economy in Zhejiang was revitalized 
by loosening controls and local governments’ support from 1992 onwards, rural 
labour began to move again even more strongly. As shown in Figure 47 and 48, over 
a million peasants moved from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector in 1993. 
Henceforward, the numbers of the agricultural labour force constantly and smoothly 
falls by 4.36% annually from 1994 to 2013. At the beginning of the new century, the 
number of people employed in the secondary and tertiary industries exceeded that in 
the primary industry (which had fallen below 100,000). 
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Figure 46 Numbers of Employed Persons at Year-end by Thee Strata of Industry (1000 persons) 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook 2014 
 
 
Figure 47 Composition of Employed Persons at Year-end by Three Strata of Industry 
 
Source: Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook 2014 
 
Migration into Zhejiang from other provinces  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the rapid development of private 
economy in Zhejiang, which created numerous jobs, migrants from other provinces 
began to flood into Zhejiang (Figure 48). The number of migrants, or ‘floating 
population’ in statistics, in Zhejiang since 2001 has been the second highest in China 
after Guangdong. Influenced by the global economic recession, numbers fell 
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somewhat in 2008, but the total amount of floating population has continued to grow. 
In 2010, as shown by the Sixth Population Census of China (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012), the floating population in Zhejiang numbered 19,900,853, including 
11,823,977 from outside Zhejiang. The total population of Zhejiang in 2010 was 
544,269,000, which means that at least one in five residents were not local. The 
destinations of floating population are mainly concentrated in developed areas in 
Zhejiang, such as Hangzhou (14.74% of total in Zhejiang), Ningbo (16.7%), 
Wenzhou (23.04%), Taizhou (10.3%) and Jinhua (10.4%). In less-developed areas of 
Zhejiang, people tended to move to other cities in the province or even out of 
Zhejiang (Zhang, 2006; Zhu & Huang 2009). Almost 90% of the floating population 
into Zhejiang are between 15-59 years old, and members of the active labour force. 
There are 8.44 million young adults (20-44 years old), accounting for 71.4% of total 
migrants. Nearly every province in China is represented in the floating population, 
although four in particular provide more than half of the total migrants – Anhui (2.29 
million, 19.33%), Jiangxi (1.53 million, 12.94%), Guizhou (1.50 million, 12.68%) 
and Sichuan (1.24 million, 10.49%) (Hangzhou Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
  
Figure 48 Floating Population into Zhejiang from other provinces, 1982-2011 
 
Source: Hangzhou Bureau of Statistics, 2012 
 
The educational background of migrants in Zhejiang is shown in Table 6.3 and 
clearly demonstrates the educational attainment of different social groups in 
Zhejiang. The education background of innerprovincial migrants is the highest of all 
the groups while interprovincial migrants perform worse than others. Of migrants 
from other provinces, 85.55% did not enter into senior secondary school (see 
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Table13). Low education and skill levels, as well as lack of occupational training, 
leave limited occupational choice for migrants.    
 
 
Table 13 Education Background of Floating Population and Residents in Zhejiang 
Group 
Total
% 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
Junior 
Secondary 
School 
Senior 
Secondary 
School 
College 
Bachelor 
Degree & 
Higher 
Level 
Residents
69
 100 6.55 30.47 38.77 14.34 5.45 4.41 
Floating 
population 
100 2.70 22.81 44.36 17.3 6.99 5.85 
Includes: 
Inner 
provincial 
100 3.3 19.27 31.62 24.17 11.44 10.21 
Inter-
provincial 
100 2.1 26.35 57.1 10.43 2.54 1.48 
Source: The Sixth National Census, (cited by Hangzhou Bureau of Statistics, 2012)   
 
Employment characteristics 
 
A substantial number of young active labourers flooded into Zhejiang and made 
significant contributions to its economic development, especially the development of 
the manufacturing and service industries. As the statistical data show in 2014, 9.91 
million migrants from other provinces moved to Zhejiang for work or otherwise 
engaging in business, 83.84% of all interprovincial migrants. A further 10.13% were 
accompanying family members. Moreover, 75.7% of interprovincial migrants work 
in the secondary industry with only 1.2% and 23.1% in the primary and tertiary 
industries respectively. Rural migrant workers make up over 80% of employees in 
mining, manufacturing, construction, hotels and catering, household repair and other 
services. Moreover, in the manufacturing industry, the percentage exceeds 90% in 
the manufacture of textile, apparel and accessories; manufacture of leather, fur, 
feather and related products and footwear; processing of timber, manufacture of 
                                                 
69 The small enterprises here refer to industrial enterprises below a designated size. From 1998-2006, 
the definition was non-state owned enterprises with revenue from principal business under 5 million 
RMB; from 2007-2010, revenue from principal business under 5 million RMB; and, since 2011, 
under 20 million RMB. The enterprises excluded by the criteria listed above are industrial enterprises 
above designated size. 
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wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products; manufacture of furniture; 
manufacture of articles for culture, education, arts and crafts, sport and entertainment 
activities, manufacture of rubber and plastics products, as well as utilization of waste 
resources (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, 2014b). It is evident that 
all these manufacturing industries are labour-intensive and low-tech. The 
employment patterns of rural migrant workers are closely related to the economic 
growth pattern of Zhejiang. Zhejiang’s economic development is based on the 
growth of ge ti hu and private enterprises, those who set sail with small capital and 
technical investment, leading to a kind of extensive development. They are 
concentrated in daily necessities and small wares. The competitive advantage of 
Zhejiang is not based on advanced technology, innovation or reasonable industrial 
layout, but rather on regional industry chain integration and the production network 
of intermediate goods, which encourages vertical integration and specialization, and 
ultimately reduces product prices. It also relies on huge numbers of young migrant 
workers working long hours and being paid cheap wages. The parsimony of 
enterprises in Zhejiang with investment in technology and skills, as well as workers, 
leads to relatively low productivity. In 2010, 0.13 people were needed to create RMB 
10,000 GDP in the manufacturing industry; Zhejiang ranked 28th out of all provinces 
in China, only higher than Anhui, Guangxi and Guizhou. It is 0.01 people/RMB 
10,000 higher than the national level, illustrating that more labour is needed in order 
to create the same amount GDP in Zhejiang compared to other provinces (Zhejiang 
Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2014a).  
 
It is obvious that the majority of factories and workshops have no need for higher-
educated and high-skilled workers. According to an analysis of supply and demand 
in the human resource market in some counties of Zhejiang, job vacancies, which 
require low-skilled workers (those which ask for no qualifications, preliminary skills 
only or preliminary professional certification) accounted for 89.6%, 93.2% and 89% 
of the total job vacancies in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. Positions that only 
required a low educational background (no schooling, primary school and junior 
secondary school) accounted for 68%, 72.1%, and 72.7% of total vacancies in 2008, 
2009 and 2010 respectively (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2014a). Since 
2009, the migrant worker shortage in the PRD and YRD has forced businesses to 
relax their recruitment requirements. Even so, the manufacturing industry in 
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Zhejiang is still suffering from a lack of workers. In 2013, the manufacturing 
industry was responsible for more than one-half of the total demand, followed by 
tertiary industry at 44.87 % (Zhejiang Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, 
2014). 
 
6.3.2 Working conditions 
 
According to data collected in 2005 (Zhang, Zhou & Shen, 2006), there were 17.83 
million rural migrant workers in Zhejiang, including 12.60 million inner provincial 
migrants and 5.23 inter-provincial migrants. The secondary industry employed 
71.03% of all rural migrant workers, 87.06% of them being employed by ge ti hu and 
private businesses. Their average (54.91) working hours exceeded the legal 
maximum; 63.69% of migrant workers work over 50 hours per week, while inter-
provincial migrant workers work even more – 60 hours per week. Over 77% of 
migrant workers lack a proper labour contract, and only 26.5% of inner provincial 
and 7.84% of interprovincial migrant workers pay into the social insurance system.  
 
In 2009, the Zhejiang Academy of Social Science surveyed four cities, eight 
districts/counties and 16 sub-districts/towns, collecting 1159 samples (Yang, 2010). 
The survey showed similar results to previous ones: 63.0% of rural migrants work 
seven days a week without any vacation, averaging 9.89 0.19 hours per day. Less 
than half of them have signed labour contracts. Moreover, 15.2% of rural migrant 
workers had been involved in labour disputes because of low wages and poor 
working conditions in the last two years, twice the rate of other social groups. Over 
70% of rural migrant workers only earned between RMB 6000-24,000 per year. The 
average salary of employed workers of Zhejiang Province in 2009 was RMB 27,480, 
but salaries in the private sector are significantly lower than in other sectors. In the 
manufacturing industry, the average salary in private businesses is RMB 19,202 per 
year, considerably less than the RMB 25,287 per year paid in other non-private 
sectors (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics). Many migrant workers’ salaries do 
not even meet the social minimum monthly wage standard of 2009 (see Table 14)   
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Table 14 Minimum Monthly Salary in Zhejiang, 1994-2014 
Implementation date 
Minimum monthly salary 
(RMB) 
28/07/1994 200 
01/10/1995 230 
01/01/1997 270 250 230 
01/07/1999 380 
01/07/2001 440 
01/09/2003 520 480 430 390 
01/10/2004 620 560 510 440 
01/12/2005 670 610 560 490 
01/09/2006 750 670 620 540 
01/09/2007 850 750 700 620 
01/09/2008 960 850 780 690 
01/04/2010 1100 980 900 800 
01/04/2011 1310 1160 1060 950 
01/01/2013 1470 1310 1200 1080 
01/08/2014 1650 1470 1350 1220 
Source: Zhejiang Provincial Human Resources and Social Security Bureau website: 
http://www.zjhrss.gov.cn/
70
 
 
Now, the young generation migrant workers are the main body of migrant workers in 
Zhejiang. According to surveys conducted in 2010 (Zhejiang Communist Youth 
League of China Provincial Committee, 2010), 2011 (Zhong, 2012)
71
 and 2012 
(Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2012)
72
 although there are a few 
differences on some results details (such as the proportion of only children in young 
generation migrant workers), they generally agreed on the particular characteristics 
of this social group. Over 60% of migrant workers are youth and there are slightly 
                                                 
70
 Since 2003, the minimum monthly salary of Zhejiang Province has been divided into four grades, 
based on the economic conditions in different cities and districts. In 2014, as an example, the first 
grade applied to Hangzhou, Yuhang District of Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Wenzhou.  
71
 This survey was sponsored by Zhejiang Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science, Project 
No.: 10CGYD87YBM, Higher Education Academy of China, Project No.: 2010YHE006; Zhejiang 
Jiaxing Planning project of technology, Project No. 2010AY301. It collects 2600 samples in all cities 
of Zhejiang. 
72
 This survey covered three districts/counties: Yuhang District (Hangzhou City), Shaoxing County 
(Shaoxing City) and Qingtian County (Lishui City), collecting 618 samples.  
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more males than females. One of the significant differences between the old and 
young generations was their educational background (Table 15). Over 90% of young 
generation migrant workers have finished China’s nine-year compulsory education, 
and 17.6% have gained diploma and even higher education qualifications. Even if 
their educational background is not the same as of their urban peers, they perform 
much better than their rural peers.   
 
 
Table 15  Education Background of Migrant Workers 
 No 
School 
(%) 
Primary 
School 
(%) 
Junior 
Secondary 
School (%) 
Senior 
Secondary 
School (%) 
College & 
Higher 
Level (%) 
Average 
Years of 
Education  
Young 
Generation 
Migrant 
workers 
0.2 4.6 54.9 23.6 17.6 10.78 
Elder 
Generation 
Migrant 
Workers 
2.0 17.2 52.2 23.2 5.4 9.38 
Urban Peers of 
YGMW 
0.1 202 29.5 29.9 39.2 12.49 
Rural Peers of 
YGMW 
10 11.7 62.9 18.0 6.4 9.55 
Source: (Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 
 
Education, as well as migration, has also postponed marriage age. Young generation 
migrant workers tend to marry later than their rural peers, which has a strong 
influence on their social reproduction process. More often than not, they have to deal 
with their ‘life-changing events’ – falling in love, getting married, having babies, 
children’s education and retirement in the locations where they are working and 
living. When asking about their future plans, 35.6% of young migrant workers make 
a firm statement that they want to settle down in the places they are working, or that 
they have already settled down. Moreover, nearly 60% want to continue to work in 
Zhejiang, and only 1% want to return to their home town to be farmers The desire to 
settle down in urban areas impels young generation migrant workers to pursue 
greater income, more stable employment and more long-term career plan as well as 
long-term family plans.  
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Increasingly young migrant workers leave their homes not only to make more money, 
but also to accumulate work experiences, expand their horizon, and for personal 
development, etc. However, the majority of jobs they are offered are located in the 
subordinate labour market, which offers little space for further personal development 
and career planning. The majority of young migrant workers value the opportunity 
for personal and career development over higher salaries when looking for jobs 
(Zhong, 2012).  
 
The salary for young migrant workers is lower than the local average monthly wage. 
In the 2010 survey, 62.53% of young migrants earned RMB 1001-2000 per month, 
while according to the National Bureau of Statistics survey in 2012, more than 50% 
of young migrants earned RMB 2000-3000 per month (Figure 49). The average 
monthly salary was estimated at RMB 2850 per month, RMB 1000 higher than 
minimum monthly salary in 2012, but lower than the mean salary of all employees of 
Zhejiang (RMB 3340 per month) and also lower than the average local wage (RMB 
4665 in Yuhang District, RMB 4157 in Qingtian County, RMB 3746 in Shaoxing 
County). In addition, because they prioritise work experiences and skills 
improvement, young generation migrant workers earn slightly less than the old 
generation. Females also earn less than male migrant workers. Fewer young workers 
are satisfied with their current salary (25.5%) than old migrants (38.1%).  
 
Figure 49 Average Monthly Salary of Young Generation Migrant Workers in Zhejiang in 2012 
 
Source: Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics (2012). 
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Although there have been improvements in labour conditions to a certain extent 
(such as improvement in living conditions, increase of labour contract signing rate 
and social insurance participation rate and a reduction in wage arrears), young 
generation migrant workers are still suffering grave violations of their labour rights, 
as well as conflicts between self-identity and reality. Piece-rate payment forces them 
to endure long working hours with only a small amount of overtime pay. Overtime is 
prized by young migrants looking to increase their income. One factory owner even 
claimed that: 
 
They [migrant workers] like to work overtime because they want to 
earn more money. Nowadays, young workers only focus on money. 
They even request overtime in order to make money. They do not 
care about learning skills, just about earning money.
73
 
 
It is, however, doubtful that migrant workers work overtime because they “like” to. 
It is rather the case that if they do not work overtime the basic wage is not enough 
for surviving. It is a tactic for capitalists to lengthen working hours, in order to 
extract more (absolute) surplus value. A migrant worker explained: 
 
I can only earn a basic wage of RMB 1800 per month if I don’t 
work overtime. The rest of the wage is based on how many pieces I 
have made. I need to work fast so that I can earn more.
74
 
 
Therefore, although the wage of migrant workers in Zhejiang is relatively higher 
than in the PRD (Xu, 2003), they still work long hours under bad working conditions. 
This has to do with the industrial structure that is in the lower end of the global 
production chain, low-tech, and small-scale. Migrant workers face intensive formal 
and real subordination process in Zhejiang. In next section, I will discuss the 
subordination of migrant workers by the local state and capital.  
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Interviewee NO.: ZJ-07062013-1,factory owner, Hangzhou 
74
 Interviewee NO.:ZJ-07152013-3, workers, Yiwu 
 207 
 
6.3.3 The Subordination of Migrant Workers in Zhejiang 
 
Large numbers of migrant workers working in these private enterprises and ge ti hu 
are in the process of leaving the land, which means 
 
They still have access to land in their hometown and they still have 
the ability to farm. Migrant workers in Yongkang, even some of the 
young migrant workers, still do farming. I went back to my 
hometown every year to do the heaviest jobs of farming like 
seeding and harvest.
75 
 
 
The workers in my factory are all from this village (where the 
factory is located). They work in my factory and take care of the 
farmland at the same time. They choose to have a job in the factory 
for having social insurance – so that after retirement they can enjoy 
a pension.
76
 
 
Another important aspect is the control over everyday life: migrant workers in 
Zhejiang, especially workers in the private sectors, usually live in rented houses in 
villages or towns. Their life remains at a distance from the full control and 
containment by capitalism. On the other hand, the reform and opening up is 
integrating China with the global market, which drives the coastal areas to become 
ideal areas for global capital to exploit cheap raw materials, loose local policies, an 
incomplete legal system, aspirant local government officials, and of course a cheap 
and unlimited supply of peasant workers. Zhejiang, although it has a history of local, 
private economy development targeted at domestic markets, is becoming 
progressively more engaged in globalization. The ge ti hu and private businesses 
embed themselves in a local industrial cluster, which plays the role of mass social 
production and then joins the global industry chain.  
 
Generally speaking, the private sector in Zhejiang separates workers into small-scale 
industrial plants. Although these industrial plants are integrated into specific 
industrial clusters, workers are dispersed and solidarity is weak. The dispersal of 
workers is also solidified by the spread of neo-liberalism in Zhejiang: local capital 
tends to lengthen working hours and increase labour intensity to create more surplus 
                                                 
75
 Interviewee NO.: ZJ-07222013-2, Official of Labour NGO, who used to be a migrant worker, 
Yongkang, Zhejiang 
76
 Inverviewee NO.: ZJ-07042013-1, Factory owner, Hangzhou 
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value. With the increase in industrial integration, intermediate costs have been 
greatly reduced, allowing opportunities and spaces for low-tech and labour-intensive 
factories to arise.   
 
Local capital and local laoban (老板 Boss-Capitalist) 
 
In Zhejiang, the local economy grew from local capital and roots in local 
communities, especially in the South-Eastern area of Zhejiang. The local business 
network is linked on the basis of kin, geographic and occupational relationships (Xu, 
2003; Yang, 2009). Retracing the development path of the private sector, a deep 
entanglement between local traditional relationships i.e. patriarchal clan and family 
system, and modern industrialization, can be seen. Local capital has been benefiting 
from close ties with local governments, communities and industrial clusters. 
Therefore, local capital pursues profits with a long-term commitment to operating 
the business in the local area. Compared with international and state investment, as 
well as domestic investment from other provinces, local capital has lower volatility.  
 
Local private enterprise owners are familiar with the party state's political 
establishment and generally supportive of the current power structure. This is not 
only because of the difficulties in effectively opposing China’s one-party-state 
structure, but also because local, private capital holders are favoured by state-led 
development policies (McNally & Wright, 2010). Hence, local private enterprise 
owners tie themselves closely to the current political structure. Local private 
entrepreneurs join government-sponsored business associations, such as the Private 
Enterprises’ Association and the Industrial and Commercial Federation as they 
believe these institutions will represent their interests (Dickson, 2003:24).  
 
In Zhejiang, private capital holders also utilize the People’s Congress System to 
participate in the political establishment. In the five year term from 2003-2008 of the 
Tenth People’s Congress of Zhejiang there were 164 representatives belonging to the 
group of private capital holders (25.87%) (Lang, 2012), while Guangdong had 93 
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representatives in this group, out of a total of 780 representatives.
77
 In the areas that 
are most economically developed and where privatization has advanced the furthest, 
private entrepreneurs are more likely to view themselves as partners, not adversaries 
of the party-state. “The views of private entrepreneurs have converged with those of 
local party and government officials regarding the roles and policy influence of 
business associations” (Dickson, 2003:57). This view is also supported by Lang’s 
investigation. Private capital holders account for 39.20%, 32.26% and 31.80% 
respectively of representatives in the Jinhua, Taizhou and Hangzhou constituencies.  
 
Local capital holders also see village level elections as an opportunity to be part of 
the local governing structure. In China, village elections are under the principle of 
villagers’ autonomy. Local capital holders can easily participate in elections and gain 
positions on village committees. In 2002, over 65% of members of the village 
committee in Yiwu were local private capital holders, similar to Yongkang, Ruian 
and Dongyang, etc. (in south-eastern Zhejiang).  
 
Therefore, as concluded by McNally and Wright (2010), Chinese private capital 
holders are thickly embedded in the party-state via guanxi (social networkers, 
connections, influential relationships) and kinship ties. This facilitates their ability to 
gain information, access credit, procure licenses, avoid onerous taxes and obtain land 
(Tsai, 2007:84; Dickson, 2003:106). This phenomenon is very obvious in Zhejiang 
and plays an important role in its economic development. As analysed by Tsai (2007), 
in Zhejiang, especially in the Wenzhou Model, local government is especially 
supportive of the development of private sector and there is evidence of this in 
capitalist development of Zhejiang Province in the reform era. When the central 
government attempted to control and restrict the development of ge ti hu and private 
enterprises, it was the local cadres who provided strong support to protect them. 
Hence, local capital holders and local government share community interests. Thick 
embeddedness allows local capital holders to support current political status quo and 
means that they are more likely to accept advice and orders from local governments 
and other quasi-government organizations such as trade unions, the Private 
                                                 
77
 The representatives of the Tenth People’s Congress of Guangdong had higher qualifications and 
better structure (Guangdong sheng di shijie renda daibiao jiao wangjie sushi genggao jiegou geng 
heli 广东省第十届人大代表较往届素质更高结构更合理)  
http://news.sohu.com/37/56/news205675637.shtml  
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Enterprises’ Association and the Industrial and Commercial Federation. In the case 
of introducing collective consultancy into the woollen industry in Wenling,
78
 it is 
evident that the active trade union cadres and the private enterprises’ association 
officers played crucial roles. The Wenling case is analysed in detail in the next 
section.    
 
Local migrant workers  
 
The first generation migrant workers in Zhejiang were mainly local peasants and the 
majority of first generation ge ti hu and private enterprise owners were local 
residents. Within each private enterprise, owners and managers are normally family 
members. Broadly speaking, people inside one village or even one town are 
connected by kinship. Kinship and geographic relationships also expand to include 
the relationship between employers and employees and recruitment takes place via 
relatives, fellow villagers and friends. The close relationships, i.e. blood 
relationships, between employer and employees at the beginning of economic 
development have become the lubricant of tense labour relations. This traditional 
network of relations has created a special ‘corporate culture’. When disputes occur, it 
they are more likely to be solved by guanxi. Business is like family, with the owners 
and managers acting as patriarchs and employees as children (Xu, 2003). The 
patriarch has absolute authority over his ‘children' within the business, but also the 
responsibility of taking care of the ‘children'. If owners are willing to shoulder the 
responsibility of taking care of workers, it will lead to the so-called ‘harmonious 
labour relations’ in businesses (Xu, 2003).   
 
As noted by Smart and Lin (2007), local citizenship, or the possession of a local 
hukou, allows local peasant workers to access more benefits in the workplace. This 
explanation provides a reasonable way to understand the specificity of Zhejiang’s 
labour relations. Localism is a major characteristic of economic development in 
Zhejiang – local capital and local peasant workers, and supportive local governments. 
Local peasant workers, who have close relations with enterprise owners and deep-
rooted connections with the local community, have more social resources compared 
to the non-local group to argue for better working conditions and higher wages. 
                                                 
78
 Wenling is in the southeast of Zhejiang Province, and forms part of Taizhou City.  
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Meanwhile, local capital’s long-term commitment leads to search for a stable 
employee base and good business reputations (Xu, 2009).  
 
Their deep embedding in the local community allows local workers to force business 
owners to take a gentle and flexible management strategy. Also, with over 60% of 
migrant workers living at home or in private rentals, employers have much less 
control over their workers than those whose workforce are tied to factory 
accommodation. Non-local migrant workers also benefit from this empowerment. 
Like a migrant workers said: 
 
I have been here for six years. I stay in this place but I have 
changed my jobs for more than 10 times. I just leave whenever I 
feel unsatisfied with the job.
79
  
 
 The ‘local citizenship’ has supported the insubordination of migrant. Frequent job-
hopping, slowdowns, and absenteeism of migrant workers at peak time (e.g. in the 
woollen industry in Wenling, Zhejiang) have forced local government and local 
business owners to introduce collective consultancy in order to maintain production. 
 
Atomized migrant workers 
 
At the beginning of the reform era, the fact that the majority of migrant workers were 
from local areas balanced the power relation between capital and labour to some 
extent. However, it should be noted that migrant workers in Zhejiang are still facing 
destructive exploitation because the manufacturing factories in Zhejiang do not only 
compete in the local or domestic market but also against companies in other areas 
and countries that also have numerous low-cost labourers. The benefits of a local 
hukou cannot dispel the global neo-liberal projects of capital, which is to 
increasingly subordinate people to capital and take advantage of national differences. 
Also, along with the increase of non-local migrant workers and the deepening of 
global integration, migrant workers are being pushed into an increasing unstable, 
insecure and informal position in labour relations.  
 
                                                 
79 Interviewee NO.:ZJ-07222013-2, migrant workers, Yongkang 
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Although the market determines wages to a great extent in Zhejiang, labour has little 
power to influence this ‘free market’. Skilled, experienced workers can benefit from 
higher wage and more security, but workers with little or even no skills are confined 
to positions with much lower wages and less security. Also, even though local 
migrant workers are empowered by local citizenship, local capital has much more 
social resources and it is common to observe thick embeddedness of local capital 
with the current political system. A labour NGO official said: 
 
Migrant workers feel that factory owners are powerful, because 
they know people in the government. They don’t want to directly 
fight with factory owners. Also migrant workers in one and the 
same factory do not have the same level of wages. It is hard to act 
together because they all have different  anticipations. Migrant 
workers do not consider themselves to be ‘workers’.  
 
He continued: 
 
The labour relation here is far behind what is happening in 
Guangdong. The factories here are small-scale, with nearly no skill 
requirements. You can learn the whole progress in one week and 
become an ‘experienced worker’. The salary is not bad but the 
working conditions are too harsh. Occupational injuries are 
common.
80
  
 
Private enterprise owners often unite to determine wages within their industry in an 
attempt to control the high turnover rate during peak times and reduce workers’ 
ability to demand higher wages. They are usually supported by local governments 
and quasi-state organizations such a trade unions, the Private Enterprises’ 
Association and the Industrial and Commercial Federation (Xu, 2003; 2009). I will 
discuss this experiment in next section in detail.   
 
In contrast to the active attitude of private enterprise owners, migrant workers have 
little interest in integrating into the current political system and show no desire to, 
for example, join the CPC party or Community Youth League. Moreover, they are 
indifferent to the official trade union.  
 
The ramifications of becoming a trade union member or 
understanding the functions of trade unions are not taken into 
                                                 
80 Interviewee NO.: ZJ-07152013-1, Official of labour NGOs, Yiwu, Zhejiang 
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account by workers, especially migrant workers. We [trade unions 
in Zhejiang] have built a lot of occupational service centres with 
computers, books and other facilities. Generally, they [migrant 
workers] like the facilities but are not interested in joining the 
union. There have been cases of migrant workers becoming trade 
union representatives on the enterprise level, but they didn’t have 
the power and resources to negotiate with managers. Therefore, 
other migrant workers were discouraged to play a role in the trade 
union.
81
  
 
Collective consultations and collective contracts are widely implemented in Zhejiang. 
However, research has shown that over half the workers have no idea of the content 
of their collective contract, and indeed, have no idea whether there is a collective 
contract (Friedman, 2014). Yet, even though they do not make use of the official 
trade, migrant workers also rarely form other forms of associations or participate in 
collective activities. The trade union, women’s federation, and collective actions are 
not used, or at least not mentioned by young generation migrant workers (Survey 
Office of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2012).  
 
Industrial clusters based on geographic distribution disperse migrant workers into 
small-scale private enterprises and ge ti hu, which inhibits the formation of workers’ 
associations. Also, there is a hierarchy within the group: local workers and non-local 
workers, skilled workers and unskilled workers, contract workers and temporary 
workers all occupy different positions in the system and it is difficult to find shared 
interests among the various groups even though they are all being exploited by 
capital (China Labour Bulletin, 2012). 
 
Educational background is another import factor that influences labour rights 
protection. Statistical data shows that 62.1% of migrant workers did not go to senior 
high school or vocational high school, and only 8% of them gained a diploma or 
degree (Propaganda Department of CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, 2008). 
Occupational training is not available for all migrant workers. Along with the 
development of Zhejiang's private sector, the demand for high-skilled workers is 
increasing. However, the majority of migrant workers are unskilled workers and 
there is a glut of these in the labour market. This lack of training opportunities 
                                                 
81 Interviewee NO.: ZJ-07062013-1 Official of Trade Union of an industrial park, Hangzhou 
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suppresses migrant workers' ability to enter the primary labour market and earn 
promotion. It also weakens the bargaining power of migrant workers because each 
individual worker can be easily replaced.   
 
6.4 Insubordination of Migrant Workers in Zhejiang 
 
The patterns of Zhejiang’s labour disputes and labour unrests show characteristics 
different from other economically advanced areas in China related to the province’s 
unique economic development path. Local people have played the most important 
role in driving economic development, resulting in relatively equal distribution 
between urban and rural residents and relatively harmonious labour relations 
between employers and employees. Nevertheless, development is a dynamic process. 
Along with deeper integration in the global economy, increasing productivity of 
labour and regular resistance from labour, the subordination of migrant workers is 
becoming increasingly hybrid and intense. The deepening of the subordination 
projects triggers the upgrading of migrant workers’ insubordination and so the 
conflict between capital and the labour worsens. This is shown by the growing 
numbers of labour disputes cases and labour unrest, as well as the complication of 
the rights claims of labour. In this section, I first analyse the situation of labour 
disputes and strikes in Zhejiang before using the Xinhe collective consultancy case 
as an example to reveal the conflict between the subordination project and the 
insubordination of migrant workers, and how this conflict leads to the adjustment of 
the control regime by the state, the quasi state-trade union and capital.  
 
6.4.1 Labour Disputes and Strikes  
 
Labour disputes 
 
Although the number of labour disputes has increased dramatically over the past two 
decades, labour relations in Zhejiang are considered as ‘relatively harmonious’ 
compared with other economically advanced provinces and areas (Xu, 2009). One 
index that supports this statement is the ratio between the number of labour disputes 
and annual GDP (shown in Table 16). 
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Table 16 Labour Disputes Case Features of Zhejiang, 1996-2012 
China Zhejiang
Zhejiang/C
hina (%)
China Zhejiang
Zhejiang
/China 
(%)
China Zhejiang
Zhejiang/C
hina (%)
1996 48121 1691 3.51 189120 3892 2.06 71572 4188.53 5.85
1997 71524 2469 3.45 221115 5514 2.49 79430 4686.11 5.9
1998 93649 3536 3.78 358531 0 84884 5052.62 5.95
1999 120191 5568 4.63 473957 20376 4.3 90188 5443.92 6.04
2000 135206 6454 4.77 422617 21175 5.01 99776 6141.03 6.15
2001 154621 8902 5.76 467150 18575 3.98 110270 6898.34 6.26
2002 184116 10928 5.94 608396 22751 3.74 121002 8003.67 6.61
2003 226391 12263 5.42 801042 22293 2.78 136565 9705.02 7.11
2004 260471 15192 5.83 764981 26960 3.52 160714 11648.7 7.25
2005 313773 18624 5.94 744195 35886 4.82 185896 13417.68 7.22
2006 317162 21036 6.63 679312 20244 2.98 217657 15718.47 7.22
2007 350182 22705 6.48 653472 35919 5.5 268019 18753.73 7
2008 693465 39954 5.76 1214328 67880 5.59 316752 21462.69 6.78
2009 684379 40560 5.93 1016922 63593 6.25 345629 22990.35 6.65
2010 600865 36080 6 815121 57009 6.99 408903 27722.31 6.78
2011 589244 37579 6.38 779490 55431 7.11 484124 32318.85 6.68
2012 641202 44632 6.96 882487 78068 8.85 534123 34606.3 6.48
Year
Cases Accepted
Number of Laborers 
Involved(person)
GDP(100,000,000 Yuan)
 
Source: China Labour Statistic Yearbook from 1996 to 2013 
 
The data clearly show that the ratio between Zhejiang and China in terms of number 
of accepted cases and numbers of labourers involved are lower than the one in terms 
of GDP before 2010: Zhejiang creates more GDP with fewer labour dispute cases 
compared with the national average level. However, it should be noticed that the first 
two ratios keep on approaching to,or even exceed the last one. (Figure 50).  
 
Figure 50 Table 17 Ratios of Cases Accepted, Number of Labourers, 1996-2012 
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Sources: China Labour Statistics Yearbook from 1996 to 2013 
 
The number of labour dispute cases accepted by the Zhejiang Labour Dispute 
Arbitration Committee in 2008 showed a sharp increase compared with previous 
decades. Numbers fell slightly in 2010 and then continued to grow. Before 2008, 
over 80% of labour disputes cases were about salary payments, but increasing 
numbers of disputes are being filed regarding overtime payments, economic 
compensation, salary raises, social insurance payments, equal pay, and holiday pay. 
Several social-economic factors have influenced the sharp increase of labour 
disputes cases (Zhejiang Higher People Court, 2013, shown in Figure 51). The first 
is that the global economic recession placed considerable pressure on business’ 
operation. Although Zhejiang’s economic growth is not driven by foreign investment, 
its exports are one of the most significant components of GDP. The economic 
downturn has seriously affected enterprises, especially private companies lacking 
risk management expertise. Businesses facing difficulties in their operations, react by 
increasing labour intensity and working hours, reducing wages and benefits 
(sometimes even delaying or refusing to pay salaries), downsizing and laying off 
staff and, if all these measures fail, closing the business.  
 
Figure 51 Zhejiang Accepted Labour Dispute Cases, 1996-2012 
 
Source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook, 1996 to 2013 
 
The second influential factor is the development strategy transformation dominated 
by local governments. Industrial upgrades are new projects for local governments, 
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driven by pressures of both the economic transition and environmental pollution. In 
Hangzhou East Software Park, the trade union officer reported: 
 
Here we only have collective strikes caused by the relocation of 
factories. The park is a high-tech industrial development zone, 
where Alibaba, Huawei, Lenovo, Zhongxing and so on
82
 are 
located. Hence chemical factories and other heavy polluting 
factories are ordered to move out, which causes mass incidents. 
However, there have been no other mass incidents or collective 
labour disputes during the past few years in this park.
83
 
 
The third factor is the implementation of the Labour Contract Law in 2008, which 
stimulated a dramatic increase in formal labour disputes. When going through legal 
channels migrant workers face a lot of obstacles in protecting their labour rights, as 
the local governments adjust the practical principles to avoid the turbulence of labour 
disputes.  As a labour NGO official clarified: 
Cumbersome judicial procedures are time-consuming and 
inefficient and they [migrant workers] find it hard to protect and 
fight for their labour rights through legal procedures. Here in 
Yongkang, every labour disputes case must go through the 
mediation process. Once you have the mediation agreement, then 
you can go to the next stage: arbitration. If you can’t accept the 
arbitration results, then you go to the court in the first instance, and 
then the second. It is extremely time consuming. Migrant workers 
generally cannot wait that long. They need to work and feed their 
family. But the mediation agreements only reach, in general, 60% 
of your requirements. You cannot get the full amount of money 
back.
84
 
 
Poor working conditions and lack of labour protection has resulted in much damage 
to migrant workers’ physical and mental health and numerous occupational injuries, 
which often leave migrant workers and their families in dire situations. The low 
participation rate in employment injury insurance leaves migrants at risk. Often their 
bosses refuse to take responsibility for the incident and even threaten and intimidate 
workers into giving up their claims against them.  
 
                                                 
82
 The companies mentioned here are all famous Chinese internet companies. Alibaba is listed in the 
U.S., with market capitalization of US 250 billion, the highest of any Chinese public company. 
83
 Interviewee NO.: ZJ-07062013-2, official of Trade union of an industrial park, Hangzhou 
84
 Interviewee NO.:ZJ-07152013-1,Labour NGO official, Yiwu 
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Strikes 
 
Unlike in Guangdong, strikes in Zhejiang rarely come to people’s attention. Those 
that are recorded and broadcast are much fewer in numbers and make less diverse 
demands. However, Zhejiang is not the business ‘paradise’ that this might suggest: 
based on incomplete statistics compiled by the China Labour Bulletin, 177 strikes 
took place from 2011 to May 2015. Unlike those in Guangdong where 36.2% of 
strikes occur in foreign invested enterprises (including Sino-foreign joint venture 
enterprises), over 50% of Zheijiang’s strikes take place in private companies. In the 
manufacturing industry, the difference is even more apparent with over 50% of 
strikes taking place in foreign-invested enterprises in Guangdong while 67% are in 
private enterprises in Zhejiang. The records list 53 strikes as occurring in enterprises 
of an ‘unknown’ ownership type, 22 involving taxi drivers. In Zhejiang, the majority 
of strikes (65%) are caused by salary arrears or demands for higher payment. This 
figure rises to 75% for the manufacturing industry. The increasing of number of 
strikes relates to wider and deeper extent of labour rights, even political rights. The 
characteristics of strikes and labour disputes in Zhejiang are influenced by the social-
economic environment, as well as the general patterns of workers, especially migrant 
workers.  
 
However, the written records do not tell the whole story as not all strikes are 
recorded nor are non-strike forms of labour unrest. The latter are more difficult to 
record as struggles and fights take place all the time. Non-strike forms of labour 
unrest are as important as strikes: ‘slowdowns, absenteeism, sabotage to 
demonstrations, riots and factory occupations are all manifestations of non-strike 
forms of labour unrest’ (Silver, 2003:35). For migrant workers in Zhejiang, ‘voting 
by feet’ is their most powerful weapon against control from capital, whether direct or 
via the state acting as an intermediary or as an agent of capital. The legitimacy of the 
strike is ambiguity, and workers are forbidden to organize trade unions. As Silver 
states, anonymous or hidden forms of struggle are especially significant in 
institutions where strikes are illegal and open confrontation is difficult or impossible.  
 
6.4.2 Zhejiang Model of Collective Consultancy (集体协商)  
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Trade unions in China are “an integral part of the state socialist system, not as 
representatives of the interests of workers” (Clarke, 2005:3). The All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has been the recipient of many criticisms and 
queries as to its independence (Tim, 2011:1) and its social control functions (Liu, 
2010). Hence its fundamental goal is not to “identify and organise workers common 
interests according to their immediate position in the system of production” 
(Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos, 2008:240) but to integrate workers into the 
state socialist system (Clarke, 2005). ‘Non-official’ trade unions or other grassroot 
organisations are strictly prohibited, leaving extremely limited political space for 
workers’ associations and labour NGOs. Increasingly pressured to reduce labour 
militancy and stabilise intensive labour relations, the ACFTU and local trade unions 
are forced to seek appropriate innovations and creations within the current political 
regime. The most successful attempt in Zhejiang is the industry collective 
consultancy, created primarily by local trade unions and local private entrepreneurs 
association and supported by local governments (Xu, 2009; Liu, 2010; Pringle, 2011; 
Long, 2013; Friedman, 2014).  
 
Wenling, a county-level city of Taizhou prefecture-level city located in south-east 
Zhejiang, has received much attention because of its innovation of collective 
consultancy by local trade unions. ‘Wenling collective consultancy’ originated in the 
Xinhe Town Woollen Sweater Industry. Once the collective consultancy in Xinhe 
was seen to have a considerable positive impact on stabilising labour relations and 
reducing labour disputes and strikes, it was taught and promoted to other industries, 
mainly composed of private, especially small-scale enterprises, first in Wenling, and 
then province-wide.   
 
 
Case Study: Xinhe Woollen Sweater Industry Collective Consultancy  
In Xinhe, more than 110 woollen sweater factories employing over 12,000 employees 
have formed a pillar industrial cluster (Pringle, 2011, Long, 2013). The peak 
manufacturing season was between April and December, no orders being received 
from January to March. Since 2011, the majority of migrant workers have come from 
other provinces whereas previously local migrant workers were in the majority. 
 220 
 
Skilled and experienced workers were urgently needed. The competition among 
private enterprises to attract and retain skilled and experienced workers was intense 
during the peak season. Employers used different strategies to retain skilled workers 
– wage arrears, illegal job deposits, keeping workers’ ID cards, paying higher 
wages, etc. They also offered higher wages to try to pilfer skilled workers from other 
competitors. However, these actions did not yield the expected results (stable 
production), but rather led to a more severe tension between employers and workers. 
Workers, especially those with skills and experience, took advantage of their 
bargaining power to request higher wages. If their demands were not satisfied, they 
immediately became involved in job hopping, sabotage and strikes.  
 
Facing the pressure of massive labour unrest, the local private entrepreneurs’ 
association, Xinhe Woollen Sweater Manufacturers, firstly attempted to reach an 
agreement on wages. However, the competition for skilled workers was too intense to 
overcome so the agreement failed. They then turned to a local trade union, the Xinhe 
Federation of Trade Unions. Led by active and motivated trade union officials, a 
sectoral trade union, the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Sector Trade Union, was formed in 
2003, and played an important role in collective consultancy (especially for wages) 
in following years.   
 
The first collective consultancy process was led by the sectoral trade union with the 
participation of relative interest groups – Wenling City Labour Bureau, 
representatives of private entrepreneurs, workers representatives and Xinhe Trade 
Union officials. Consultancy was mainly focused on wage rates. Following six 
formal consultancys and ten meetings, as well as investigations based on over five 
hundred documents containing suggestions and amendments from relative interest 
groups, a new wage rate was agreed and a formal document,‘Wenling City Xinhe 
Town Changyu Woollen Sweater Sector Workers Wage (Wage Rate) Consultation 
Agreement’ was issued (Pringle, 2011:126). In 2004, a second collective consultancy 
took place, directly led by the sectoral trade union. After eight formal consultancys, 
twelve meetings and investigations based on over eight hundred standard ‘opinion 
forms’, an upgraded wage rate table was agreed and signed as a formal document. 
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Since 2003, sectoral collective consultancy has stabilized labour relations and 
reduced labour unrest. Wages, the focus of collective consultancy, have increased 
year on year at a stable rate. Governments, from top to bottom, have spoken highly 
of this innovation led by a local trade union. It was absorbed by the government and 
has been piloted in similar industries in Zhejiang.  
 
A clear and positive result was seen after the implication of the new wage rate 
standard (Table 6.7). Other similar industries in Zhejiang soon followed in the 
footsteps of the Xinhe woollen sweater industry model (See cases analysed by Liu, 
2011 and Friedman, 2014). Their first step is to build up a sectoral trade union, led 
by the local trade union and encourage active participation by related interest groups. 
Then the sectoral trade union executed a collective consultancy function to reach 
agreement among the interest groups. To achieve this goal, several rounds of formal 
consultancies, meetings, and concrete investigations are required, tolerating and 
respecting the different views and opinions expressed. The agreement is then 
formally signed by all participants and put on record at the local labour and social 
security bureau. Once approved by the bureau, it becomes effective.  
 
 
Table 17  Comparison of Labour Disputes Cases accepted by Wenling Labour and Social Security Bureau between 
the Woollen Sweater Industry and Shoe Industry 
Year Labour Disputes in Woollen 
Sweater Industry 
Labour Disputes in Shoe 
Industry 
Cases 
Number of 
Labourers 
involved 
Repay 
Wages 
(RMB) 
Cases 
Number of 
Labourers 
involved 
Repay 
Wages 
(RMB) 
2001 -   17 43 30318 
2002 3 67 154700 30 97 67762 
2003 1 13 43269 58 211 278798 
2004 1 4 3872 51 192 355814 
Source: Lin, 2007 
 
 
The rise of the collective consultancy model in Zhejiang cannot be separated from its 
specific social-economic environment. The Wenzhou Model development strategy 
provides a localized market. Developed from family-based industrial plants, 
industrial clusters with a lot of private, usually small-scale enterprises and ge ti hu, 
are concentrated in a particular geographical area, thus creating similarities in 
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working conditions and working processes in one industrial cluster. Hence, the tight 
labour market empowers skilled workers to bargain with employers. Moreover, the 
majority of private enterprises in Zhejiang are small-scale, hiring only a few, high 
turnover, workers. This erects barriers to building up enterprise-level trade unions 
that can do something useful to protect workers’ rights. Meanwhile, the localisation 
of capital also has a close relationship with the ‘thick embeddedness’ of private 
enterprises owners in the current political regime, which prompts local entrepreneurs 
to cooperate with local trade unions. In addition, as discussed by Pringle (2011) in 
the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Industry case and Liu (2010) in the Zeguo Water Pump 
Industry case, motivated and innovative local trade union cadres are skillfully 
transforming the union’s administrative power into substantial bargaining power and 
utilising political resources gained from local government support. This specialized 
environment has given birth to the sectoral trade union, which can keep its distance 
from the control of capital and “transform the union’s administrative power and 
government support into substantive bargaining power” (Liu, 2010:45). 
 
Of course not all experiments in collective consultancy in Zhejiang have delivered 
equivalent positive results. As observed by Friedman (2014) in the Rui’an eyeglass 
industry, migrant workers were not aware of the collective agreement in place while 
few managers abided by the agreement. High turnover and intense competition for 
skilled workers continues to annoy numerous private enterprises’ managers and 
owners. Agreements are not well enforced, mainly because workers are excluded 
from the process of collective consultancy. The Rui’an glass industry, for example, 
has remained true to its previous style: workers come and go freely during peak 
season, enterprises compete to retain skilled workers, the agreement of collective 
negotiation remains pure paper work.  
 
From the perspective of trade union reform and innovation, collective consultancy is 
an effective attempt to solve the complex challenge of increasing labour unrest in a 
tight labour market (Pringle, 2011). Sandwiched between the state’s demand for 
‘maintenance of stability’ and ‘economic development’ and labour’s demand for 
‘protection of labour rights’ and ‘representatives of interests’, the local trade union in 
Xinhe broke with traditional practice and found a new way to solve problems. 
Similar industries in nearby towns learnt from this and the practice gradually spread 
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across the province. The ACFTU and central government have admitted that the 
experiment has been a success and that it may offer a possible path for trade union 
reform in the future.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The state’s (including quasi-government organisations such as trade unions and 
entrepreneurs’ associations) and employers’ view is only one side of the story. The 
history of Zhejiang clearly charts the unyielding escape of peasants from the existing 
containment control, from the powerful central government. In the Mao-period, 
people were divided into rural residents and urban residents and their mobility was 
strictly controlled. The control regime was implemented to maintain the existing 
political and economic order. However, peasants in Zhejiang did not stop trying to 
escape the bondage of the people’s commune system. They left their registered 
residences without authorisation and engaged in commercial business, smuggling, 
long distance transportation, loan-sharking and contraband, all of which were strictly 
banned by the central government. They refused to be reduced to an object of state 
control, but were active subjects. The central government’s response to the escape of 
peasants was to try to absorb the energies of moving people. However, harsh 
punishments for ‘illegal mobility’ proved less than effective. In fact, private 
enterprises and ge ti hu already existed in the 1970s – before reform and opening up. 
Facing the energy created by escape, which is rupturing the equilibrium of the 
existing regime of control, a new regime of control needs to be established in order 
to appropriate this energy and transform it into a new manageable social subjectivity 
(Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos, 2008:52).  
 
Zhejiang’s reliance on local capital and local migrant workers has created a unique 
social-economic environment. Local migrant workers were released from the 
bondage of land and the commune system, and the majority of them were absorbed 
by local private small-scale family-based industrial plants. Within this process, 
migrant workers in Zhejiang were involved in the subordination project of local 
capital and local state. Local citizenship empowered them to gain more benefits in 
the workplace. Deep embeddedness with the local community provided them with 
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more social support and more emotional connection with the owners of private 
businesses. Generally, the conflict between capital and labour was eased by blood 
relations, neighbourhood relations, and kinships. It is apparent that during the formal 
subordination process of local migrant workers to capital, the state’s exclusive 
institution did not play a significant role. However, with the deepening of capitalist 
development the conflict has become more intense. Capital lengthens working hours, 
reduces workers’ wages and increases labour intensity to exploit more surplus value. 
The surge of non-local migrant workers into Zhejiang deepened the division of 
labour on the one hand, and brought in new struggle strategies and tactics on the 
other. As non-local migrant workers have fewer benefits and less power than local 
workers as well as less ‘guanxi’ in workplaces, all because of the hukou system, they 
tend to struggle for their rights by taking advantage of the labour market (Pringle, 
2011:125). The insubordination of migrant workers within capital relations has 
pushed capital and the local states to introduce new regime to absorb their mobility.  
 
Insubordination is a mode of social change that is forceful enough to challenge the 
present configuration of control (Papadopoulos et al., 2008:xiv) and force the control 
regime to reorganise itself. In case of the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Industry, the 
insubordination of migrant workers preceded the innovation of the trade union. A 
tight labour market leads to a shortage of skilled, experienced workers who take 
advantage of the situation via strikes, sabotage, job-hopping, protests, and other 
forms of struggle. Their energy of escaping ruptures the equilibrium of the existing 
regime of control and their struggle disrupts normal production and slows down 
economic growth. Migrant workers’ insubordination to capital, including job-
hopping, slowdown, sabotage, marching, protests and strikes, has forced business 
owners and local governments to create new regimes to absorb and transfer such 
forceful energy and one possible solution to the problem is the newly created 
collective consultancy system. The trade union, as a quasi-government organisation, 
actively involves itself in this process to respond to migrant workers’ struggles. The 
process of collective consultancy and the building up of a sectoral trade union are a 
direct measure taken to calm labour militancy. However, when closely observed, it 
becomes apparent that the goal of collective consultancy is not to represent workers’ 
interests but rather to stabilise labour market and production. Its fundamental 
objective is to establish a new regime of control in response to workers’ ‘chaotic’ 
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refusal of work and to re-make migrant workers into a more manageable and 
controllable labour force. It limits the mobility of labour. Migrant workers have now 
been absorbed in sectoral trade unions that restrict their political space and the 
possibility of a real association. The escape of migrant workers is channelled into a 
legal process recognised by the government while other forms of struggle are 
deemed ‘illegal’ and ‘unreasonable’.  
 
The reorganisation of the regime of control is a process to consolidate control over 
escaping subjects. It is targeted at migrant workers who are excluded by the 
innovation process. It cannot protect migrant workers’ rights and representation, but 
to attacks and fragments their struggles. As shown in the Rui’an eyeglasses industry, 
migrant workers continue to take advantage of the current labour market to fight for 
their labour rights, as the collective consultancy is an advanced regime to control 
them.  
 
Reform and opening up has brought capitalism to China, resulting in dramatic 
economic development and dynamic transformation. Zhejiang’s development path, 
represented by the Wenzhou Model, relies on local capital and local migrant workers, 
which in turn benefits the local community. Thick embeddedness of local capital in 
the current political structure encourages private capital holders to cooperate with the 
local governments and quasi-governments. Local citizenship also provides local 
migrant workers with more social support to confront capital. Labour relations in 
Zhejiang have been ‘relatively harmonious’. However, as the social-economic 
environment transforms, labour relations in Zhejiang are beginning to exhibit new 
characteristics. The development of capitalism tightens the screws of the labour 
process, which increasingly pushes migrant workers towards the formal 
subordination. As they lose their means of subsistence they are sucked into capitalist 
exploitation relations. Deepening integration with the domestic and global markets 
increases competition between and stress on local, private enterprises. Demographic 
changes have reduced the labour supply and encouraged the arrival of more non-
local migrants. All these changes impact on the characteristics of labour relations in 
Zhejiang.  
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Migrant workers in Xinhe and other areas with similar conditions have taken 
advantage of their position in the labour market to fight for their rights, forcing 
private enterprise owners and local authorities to solve the challenge they present. It 
is the migrant workers’ escape that leads to the innovation of regime of control. 
Trade union innovation is another attempt to absorb the energy of insubordination. 
Based on the preconditions of its particular social-economic environment, Zhejiang’s 
local trade union experimented with a sectoral collective consultancy which proved 
to have a strong stabilising effect on the local labour market and may be considered 
as the future path for further trade union reform. On the one hand, the state and 
capital cooperate to introduce a new framework of collective consultancy to absorb 
the resistances of migrant workers. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous 
section, Zhejiang Province and individual capitalists are considering bringing in 
automation to replace migrant workers and improve productivity, thus revealing the 
state and capital’s plans to further deepen the subordination of migrant workers.  
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Chapter 7 Jiangsu Province- Local State, Daily Struggle 
and Collective Actions  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The development of TVEs in Jiangsu has significantly driven economic growth and 
speeded up the urbanisation process in the province. It has created a particular 
development path in Jiangsu, known as ‘Sunan Model’, which is parallel with the 
Pearl River Model in Guangdong Province and the Wenzhou Model in Zhejiang 
Province. The speciality of the development path of Sunan also has greatly 
influenced the pattern of the labour disputes and collective actions of migrant 
workers. Jiangsu has a stronger foundation of manufacturing industry than the other 
two provinces. Since the reform and opening up, the economic growth of Jiangsu, 
espeicially south Jiangsu, has been based on the accumulation of collective economy 
and dominant of local states. At the beginning of the reform and opening up era, the 
collective economy remained, providing workers with social welfare and good pay, 
which actually buffered the escape of migrant workers from containment and the 
insuboridnation of migrant workers to capital relations. The remaining of the 
collective economy helped local states to keep their authority over economic 
relations. Since 2000, after the restructruing of collective TVEs, FIEs and private 
enterprises have become the main body of the private economy in Jiangsu. However, 
local states have remained closely related to econmic actors. As a result, compared 
with other two provinces, the local states in Jiangsu are more capable to intervene in 
conflicts between capital and migrant workers. The capable local states have created 
a seris of institutions to control the labour conflicts; the insubordination of migrant 
workers in Jiangsu, however, is still noticable, despite the relatively good pay and 
working conditions. Migrant workers’ insubordination characterises here in Jiangsu 
in daily struggles, which still gradually push the local states and capitalists to change 
both their development and subordination strategies. 
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This chapter first analyses the historical context in which the Sunan Model rose, and 
illustrates its development in post-1978. It then reveals the making of migrant 
workers in Jiangsu and their insubordination strategies to capital. It then closely 
examines two collective actions of migrant workers in Yaoguan Town, a typical 
Sunan Town in Changzhou. Based on the analysis of the daily struggles of migrant 
workers and collective actions they take, this chapter discusses with a capable state, 
how migrant workers still fight back through daily struggles and collective actions.   
7.2 The Sunan Model and the New Sunan Model 
As an east coast province of China, Jiangsu has also experienced fast economic 
development since 1978. Historically, Jiangsu, especially south Jiangsu, was one of 
the most prosperous areas of China. It had an advanced agricultural system based on 
fertile soil, abundant rainfall, and well-established water irrigation systems and a 
flourishing commerce and handicraft industry. Jiangsu was famous for its silk, cotton 
textiles, china, salt, papermaking, printing and tobacco. Additionally, Jiangsu's 
unique geographic situation and natural advantages make it a natural crossroads for 
domestic trade. The Changjiang, Huaihe and Yishuhe Rivers, important navigation 
channels, all flow through Jiangsu. There are also canals linking Jiangsu with north 
China. The Grand Canal, as an example, was used for tribute grain (cao liang 漕粮) 
transport from south China to north China. Towns in Jiangsu like Wuxi, Xuzhou, 
Nantong, became trade and distribution centres.  
After the Opium Wars and the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, foreign investors, 
Chinese landlords and capitalists started to build modern industries in Jiangsu. Most 
of these modern industrial factories were concentrated in Sunan, particularly in 
Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou. They were the largest industrial cities in China at the 
time. In the meantime, north Jiangsu was suffering from flooding. Benefiting from 
its modern industries, advanced agriculture and rural economy, south Jiangsu 
became significantly distinguished from the other areas of the province (Suzhong in 
the middle and Subei in the north), to earn its own name and it became known as 
Sunan. Sunan area was also called ‘Su(zhou)-(Wu)Xi-Chang(Zhou)’. In 2001, the 
Jiangsu provincial government placed Nanjing and Zhenjiang in the administrative 
group of Sunan, because the two cities had achieved a similar economic 
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development to Su-Xi-Chang. Suzhong includes Yangzhou, Taizhou and Nantong, 
and Subei includes Xuzhou, Lianyungang, Yancheng, Suqian and Huai’an (Figure 
52). 
Figure 52 Jiangsu Province and Sunan, Suzhong, Subei 
 
Source: Made by Author based on online source:  
http://www.58pic.com/tupian/zhongguoditushiliangtu.html 
 
7.2.1 Economic Achievements 
 
By 1949, Jiangsu had established a significant number of modern enterprises and 
was one of the most developed provinces of China. After the establishment of the 
PRC, Jiangsu retained its leading position in the economy. In 1950, Jiangsu 
contributed 10% of China’s industrial output with only 1% of China’s total land area. 
During the Mao-period, although influenced by political drifts, the secondary 
industry continued to grow. From 1970 to 1975, industrial output surpassed 
agricultural production and since 1978, Jiangsu has recorded rapid growth. From 
1978 to 2013, the average annual growth rate of GDP was 17.30% while the per 
capita GDP was 16.22%. The total amount of GDP grew from RMB 24.9 billion, 
accounting for 6.84% of total GDP, to RMB 5975.34 billion, accounting for 10.16% 
(Figure 53). Jiangsu remains one of the most developed provinces in China. 
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Figure 53 Proportion of Jiangsu GDP to Total GDP (1978 -2013) 
Sources: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
As clearly shown in Figure 54, there are several dramatic peaks and troughs in the 
GDP growth rate. Although Jiangsu’s economy has grown rapidly over the past three 
decades, it is sensitive to policy change and environmental variability. The main 
engine of economic growth in Jiangsu is TVEs, both collective and private, which 
have experienced vicissitudes. The details of these are analysed in coming sections.  
Figure 54 Jiangsu GDP and Growth Rate (1978 -2013) 
 
Sources: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The growth of GDP per capita of Jiangsu follows the same trend as the growth of 
GDP. In 2012, the GDP per capita of Jiangsu as a province jumped to over 
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US$10,000: Jiangsu was on a par with developed countries. Sunan cities are much 
more advanced than other cities: for example, Wuxi also achieved US$10,000 in 
2008, rising to US$ 20,000 in 2013 (Xinhua Daily, 2014). 
Figure 55 Jiangsu per Capita GDP and its Growth Rate (1978-2013) 
Sources: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The industrial structure of Jiangsu also has experienced transformation. The 
secondary industry contributed around half of the GDP from 1978 to 2013. With the 
deepening of reform, agriculture has contributed less and less to Jiangsu’s GDP, 
declining from 27.57% in 1978, to 10.47% in 2000, and then to 5.81% in 2013. The 
vacancy it left has been filled by tertiary industry, increasing from 19.84% in 1978 to 
45.52% in 2013, nearly half of Jiangsu’s GDP (Figure 56).  
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Figure 56 Structure of Gross Domestic Product (1978-2013) 
 
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The restructuring of industries also leads to a restructuring of employment. An 
increasing number of people have abandon agriculture and work in the secondary 
and the tertiary industries. In the tertiary industry, the number of employees tripled 
from 58,974,000 to 176,116,000 between 1978 and 2013 (Figures 57&58).  
Figure 57 Composition of Employees in Three Industries (1989-2013) 
 
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
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Figure 58 Number of Employees in Three Industries (1989-
2013)
 
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
The rapid economic development based on industrialisation is closely linked to the 
rapid urbanisation in Jiangsu. As shown in Figure 59, in 1978, only 13.7% of the 
population held urban household registration status. In 2012, this had risen to nearly 
two-thirds. As the development of TVEs propelled the urbanisation process, small 
towns and villages in Jiangsu also experienced rapid modernization. Rural residents 
were transformed into urban or quasi-urban residents with very little geographical 
relocation. The development of TVEs also provided the economic foundation for the 
improvement of the rural living standard. Hence, in Jiangsu the income gap between 
urban residents and rural residents is much lower than the national level. However, 
once Jiangsu began to integrate with the global market post-2000, the difference 
began to grow (Figure 60).  
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Figure 59 Composition of Urban Population and Rural Population of Jiangsu (1978-2012) 
 
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
Figure 60 Urban and Rural Income Ratio (1990-2014) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistic, China 
Jiangsu Province has experienced significant socio-economic transformation since 
1978, especially in terms of economic development. The next section analyses this 
transformation process in detail.  
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7.2.2 Socialist Transformation and Commune and Brigade Enterprises (she dui 
qi ye 社队企业)  
 
Jiangsu’s historical traditions and cultural background, combined with the 
accumulation of capital, skilled labourers and commercial experiences, offered a 
solid foundation for the rise of modern capitalism in the province. Between the late 
19th century and early 20th century, local capitalists had made a considerable effort 
to develop light industries, such as silk, cotton textiles and flour mills in Jiangsu. 
However, heavy industry was not as well developed because Jiangsu lacks natural 
resources such as coal, minerals, petrol, and other crucial resources for heavy 
industry. In 1932, there were 4,652 modern enterprises and factories in Jiangsu, of 
which 80.3% were owned by local capitalists. Private capital in Jiangsu accounted 
for 10% of the total private capital of the whole country at that time (jiang su sheng 
zhi: zhong gong zhi, 2007). In 1949,the industrial output of the private sector 
accounted for 80.53% of the total industrial output of Jiangsu and the private sector 
contributed 76.83% of the total wholesales of the whole province (jiang su sheng zhi: 
zhong gong zhi, 2007). 
After the founding of the PRC, the private enterprises and factories in Jiangsu were 
gradually taken over by the government. Private industrial and commercial 
enterprises were encouraged to be involved in socialist transformation and 
construction. The Jiangsu government had formulated a plan that converted private 
ownership to joint state-private ownership. In 1952, the industrial output of state-
owned enterprises, co-operative enterprises, joint state-private enterprise and private 
enterprises accounted for 17.3%, 11.5%, 7.5% and 63.7% of the total industrial 
output of Jiangsu province respectively (jiang su sheng zhi: zhong gong zhi, 2007). 
The socialist transformation of the private sector began in 1953 when governments 
paid private capitalists a fixed annual rate of interest on the monetary value of their 
assets. The rest of the profits was used to pay tax, labour's welfare, bonuses fund, 
and accumulation fund. In 1953, there were 49 joint state-private industrial 
enterprises and factories, increasing to 110 in 1954 and 270 in 1955, and jumping to 
1929 in 1956. Over 300,644 retail merchants had transferred to joint state-private 
ownership by 1956. By the end of 1957, state-owned enterprises (including joint 
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state-private enterprises) produced 73.7% of the total industrial output of Jiangsu, 
while collective-owned enterprises produced the rest. Moreover, 48.5% of total 
social retail sales were from the wholly people-owned retailers while 43.1% were 
from collective-owned ones (jiang su sheng zhi: zhong gong zhi, 2007). 
Once the socialist transformation was complete, Jiangsu entered into a period of a 
single economic structure, in which socialist public ownership overwhelmingly 
dominated. In agriculture, farm families were progressively organised into 
cooperatives, collectives, and finally people’s communes. At the end of 1956, 91.3% 
of farm families in Jiangsu had joined people’s communes. In commerce and 
industry, some large collective enterprises were upgraded to wholly people-owned 
enterprises, small collective enterprises were merged and upgraded to large 
collective enterprises. Because the people’s communes, which were more advanced 
than cooperative farms, had been widely opposed by farmers, a three-level 
ownership was implemented. This system includes people’s communes as the top 
level, followed by the production brigades, and finally the production team as the 
bottom level. The socialist transformation of farm families also led to the origin of 
the Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) (she dui qi ye 社队企业), run and 
owned by people’s communes or production brigades. This was the predecessor of 
Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs). In the beginning, CBEs grew because of the 
Great Leap, which was supposed to fuel industrialisation. As the Great Leap did not 
succeed, the first wave of CBEs did not last long (jiang su sheng zhi: xiang zhen 
gong ye zhi, 2007). 
The second wave of CBEs began in 1969 because of the absence of urban industrial 
factories; many had stopped production during the Cultural Revolution. It was also 
influenced by the increasing population living on limited farmland. Additionally, 
skilled workers and engineers from Shanghai and other metropolises, policy support 
and tax incentives all stimulated their development. The planned economy system 
also accepted CBEs to facilitate its development. In 1969, the value of their 
industrial output reached RMB 240 million in Jiangsu, up 70.21% over the previous 
year. From 1969 to 1976, the average annual growth rate of industrial output of 
CBEs was 35.62% (jiang su sheng zhi: xiang zhen gong ye zhi, 2007). By the end of 
1978, the number of CBEs in Jiangsu had increased to about 565,000 with 2.5 
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million employees creating RMB 6.3 billion industrial output, or 16.6% of the 
national industrial CBE output (Party History Research Centre of the CPC Central 
Committee, 2009)  
Because the original purpose of CBEs was to support agriculture, they had 
successfully facilitated the development of agriculture, improved peasants’ living 
standards, and even further fuelled the rural economic structural transformation 
(Table 18).   
Table 18 Gross Industrial and Agricultural Output Value, Industrial Output Value and CBE Output Value of 
Jiangsu (1952-1978) 
Year Gross industrial and 
agricultural output 
value 
Industrial output 
value 
Output value of 
CBEs 
1952 80.36 19.65 N/A 
1957 98.87 32.61 N/A 
1965 156.51 69.31 N/A 
1970 228.89 124.86 6.96 
1975 353.04 220.53 22.84 
1978 485.90 320.17 63.38 
RMB 100 million  
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 1985 
Table 18 reveals that rural collective industry played a more and more important role. 
It not only created significant social wealth, but also accumulated various resources 
for further development – land, skilled workers, links with experts in Shanghai, 
management experiences, techniques, and exploration of the market. It created a 
solid foundation for its successor: the Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) (xiang 
zhen qi ye 乡镇企业). 
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7.2.3 TVEs and the Sunan Model  
 
In parallel with the Zhujiang or Pearl River Model and the Wenzhou Model, the 
Sunan Model has been one of the most significant development paths in China since 
1978. The Sunan Model refers to the development path in south Jiangsu cities like 
Wuxi, Suzhou, Changzhou. Although there is still debate about the details that it a 
distinctive model, the most outstanding characteristics are agreed as: 1) Collective 
Ownership: capital fund of TVEs in south Jiangsu is from the collective investment 
of communities; 2) Town and Village Owned Enterprises: TVEs are collectively-
owned enterprises; 3) Local State-Led Development Strategy: the commercial 
operation is mainly led by the local state (at town and village-level). The local state 
is actively involved in the creation, investment, operation, production, marketing, 
and employment; 4) Urbanisation based on the development of small cities and 
towns (Hong, 2007; Li, 2004; Wei, 2004; Wei and Gu,2013; Xue, 2001). 
 
As discussed above, CBEs were born from practice people’s communes, production 
brigades, and production teams and they are embedded in the planned economic 
system. As we know, reform and opening up began with the implementation of the 
HRS (household contract responsibility system), which directly undermined the 
foundation of CBEs. Since 1981, the HRS system has spread across the province and 
by 1983, 98.6% of the production teams in Jiangsu had executed this system. The 
hukou system was implemented everywhere, affecting crop growing to forestry, 
animal husbandry, and fisheries, from agricultural to rural industry, commercial 
business, construction and transportation. Rural reforms stimulated agricultural 
development, which in turn provided capital, raw materials, and labour for rural 
industrialisation (Wei, 2000). Rural enterprises also adopted the HRS system. In 
1983, Yanqiao in Wuxi Town initiated the HRS system known as ‘yi bao san gai’ 
(一包三改). Yi bao san gai means ‘one responsibility system and three changes’. 
Because people’s communes ran and managed the CBEs, their cadres and managers 
were appointed and removed by states and people’s communes. The cadre 
appointment and removal system was discarded and the general employment system 
was adopted. Contracts were need to establish the relationship between workers and 
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factories. The salaries of both cadres and workers were no longer fixed but linked to 
the performance of factories and individuals. Yanqiao Town had successfully 
implemented the reform of CBEs in 1983 and repeated this success with yi bao san 
gai. The system then spread across the whole province, signalling the withdrawal of 
planned economy and the progress of the socialist market economy.  
 
In 1984, the Chinese central government issued No. 4 Document that renamed CBEs 
as Collective Town and Village Enterprises (乡镇企业 xiang zhen qi ye) because the 
towns and villages had replaced people’s communes, production brigades and 
production teams as the basic level rural governments. This document also appealed 
to local states to support the development of collective TVEs. In June of the same 
year, Jiangsu established town and county-level governments and village committees, 
and withdrew the people’s communes (jiangsu sheng zhi: zong he jing ji zhi, 2007).  
 
Collective TVEs in Jiangsu have experienced rapid development since 1984. Table 
19 clearly shows the growth rates of industrial outputs of TVEs between 1984 and 
1990 averaging over 30%, with a peak of 55.8% in 1985. After a period of slowing 
down in 1989 and 1990, the growth rate grew dramatically again from 1991 to 1995 
(Table 19).  
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Table 19 The development of TVEs in Jiangsu (1978-1997) 
Year Number of TVEs 
Number of 
employees of 
TVEs(1000) 
Industrial Output 
Total (RMB) 
(100,000,000) 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
1979 17457 142.41 46.74 21.59 
1980 19899 170.82 66.24 41.72 
1981 20348 187.35 77.05 16.31 
1982 20322 193.18 81.97 6.39 
1983 20255 204.47 99.29 21.13 
1984 22595 231.54 134.75 35.71 
1985 22445 265.39 209.94 55.8 
1986 27839 296.77 271.11 28.66 
1987 29382 317.47 374.36 38.6 
1988 29821 328.39 540.75 44.45 
1989 29785 311.63 615.78 13.88 
1990 29448 311.88 691.03 12.22 
1991 28891 328.83 846.24 22.46 
1992 29012 333.96 1422.34 68.08 
1993 29439 337.79 2237.22 57.29 
1994 29867 325.66 3151.89 40.88 
1995 28553 316.22 4175.24 32.47 
1996 27783 297.88 3650.88 -12.56 
1997 23140 270.09 3574.26 -2.1 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Jiangsu of Town and Village Enterprises (1979-1996); Jiangsu 
Statistical Yearbook 1997. 
 
Several factors allowed collective TVEs in Jiangsu to achieve their economic 
success. First of all, the accumulation made by CBEs gave TVEs capital, skilled 
workers, market shares and so on. Secondly, they are market-oriented. The TVEs, 
unlike SOEs at that time, produced goods based on market demand and bought raw 
materials based on their production needs rather than blindly following a central 
economic plan. TVEs also benefited from the close links with large enterprises in 
Shanghai. Businesses in Shanghai, frequently SOEs, not only supplied TVEs with 
subcontracted orders and raw materials, but also another important resource: experts, 
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engineers, and skilled workers. Hence, collective TVEs in Jiangsu ‘borrow others’ 
brains to make money’. Additionally, the flexibility of employment of TVEs reduces 
costs and increases the enthusiasm of both managers and employees. The linking of 
pay to performance rather than rank also increased productivity significantly. 
 
The largest and strongest support came from the local state, which enacted TVE-
favourable policies from provincial to county level. TVEs in Jiangsu are either 
exempt from taxes or pay taxes at a very low rate. Local states are also directly 
involved in the operation of TVEs, which has obvious benefits. They organise the 
means of production – lands, assets, and labourers. The political power of local states, 
conferred by the political institution, has also assisted TVEs in rapidly expanding. 
There is no denying that the development of collective TVEs was fuelled by local 
states’ direct interventions at an early stage of transition from planned economy to 
the socialist market economy (Zheng, Cheng & Ruan, 2011).  
 
However, with the deepening of marketisation, the ‘golden age’ of collective TVEs 
ended in the late 1990s. As shown in Table 19, the growth rate of industrial output 
fell from 1992 onwards and employee numbers also dropped consistently from this 
year on. There were several contributing reasons: the external socio-economic 
environment changed rapidly during the reform era and the special environment, 
which had facilitated collective TVEs was diminishing gradually. After their reform, 
SOEs re-entered the market competition. Private enterprises also received large 
amounts of government assistance, without carrying a heavy collective burden. The 
radical reforms toward globalization and marketisation saw foreign capital move to 
the YRD. The deepening of marketisation also saw the supply of commodities shift 
from shortage to surplus, which led to difficulties in marketing and sales. TVEs no 
longer enjoyed preferential taxation policies that further reduced their competitive 
strength.   
 
The structure of TVEs also created obstacles. The small-size TVEs employed less-
trained labour forces and lacked economies of scale and agglomeration, which made 
them less capable of utilising technical innovations and improving management. The 
intimate relationship between local state and TVEs initially accelerated their growth 
but then held it back. Unidentified property rights, unclear management and 
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administrative rights, unclear asset management rights, all prevented TVEs from 
becoming independent of local states. Their use of the rolling capital offered by local 
communities, meant TVEs had to accept responsibility for community welfare: a 
portion of their profits was ringfenced to establish welfare facilities, construct 
infrastructures, and boost agricultural development. Moreover, local states and 
managers of TVEs became a close interest community, resulting in corruption and 
inefficiencies. Some bureaus and local government departments even treated TVEs 
as their private bank account, exploring every avenue to extort money; fees, fines, 
sponsorships and any other pretext were used to this end (Chen & Chen, 1997; Ho, 
Bowles & Dong, 2003; Nie, 2003; Wei & Gu, 2010; Xia, 1996; Yu, 2008; Zou, 
2003). 
 
In 1993, a restructuring of collective TVEs was initiated under the principle of ‘grasp 
the large, reform the medium, and release the small’. In the mid-1990s, it was 
accelerated to ‘clarify’ property rights and improve efficiency by transforming 
collective TVEs into multiple ownership forms, in other words, privatization. By 
restructuring, collective TVEs became shareholding enterprises, limited liability 
corporations, private enterprises, and Sino–foreign joint ventures through sale (or 
half-sold-half-leased) or auction (Ho et al., 2003; Wei, 2004). Only the small, 
vaguely profitable or inefficient collective TVEs were allowed to be sold. However, 
in reality, the bigger and more efficient TVEs should have been the first choice for 
sale to maximize the benefits to local states. “Local states regard TVEs as their 
daughters, once beginning to ‘marry’ them, they choose to marry out (sic) the 
prettiest ones. As for the less pretty or ugly ones, they try to lower the price or even 
transfer them as gifts to existing managers” (Wei, 2010; Zou, 2003 44).  
 
In the process of restructuring, local states and existing managers of TVEs actively 
pushed privatization. From local states’ perspective, collective TVEs were no longer 
gold mines but money pits with low profitability, high debt and overstocking of 
products, which were undermining local GDP growth, the crucial index of the 
qualification assessment of local states. From existing managers’ perspective, being 
‘promoted’ to owner was very different from being the manager. However, for most 
employees, those who better suited to the collective economy rather than 
marketisation and privatisation, the restructuring of TVEs made very little difference. 
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TVE employees, unlike urban workers, had farmland in towns or villages and so 
their salary was not their only source of income. Additionally, in contrast to the 
reform of SOEs, the restructuring of TVEs was not necessarily linked to ‘xia gang’ 
(下岗 laying-off) (Zou, Dai & Sun, 1999) and did not cause a conspicuous labour 
movement.  
 
7.2.4 The New Sunan Model  
 
By 1999, most TVEs had restructured to private and joint ownership firms. The large 
and medium size TVEs mostly transferred to shareholding enterprises and limited 
liability corporations, while most small TVEs transferred to private enterprises (Liu 
& Li, 2009). This signalled the end of the historical role of TVEs and the broad 
discussion of the Sunan Model (Wei, 2002). Scholars, politicians, observers and the 
‘common people’ have all questioned the validity and efficiency of this decision and 
some even claim it is ‘the end’ of Sunan Model.  
 
However, the globalisation of capital brought new opportunities to the Sunan area. In 
1990, the development and opening up of Shanghai Pudong Airport created a turning 
point in relations between Shanghai and Jiangsu. Jiangsu’s government actively 
supported structural adjustment and an export-oriented economy to enhance the 
vitality and vigour of the adaptation and opening-up (Zhang & Fu, 2009). Exploiting 
their closeness to Pudong, Jiangsu, (mainly south Jiangsu), not only created new 
export channels but also gained new technologies, products, processes, global 
markets and management methods – and foreign capital. This stimulated the 
development of the export-oriented economy of Jiangsu. The cooperation between 
Shanghai and Jiangsu businesses continues to accelerate the industrial structure 
upgrade. The collective TVEs in Jiangsu primarily concentrate on light industries, 
following their history and tradition. Accompanied by the connection with Shanghai, 
it gradually strengthened complementary. Foreign-invested enterprises and private 
enterprises have grown rapidly since then.  
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Foreign Direct Investment 
 
As shown in Figure 61, Jiangsu’s imports and exports grew from 1990 to 2013 and 
increased significantly from 2000 to 2013. In 2013, the province’s import/export 
total reached 5508.44 billion dollars, the traditional Sunan Area (Su-Xi-Chang area) 
contributing 74.23%. If Nanjing and Zhenjiang’s contribution is factored in, 86.2% 
of export/import trade comes from the Sunan area. Among the exports, general trade 
contributes 44% and the processing trade with imported materials, 40%. Foreign-
invested companies account for 60% of exports, 45.5% from wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises.  
 
Figure 61: Exports and Imports of Jiangsu (1985-2013) 
 
SourceS: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
The rapid growth of imports/exports indicates that Jiangsu, especially the Sunan area, 
has aimed itself in an export-oriented direction. This can be seen in its degree of 
foreign trade dependence (Figure 62). The degree jumps dramatically from 33% in 
1999 to 100% in 2005 and remains over 100% in 2006 and 2007. Even during the 
global economic recession in 2008, it remained at over 60%.  
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Figure 62 Jiangsu’ Foreign Trade Dependence Degree (1985-2012) 
 
Sources: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2013 
 
Additionally, foreign investment has flown into Jiangsu since 1990. It shares the 
same trend as FDI in China (Figures 63&64). In 2003, Jiangsu overtook Guangdong 
as the most attractive region for FDI.   
 
Figure 63: Utilisation of Foreign Investment (1985-2012) 
 
Sources: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2013 
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Figure 64 Total Amount of Foreign Investment Actually Utilised in Jiangsu (1990-2013) 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 
As shown in Figure 65, the ratio of FDI in Jiangsu to the national total exceeded the 
ratio of GDP in Jiangsu to the national total, which means that Jiangsu’s FDI 
Performance Index is much higher than 1 and even jumped to 3.03 in 2012. In other 
words, Jiangsu attracts FDI bigger than its GDP scale.  
Figure 65 Proportion of Jiangsu GDP to Total GDP and Proportion of Jiangsu FDI to Total FDI (1990-2013) 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2014 and Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2014  
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In the beginning, FDI mainly focused on the processing industry. As it integrated 
with the global market, Jiangsu began to attract increasing FDI investment in the 
equipment manufacturing, service and high-tech industries.  
 
Nowadays FDI in Jiangsu mainly invests in wholly foreign-owned enterprises. In 
2013, over 80% of FDI went to wholly foreign-owned enterprises. One explanation 
as to why FDI in Jiangsu invests in high-tech areas and sole proprietorship is that it 
helps to protect technical superiority. FDIs are mainly from Asian countries and 
regions: in 2013, 95% of FDI was from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, 
80% alone from Hong Kong. More than half of FDI is invested in the Su-Xi-Chang 
area, and 70% in Sunan (including Nanjing and Zhenjiang) (National Statistical 
Bureau, Jiangsu Statistical Bureau, Suzhou Statistical Bureau, Wuxi Statistical 
Bureau, Changzhou Statistical Bureau, Zhenjiang Statistical Bureau, and Nanjing 
Statistical Bureau, 2014).  
 
Private Enterprises 
 
Analysing the actual funds for investment in Jiangsu from 1990 to 2013 (Figures 
66&67), it is clear that FDI contributions to the total investment of Jiangsu increased 
from 4% in 1990 to 13.6% in 1998, remained around 10% in the first decades of the 
21
st
 century, then gradually falls to 2.5% in 2013. While the FDI and FIEs play an 
important role in the economic development in Jiangsu, especially in the Sunan area, 
privately-owned businesses also play a significant role in pushing Jiangsu forward. 
Since the restructuring of collective TVEs, their number of employees declined 
rapidly from 1998 and in 2012, only 2,759,000 employees were working in 
collective TVEs. 
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Figure 66: Actual Funds for Investment in Jiangsu, 1990-2013 
 
Sources: Collected from Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 1991 to 2014 
Figure 67: Composition of Actual Funds for Investment in Jiangsu, 1990-2013 
Sources: Collected from Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook, 1991-2014  
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In the meantime, the number of employees working in private-owned enterprises and 
ge ti hu increased sharply. In 2013, 19.19 million employees were working in private 
enterprises and 6.24 million workers for ge ti hu, the two accounting for more than 
half of the total employees in Jiangsu (NBS, 2014; see Figures 68,69,70).   
  
Figure 68 TVE Employees in Jiangsu, 1998-2012 
 
Sources: Collected from Jiangsu Statistical Yearbooks of Town and Village Enterprises 1999-2013 
 
Figure 69 Number of Employees of Private Enterprises and Rural Private Enterprises in Jiangsu, 1992-2013 
 
Source: National Statistical Bureau of China, 2014 
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Figure 70: Numbers of Employees of Ge Ti Hu and Rural Ge Ti Hu in Jiangsu, 1992-2013 
 
Source: National Statistical Bureau of China, 2014 
 
The private sector in Jiangsu has developed rapidly since 1978, especially after the 
restructuring of the collective TVEs when a large number of them were privatized 
and restructured to private enterprises. The number of private enterprises in Jiangsu 
increased sharply from 6000 in 1992 to 1.45 million in 2013. In 2013, Jiangsu had 
the most private enterprise (1,451,000), the most private sector employees in China 
(Figure 71) and the highest registered capital of private enterprises (RMB 4756.8 
billion). The 2014 edition of ‘China’s top 500 private enterprises’ published by the 
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, lists 96 Jiangsu private enterprises, 
with a total operating revenue of RMB 2843,42 billion. Zhejiang leads the list with 
134 businesses and RMB 2874.30 billion operating revenue. This shows that 
Jiangsu’s private enterprises are creating similar operating revenue to Zhejiang, but 
with fewer businesses (National Statistical Bureau of China, 2014).  
Figure 71 Number of Private Enterprises in Jiangsu, 1992-2013 
  
Source: National Statistical Bureau of China, 2014 
 
Development Zones and Industrial Zones 
Unlike with TVEs, local states did not conduct direct interventions with FIEs and 
private enterprises. They withdrew themselves from direct operations within 
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enterprises but supported them in other ways – for example, establishing industrial 
and high technology parks. Local states have actively lobbied the central and 
provincial governments for more national, provincial, and local development zones 
and parks. By the end of 2006, Sunan had built 11 national-level development zones 
and 26 provincial-level development zones. The municipality has one national-level 
development zone and nine provincial-level development zones. These districts and 
parks are experiencing rapid urbanisation and have become new centres of 
production, enjoying the benefits of clusters and agglomeration. In 2005, these ten 
development zones realized a GDP of RMB 32.9 billion, accounting for 25.3 % of 
the total GDP of the municipality (Chen & Gu, 2007:79). They also lead the export-
oriented economy. In 2013, these development zones created a total import/export 
volume of RMB 448.8 billion, 81.5% of the total provincial volume.  
 
Wei and Gu (2013) summarised the difference between the Sunan Model and the 
New Sunan Model: 
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Table 20 The Sunan Model and Recent Development 
Dimensions Sunan Model ‘New’ Sunan Model 
Year 1970-1980s 1990s 
Geographical base Rural areas Cities and regions 
Ownership 
structure 
Collective (fuzzy property 
rights) 
Foreign, private, and 
shareholding (clear property 
rights) 
Industrial 
structure 
Industry (machinery, 
textiles) 
Industry and service (+ 
technology industry) 
Scale economies Small, in small towns Larger, in development zones 
Growth patterns Traditional, extensive Upgrading, technology 
Migration "Leave the land but not the 
township." 
Urbanization, concentration 
Urbanization Small town-centred TVEs, City-centred,  
Mechanisms Bottom-up From above and outside 
Local states   
      A. Enterprise Directly involved Service, business environment 
      B. Key level Township County 
      C. Area Economic growth Socio-economic development 
      D. Format Resources and Policies Plan, policies 
Sources: Wei and Gu, 2013:329 
 
Table 20 shows the transformation of Jiangsu economy in different aspects. The 
centre of economic development moves from rural areas to urban industrial 
development zones and parks. Local states shift their position from direct managers 
to promoters and protectors of TVEs. Jiangsu’s economy is progressively integrated 
with the global market and, in turn, is profoundly influenced by the global market. 
The shift in the Sunan Model has brought about socio-economic changes in Sunan 
area, profoundly affecting the behaviour patterns of different agencies of 
development. The Sunan Model’s its development is centred on the development of 
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collective TVEs. The transformation of the Sunan Model into the New Sunan Model 
also transformed the development centre from collective TVEs to private enterprises 
and FIEs and introduced the establishment of industrial parks and zones. Nonetheless, 
there is a line of succession. The CBEs were renamed as collective TVEs, which 
then were restructured as private enterprises. Although the local governments 
gradually loosened their control over the operation of enterprises during this process, 
the power relations between local states, the businesses and local migrant workers 
continued from the Mao-period, through the Sunan Model period and on to the New 
Sunan Model period. Jiangsu’s development during the reform era was based on the 
previous abundant collective economy, motivated by local governments. Jiangsu’s 
local governments can be seen as capable local states, which have authority over 
employers and workers (Wu, 2014). The capable local states and the retention of 
power relations between local states and capitalists have also deeply influenced the 
making of migrant workers in Jiangsu. In the next section, I analyse the containing of 
migrant workers to capitalist production relation in the province.  
 
7.3 The Making of Migrant Workers in Jiangsu 
 
The making of migrant workers in Jiangsu shares some similarities with Zhejiang in 
that they initially came from local communities. The difference between the two is 
that a large number of the local migrant workers in Jiangsu used to be CBE workers: 
Jiangsu’s characteristic development path is reflected in the special pathway of 
making migrant workers.  
 
7.3.1 Floating population 
 
The characteristics of migrant workers in Jiangsu have a close connection with the 
province’s development path. As discussed above, at the beginning of the reform and 
opening-up, the driving power of Jiangsu’s economic development were the 
collective TVEs created from the previous CBEs. Both CBEs and collective TVEs 
hired local peasants as their employees. Hence, in the early stages of migration, 
farmers in Jiangsu left their land but did not leave their towns. Most collective TVE 
employees did not leave their lands either. They worked a ‘dual track’, continuing to 
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farm and working in factories at the same time. Therefore, the number of labourers 
in the primary industry declined slowly up until 1990 and more quickly post-1990. 
From 1990 to 1999, the rural population had decreased to 6,863,000 while the 
number of labourers in the primary industry had also been reduced to 4,806,000 .The 
trend continued after 2000. In 2013, 18.44 million rural labourers had moved 
industries in Jiangsu. The decline of agricultural labourers was accompanied by an 
increase in workers in the secondary and tertiary industries. As shown in Figure 58, 
the number of employees in the secondary and the tertiary industries overtook that in 
the primary industry at the beginning of the new century. At the same time, peasants 
started to leave their home towns to find jobs. In 1982, Jiangsu had a floating 
population of 770,000, increasing to 4.48 million in 1991, 3.17 million in 1995, and 
3.40 million in 1997 (Huang, 2006). According to the second China Census of 
Agriculture, in 2006, the rural floating population numbered 10.62 million, of which 
68.01% were migrants moving out from their home towns.  
 
A staggering 97% of them work in the secondary and tertiary industries. Within the 
secondary industry, 61% of rural migrants work in manufacturing and construction: 
over 70% of them under the age of 40 of which 83.9% have finished the nine years 
of compulsory education. However, only 13.3% had gone onto high school and 
higher education. Fewer rural females leave their home towns than males: the ratio 
of male to female is 207:100. Compared with male migrants, migrant women prefer 
to work in the tertiary industry (Jiangsu Statistics Bureau, 2009). 
 
Within Jiangsu Province, the most important dimension of regional inequality occurs 
across Sunan, Suzhong and Subei. The Sunan area creates 60% of the total GDP, and 
75% of the total provincial imports and exports, attracting 70% of FDI. Suzhong and 
Subei fall behind. This uneven development also influences the transfer of rural 
labourers. In the Sunan area, peasants leave their lands but do not leave their towns. 
Sunan also attracts a lot of rural labourers from Suzhong and Subei. In 2003, 1.16 
million migrants left the Sunan area, accounting for 23.7% of the total migrants from 
Sunan. In the meantime, 51.5% of Suzhong’s migrants left, as did 62.7% of Subei’s 
(Zhang, Tang & Li, 2006). In 2006, 45.54% of the total floating population in 
Jiangsu was from the Subei area. The majority of Subei’s floating population moved 
to the Sunan area (Jiangsu Statistics Bureau, 2009). Hence, one of the most 
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important characteristics of migrants in Jiangsu is that the majority of them move 
inside the province, normally from north to south, from less developed areas to more 
developed area.  
 
The rapid development of the Sunan area not only attracts migrants from Jiangsu, but 
also from other provinces. Between 2000 to 2010 Jiangsu’s floating population 
boomed from 9.1 million to 18.2 million. The floating population from outside of 
Jiangsu increased from 2.54 million to 7.34 million. Based on the data collected by 
the fifth and the sixth national censuses in 2000 and 2010, Anhui is the primary 
source of floating population from outside Jiangsu (44.2%). Sichuan was second 
(11.84%) and Zhejiang third (7.56%) in 2000; in 2010 35.2% came from Anhui, 
13.5% fromHenan and 7.2% from Sichuan. In this period the majority of the floating 
population from outside Jiangsu came from nearby, less developed provinces. 
However, increasingly people are migrating from further away. Almost 90% of the 
floating population from outside Jiangsu settled in the Sunan area in 2010. Suzhou 
has become the most attractive city in the Sunan area, attracting one-third of total 
inter-provincial migrants (Wang, 2015).  
 
7.3.2 Working conditions  
 
The precise number of migrant workers in Jiangsu is hard to state. According to 
some surveys and statistic data, there were approximately 5.36 million migrant 
workers in Jiangsu in 2004, with 4.14 million migrant workers from inside Jiangsu 
(Hua, 2004). In 2007, migrant workers from outside Jiangsu had increased sharply to 
over 4 million, while migrant workers from inside Jiangsu increased to around 5 
million. Of these, 5.19 million migrant workers worked in the urban area, and 4.14 
million worked in rural enterprises. The ratio of males to females was 114:100 
(Statistical Bureau of Jiangsu, 2008). In 2012, the number of migrant workers had 
not changed much, remaining at around 10 million. There were 5.86 million intra-
provincial migrant workers (International Finance News of People’s Daily, 2013). In 
2013, the number remained the same (Yu & Zhou, 2014). It is clear that the number 
of migrant workers in Jiangsu is substantial, and over one half of them are from 
Jiangsu.  
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According to statistical data, migrant workers in Jiangsu have relatively higher 
educational backgrounds than rural residents. This is evidence that the educated rural 
peasants prefer to leave their home towns to work in the non-agricultural sector. The 
nine years of compulsory education was completed by 86.38% of migrant workers. 
However, when compared with urban residents, fewer rural migrant workers 
remained in education beyond the compulsory period (Jiangsu Rural Statistical 
Yearbook 2012, see Table 21). The average length of education of Jiangsu migrant 
workers is 10. 3 years (Ma, 2013).  
 
Table 21 Educational Background of Migrant Workers of Jiangsu in 2011 
 No 
school 
(%) 
Primary 
school 
(%) 
Junior 
secondary 
school (%) 
Senior 
secondary 
school (%) 
College and 
higher level 
(%) 
Migrant 
workers 
1.44 12.19 58.17 21.72 6.49 
Rural 
residents 
8.18 34.10 43.47 10.90 3.36 
Urban 
residents 
4.67 22.73 40.09 18.76 13.75 
Source: Jiangsu Rural Statistical Yearbook 2012 
The majority (78.5%) of migrant workers in Zhejiang work in the private sector. 
Moreover, restricted by their limited educational background and occupational 
training, migrant workers tend to concentrate in industries requiring low skill levels 
and heavy labour. As shown in Table 22, 57.7% of them work in manufacturing and 
construction and 20% in the service industry (Jiangsu Provincial Bureau of Human 
Resource and Social Insurance, 2012).  
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Table 22 Distribution of Rural Migrant Workers of Zhejiang by Sector in 2011 
 Rural migrant workers 
(%) 
Urban residents (%) 
Manufacturing 39.9 45.11 
Construction 17.8 7.39 
Wholesale and retail 
trades 
5.2 4.01 
Hotels and catering 
service 
7.4 1.28 
Services to households, 
repair and other services 
7.1 0.13 
Culture, education and 
health 
3.33 16.24 
Sources: Jiangsu Provincial Bureau of Human Resource and Social Insurance, 2012c 
The wage of migrant workers increased four-fold between 1994 and 2009. In 1994, 
the monthly salary was RMB 448 and it had increased to RMB 1899 in 2009 (Lu, 
2012). The average monthly wage was RMB 2369 and 2677 RMB in 2011 and 2012 
respectively, which was RMB 320 and RMB 387 higher than the national average 
salary. Additionally, migrant workers’ wages are not based on the official minimum 
monthly salary standard (Table 23): factory owners in Yaoguan Town claimed that 
salary is a crucial element to attract workers and that the minimum monthly pay 
should not be lower than RMB 2500. Otherwise, it is impossible to attract and retain 
workers. Skilled workers have even higher wages – some key positions can 
command up to RMB 10,000 per month. Skilled workers are always in short supply 
and factory owners have to compete to keep their key skilled workers.  
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Table 23 Minimum Monthly Salary in Jiangsu, 2001-2014 
Implementation 
Date 
Minimum Monthly Salary （RMB） 
Tier 1 (RMB)
85
 Tier 2 (RMB) Tier 3 (RMB) Tier 4 (RMB) 
01 Jul, 2001 430 360 300 250 
01 Jul, 2002 460 370 320 260 
01 Jul, 2003 540 450 390 320 
01 Jul, 2004 620 500 440 360 
01 Oct, 2006 750 620 520 N/A 
01 Oct, 2007 850 700 590 N/A 
01 Jan, 2010 960 790 670 N/A 
01 Feb, 2011 1140 930 800 N/A 
01 Jun, 2012 1320 1100 950 N/A 
01 Jul, 2013 1480 1280 1100 N/A 
01 Nov, 2014 1630 1460 1270 N/A 
Source: Jiangsu Provincial Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, 
http://www.jshrss.gov.cn/sy2011/index.html  
 
However, when compared with urban residents, skilled workers’ wages are still at a 
lower level. Migrant workers only earned 61.82-62.65% of urban populations’ 
monthly salary in 2011 and 2012 despite their long working hours and poor working 
conditions. In 2008, they worked an average of 50.64 hours per week, 5.75 hours 
more than urban employees. Migrant workers in urban areas work longer hours than 
migrant workers in rural areas (Statistical Bureau of Jiangsu, 2009). According to a 
survey of migrant workers in Changzhou, they have to work 54.9 hours every week 
and only have three days off a month (Ma & Tao, 2013).  
 
Labour contracts are another issue for consideration. In 2008, only 41.3% of migrant 
workers had signed labour contracts with employers. FIEs have the best performance 
with a signing rate of 91.8%, followed by Collective Enterprises and SOEs at 80.7% 
and 73.9% respectively. The service industry and ge ti hu have the lowest signing 
                                                 
85
 Wage tiers are set according to the economic conditions of cities and districts. For example, the first 
tier includes Nanjing City, Wuxi City, Jiangyin, Yixing, Changzhou City, Suzhou City, Wujiang, 
Zhangjiagang, Changshu, Kunshan, Taicang, Nantong City, Qidong, Tongzhou, Haimen, Zhenjiang 
City and Taizhou City. 
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rates at 2.1% and 6% (Statistical Bureau of Jiangsu, 2009). The Jiangsu provincial 
government issued ‘Measures of Jiangsu Province on Protection of the Rights and 
Interests of Rural Migrant Workers’ in February 2008. They are the earliest specific 
local regulations to protect migrant workers’ labour rights in China. The Jiangsu 
Provincial Bureau of Human Resource and Social Security then took a special action, 
‘chun nuan’ (warmth of spring) over the following three years to improve the rate of 
signing of labour contract of migrant workers (Jiangsu Provincial Bureau of Human 
Resource and Social Security, 2008). In 2011, the signing rate increased by 78% (Liu, 
Yong & Shu, 2011).  
 
7.3.3 Young generation migrant workers  
 
Based on a survey in 2013 (Liu, Zou & Chen, 2014), the educational background of 
young generation migrant workers is relatively better than the old generation. 
71.89% of the young generation migrant workers in the survey had finished senior 
secondary school and secondary vocational school. They are no longer interested in 
the manufacturing and construction industries, but are more interested in the tertiary 
industry. The percentages of young generation migrant workers in manufacturing, 
construction, transportation and logistics industry, catering and services and self-
employed are 13.4%, 15.7%, 14.6%, 27.2% and 16.5% respectively. Looking to the 
future, one-third want to be self-employed as they see this as being freer and less 
controlled.  
 
They also have high expectations for their career development despite the fact that 
the only jobs open to them are in labour-intensive industries, offering low wages, 
and long working hours. The disparity between dream and reality also drives young 
generation migrant workers to change jobs more frequently than their parents’ 
generation. According to another survey in 2011 (Xie & Meng, 2015), the young 
generation changes job every 2.8 years, the old generation only every five years.  
 
According to the analysis above, the working conditions in Jiangsu are relatively 
better than in Guangdong and Zhejiang. Several pieces of comparative research on 
working conditions of migrant workers in different coastal areas (Liu, 2007; Liu, 
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Yong & Shu, 2011; Ma, 2013) show that Jiangsu performs better than Guangdong 
and Zhejiang regarding the signing of labour contracts, working hours, and salary. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the educational background of Jiangsu 
migrant workers is higher and migrant workers in Jiangsu also have access to more 
occupational training. Second, the historical tradition of the collective economy 
passed on a significant legacy of management style to the private TVEs. It uses 
‘relationships’ and ‘traditional cultures’ to interact between employers and 
employees, building emotional ties which can help to lubricate conflicts. Thirdly, 
migrant workers in Jiangsu are mainly from local areas: they leave the land but not 
their towns. The solidarity of the local community has absorbed the uncertainty 
brought by transformation to some extent. Last, but not least, the restructuring of 
collective TVEs that took place in the late 1990s, at the same time that Jiangsu, 
especially Sunan, was accelerating its integration with the global market. Jiangsu has 
learnt how to manage labour disputes and display good governance from Guangdong 
and other coastal areas. The Jiangsu provincial governments are attentive to migrant 
workers and implemented a series of rules and laws to help solve migrant workers' 
‘problems’, like increasing signing rates of labour contracts, claiming back wage 
arrears and the supervisory system of labour relations. Hence, having started from 
and maintained a higher level, Jiangsu has better working conditions than other 
coastal areas.  
  
7.3.4 Labour disputes   
 
The number of labour dispute cases accepted by the arbitration and court in Jiangsu 
has increased constantly since the restructuring of collective TVEs, but was of 
relatively low level before 2008. In 2008, with the implementation of the Labour 
Contract Law, the number of cases doubled from the previous year, from 350,182 to 
693,465. It remained stable in the following years (Figure 72). From 2008 to 2011, 
the number fell slightly but in 2012, started to increase again. The blue book of the 
trial of labour disputes of Jiangsu courts (2013) attributed the rise in numbers in 
2012 to the economic recession. In 2012, economic growth slowed, business costs 
increased, and foreign trade orders decreased; this increased pressure on businesses, 
which responded with wage reductions, wage arrears, and even factory closures. 
Sometimes factory owners just abandoned their factories and left. Cases were 
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concentrated in the labour-intensive enterprises, especially micro and small 
businesses. According to the statistical data (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 
2014), labour remuneration issues accounted for one-third of cases. Social insurance, 
work injury insurance and relieve or end of labour contract account for 25.5%, 20% 
and 25.6% respectively of the total cases. The causes of disputes become more 
diverse than before. Apart from direct economic causes (labour remuneration, work 
injury insurance and economic compensation), labour dispatch, pay equality, 
limitation of competition, occupational training, and health and safety at work also 
become the focus of disputes.  
Figure 72: Labour Dispute Cases Accepted in Jiangsu, 1999-2013 
 
Sources: Collected from China Labour Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2014 
 
The economic recession also led to an increase in collective labour disputes in 2012, 
from 273 cases in 2010 to 505 in 2012 and 570 in 2013. Wage arrears caused by 
enterprises’ capital chain rupture is the leading cause of collective labour disputes.  
As shown in Figure 73, the ratios of cases accepted and the number of labourers 
involved between Jiangsu and China approach the ratio of GDP. Jiangsu used to 
create less GDP with more labour dispute cases compared to the national average 
level, however, the incidence of labour disputes in Jiangsu is now approaching the 
national average. One reason for the change may be the powerful local states: the 
provincial state has implemented several special actions to improve labour relations, 
such as the chun nuan action mentioned above, targeting the signing rate of labour 
 262 
 
disputes. Since 2004, eight Jiangsu provincial government departments have taken 
joint action to conduct an inspection of migrant workers’ wage payment. The Jiangsu 
Federation of Trade Unions has also taken the action ‘Migrant Workers Joining in 
Trade Union’ (Xinhuanet, 2015) which aims to involve migrant workers in the 
current trade union system. Although all these actions are top-down and strongly 
bureaucratic, they have improved the working conditions for migrant workers to a 
certain degree.  
Figure 73 Ratios of Cases Accepted, Number of Labourers Involved and GDP between Jiangsu and China (1999-
2013) 
 
Sources: Collected from China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2000-2014 
 
7.4 Escape and Insubordination of Migrant Workers Under the 
Capable Local State: an analysis based on the case of Yaoguan Town 
(遥观镇) 
 
7.4.1 Socio-economic Background of Yaoguan Town  
 
The municipality of Changzhou is located in the Sunan area of Jiangsu, to the north 
west of Suzhou and Wuxi. In 2013, Changzhou had a registered population of 3.66 
million, a permanent resident population of 4.69 million and a land area of 4372 km
2
. 
Changzhou was one of the earliest economic centres in China. It was famous for 
handicraft industries such as combs, silks, cotton textile, and papermaking. After 
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1949, many of the small-scale private enterprises in Changzhou went through a 
socialist transformation and became collective enterprises. Under socialist 
industrialisation, Changzhou became an important manufacturing centre and 
established a group of industries in the 1950s and 1960s that included machinery, 
metallurgy, electronics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Over the rest of the Maoist 
era, the city expanded its industrial base and scope of production. Secondary industry 
overtook the agricultural sector in 1969 (Figure 74). 
 
Figure 74 Structure of Gross Domestic Product of Changzhou, 1949-1978 
 
Sources: Changzhou Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
By the eve of reform and opening up, Changzhou had built up some small-scale 
TVEs in the countryside. In 1976, collective TVEs produced 21% of industrial 
output in Changzhou Municipality, 19.8% in 1985 and 53.1% in 1988. Changzhou 
also experienced the restructuring of collective TVEs, most of them becoming 
shareholding enterprises, limited liability corporations, private enterprises, and Sino–
foreign joint ventures. Secondary industry has dominated the economic development 
of Changzhou since 1978 (Figure 74). Changzhou was a prototype of the Sunan 
model, especially its Wujin District (previously Wujin County). As economic growth 
was driven by first, collective TVEs, than private TVEs, its urban/rural income gap 
is lower than the national average. Although the gap is increasing, it remains under 
2.2 (Figure 75), i.e. urban and rural residents have a similar living standard.  
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Figure 75: Income Gap between Urban and Rural Residents of Changzhou, 1985-2013 
 
Sources: Changzhou Statistical Yearbook 2014 
 
However, unlike Suzhou, which has successfully followed the export-oriented and 
FDI-pushed development path, Changzhou’s industry is still mainly made up of 
traditional sectors (Wei & Gu, 2013). Changzhou is far from Shanghai, compared to 
Wuxi and Suzhou and its local government is less successful in attracting FDI. 
Hence, Changzhou remains a legacy of the Sunan Model.  
 
Yaoguan Town
86
 
 
Yaoguan Town is the biggest industrial town in Wujin County. It lies in the 
southeast of Changzhou, with a registered population of 44,500 and a floating 
population of 71,400. It covers an area of 45.29 km
2
 only a 20-minute drive from the 
Wujin District centre and 30 minute from Changzhou city centre. The Grand Canal 
flows through Yaoguan Town, which historically made Yaoguan Town an important 
centre of handicraft. In 2013, its GDP was RMB 12,331.48 million, of which 72% 
came from the secondary industry. The per capita net income of a rural resident is 
RMB 20672. Its main industries are rail transportation manufacturing, steel pipes, 
metal container manufacturing and electric machinery manufacturing. The rail 
transportation manufacturing industry is the largest, contributing 60% of the total 
industrial output. It also has a fibreglass industry, household electrical appliances 
                                                 
86
 Yaoguan’s background is summarized based on interviews conducted in Yaoguan Town from 
December, 2012 to February, 2013. 
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industry, welding consumables industry and floor manufacturing industry. It is home 
to approximately 1600 businesses, creating a RMB 50 billion industrial output. 
There are 130 above designate-size enterprises, of which 45 have the ability to create 
over RMB 100 million in sales revenue. The businesses of Yaoguan Town mainly 
target the domestic market. The majority are privately owned or shareholding 
enterprises, some of which were transformed from collective TVEs.  
 
As mentioned above, the floating population in Yaoguan, the majority of which is 
made up of migrant workers, is larger than the registered population. Local people 
also work in the private enterprises. Some of the local workers used to work in the 
previous collective TVEs and have continued to work in their successors. At the 
beginning of the restructuring of collective TVEs, most workers were local, but with 
the development of private enterprises, an increasing number of workers migrated to 
Yaoguan Town. Initially, they came mainly from the Subei area, and then Anhui. 
Recently, the number of employees from Subei and Anhui has decreased sharply and 
the numbers from Sichuan, Guizhou and Henan has increased. A factory owner A
87
, 
who used to be a production brigade leader during the Mao period and later the 
manager of a collective TVE, which restructured and transferred to him, narrated: 
 
The factory I own was built in 1984, as a collective TVE. It had 
around 100 workers, all local residents. Then it was restructured in 
1997. I took over the factory and hired the previous workers. In 
order to increase productivity, I only hired around 50 of them. 
These years, more migrant workers from outside come into 
Yaoguan Town. And around 2005, the majority of the workers 
from the previous collective TVE retired and I need to hire new 
workers. Now I have around 20 workers. Half of them are from 
outside Yaoguan, mainly from Subei, and even outside Jiangsu, 
like Anhui, Sichuan and Guizhou. Even though the number of my 
workers reduced, output didn’t reduce because I began to bring in 
more machines.  
  
Migrant workers in Yaoguan are usually married. They travel as a family not as 
individuals and this makes the local labour market relatively stable. A migrant 
worker
88
 interviewed in Yaoguan Town said:  
I have worked in this factory for 10 years. The relationship between 
                                                 
87
 Interviewee: JS-02202013-1 Yaoguan. 
88
 Interviewee: JS-03142013-1 Yaoguan. 
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the boss and the workers is very peaceful. The wage is good as well. 
I have introduced my relatives and laoxiang (老乡,fellow villagers) 
to this factory. My kids are also live with us and get education here. 
I feel that here is my second hometown. 
 
This family focus strengthens the close relationship between factory owners and 
migrant workers. However, the situation is changing. Young migrant workers are 
more likely to choose ‘decent’ jobs and tend to be flexible. They change jobs 
frequently for many reasons, if they are stressed, feeling disoriented or lost, low 
salary, looking for skilled jobs, or sometimes for no reason. The factory owners also 
find it harder to manage young migrant workers. Factory Owner A
89
 continued: 
 
Another reason why I bring in machines is that it is too hard to 
recruit workers and maintain them. I am in the rubber industry, 
where the working environment is very dirty, and it requires heavy 
manual labour. Young people do not want to work in my factory. 
The average age of my workers is around 35 years old. Even if I 
offer high wages of RMB 35000 per year, I still cannot successfully 
recruit young workers. 
 
Factory Owner A’s statement is corroborated by the young migrant workers: I 
conducted a series of interviews in the local human resource market, which hosted 
career fairs and recruitment information about the local labour market.
90
 Every day, 
dozens of young migrant workers went to the human resource market to attend the 
career fairs and read the recruitment advertisements. The interviewees gave their 
reason for changing jobs: 
 
I don’t like my current job. It is a job in production line and it is too 
stressful. I want to find an easier job where I can learn some skills. 
I am studying at night school now. I want to learn some skills, and 
then I can find a better job. 
Worker A
91
 
 
I quit my previous job because the management of that factory was 
too strict. It felt uncomfortable to be controlled by the managers. I 
want freedom. But I don’t know where my future is or what I can 
do. Maybe I will go back to school.  
Worker B
92
 
                                                 
89
 Interviewee: JS-02202013-3,Factory owner, Yaoguan  
90
 Interview conducted in Human Resource Market of Wujin District, Changzhou, February, 2013. 
91
 Interviewee: JS-02212013-3 worker, Wujin  
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I left my home town and am working here just to get experience. I 
work in different factories so that I can learn the skills. When I was 
in a previous factory, I often slowed down and slept during the 
night shift. Then I felt quite bored and just left the factory.  
Worker C
93
 
 
The majority of migrant workers in Yaoguan Town live in rented accommodation, 
partly because factory owners prefer to offer rent subsidies rather than dormitories 
and partly because they have their families with them. Because the factories are not 
concentrated in one specific development zone or industrial zone, migrant workers 
rent houses from local people. The monthly rent is around RMB 150-180 for the 
whole family, around 4.2%-5.1% of the average monthly salary. The factory pays a 
monthly rent subsidy of around RMB 60. Nearly all the factories offer free lunch. 
Before the economic recession, the working day was 10-12 hours long; it is currently 
an average of 8 hours to 10 hours, the hours being closely related to economic 
conditions. From the perspective of labour rights protection, it makes sense to 
shorten the daily hours but because workers are paid on a piecework basis, fewer 
hours means less pay.   
 
At the town level, the Yaoguan Office of the Wujin District Labour Disputes 
Arbitration Committees deals with the labour disputes, its primary function being 
mediation. The majority of cases are caused by factories illegally penalizing workers, 
not signing labour contracts, not paying overtime, or workers requesting economic 
compensation for the termination of their labour contract. According to the data 
collected by the Yaoguan office, around 300 labour disputes cases are accepted each 
year. Factory owners win 5%, workers win 35% and the rest are mediated to reach a 
compromise. Collective labour disputes were rare before the economic recession, 
only around five cases a year. However, numbers have started to increase.  
 
According to the recorded labour disputes and number of strikes, it is apparent that 
labour relations in Yaoguan Town are relative peaceful and stable. The local state 
has made an effort to maintain stability, and the tie between local capitalists and 
                                                                                                                                          
92
 Interviewee:  JS-02212013-3 worker, Wujin  
93
 Interviewee: JS-02222013-1, worker, Wujin 
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migrant workers is tight. However, looking at the daily routine of migrant workers in 
the production process, reveals the passive struggles as a kind of insubordination to 
capital in Yaoguan Town.  
It is getting harder and harder to manage the workers. Young 
workers, they don’t really care about the rules of management or 
whatever you have said. They just come whenever they want and 
leave whenever they want without any announcement. You can see 
there is a young worker working in this position in the production 
line, and tomorrow the position is just empty. You don’t know 
where they go. Also, their passion is much worse than elder 
workers. A young worker, a man, has long and coloured hair. I 
asked him to cut the hair off. He just directly quit the job 
immediately!   
Factory Owner B
94
 
 
Nowadays you cannot force workers to work, even if you have 
urgent orders. The workers from outside, unlike previous local 
workers, they don’t share the same interests with you. I need to 
increase the bonus to encourage them to work fast during peak 
season. I have no other choice. It is very hard to hire a good skilled 
worker. To retain them, all I can do is just give them more money, 
and give them better food. I also need to have a year-end party to 
give workers awards. Workers share information about working 
conditions and annual bonuses of factories.  
Factory Owner C
95
 
 
Every year the first month after Chinese New Year is one of my 
hardest periods in the whole year. In the early days, workers came 
back two weeks after the Chinese New Year. They wanted to come 
back and earn money. But now, these years (since 2011), half of 
them didn’t come back in the first month. I need to call them one 
by one to persuade them to come back. And I also need to give 
bonuses to those who come back earlier. If they come back in the 
first two weeks, I give them RMB 500 each, and in the first month, 
RMB 300 each. 
Factory owner D
96
 
 
It is apparent from the above that migrant workers in Yaoguan Town mainly use 
daily struggle to force factory owners to improve their working conditions and 
increase wages. In response to these daily struggles, factory owners compromise to a 
certain extent, but if pushed too hard they introduce more machines to replace 
workers and to increase the intensity of labour. Factory A, a rubber manufacturing 
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 Interviewee: JS-02232013-1,Yaoguan 
95
 Interviewee: JS-01032013-1,Yaoguan 
96
 Interviewee: JS-01032013-2,Yaoguan 
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plant, had almost 100 employees when it was a collective TVE. After the 
restructuring in 1997, it transformed to a private TVE and made half the staff 
redundant. Its annual output value did not drop, however, because individual workers 
were forced to double their productivity. One worker used to be in charge of half of a 
machine, but this increased to take charge of one machine. The increase in 
productivity did not stop there: every year, Factory A invested 5% of its annual 
output value in new equipment. In 2013, Factory A only hired 17 employees yet still 
created RMB 20 million annual production value, a figure that had quadrupled in the 
past ten years. Over the same period, the salary of workers in Factory A had only 
doubled. It is clear individual worker’s pay is increasing while the labour cost is 
decreasing and this is closely related to the upgrade of production lines. As the 
owner said, it is much easier to manage machines than to manage the young migrants.   
As well as the daily struggles and labour disputes, migrant workers also participated 
in collective actions to protect their rights. Details of two collective cases in 
Yaoguan Town are given below. 
 
7.4.2 Case Studies: Factory B and Factory C 
Factory B: Machinery Plant 
Factory B was established in 1995 and produces mechanical accessories for the 
domestic market. Its annual production value was around RMB 13 million with 15% 
after-tax profit. It had 80 employees earning, on average, RMB 3000 for a 210-hour 
month with overtime paid at time and a half. The factory offered dormitory 
accommodation and free lunches to workers. Factory B had run smoothly since its 
establishment and had stable orders from regular customers.  
 
However, the factory was shut down because the boss of Factory B was a gambler. 
His gambling debts cut off the floating capital chain and Factory B could not pay its 
wages or suppliers’ invoices. Anything of value was gradually taken by suppliers, 
forcing the factory to stop production. Worse still, the boss just abandoned the 
factory.  
 
Workers decided to take collective action. They believed that ‘da nao da jie jue, xiao 
nao xiao jie jue, bu nao bu jie jue’(大闹大解决， 小闹小解决), which means if migrant 
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workers fight and struggle back heavily and intensely, their problems will be solved 
immediately and completely; if they take action ‘gently’, their problems will be 
solved partially and slowly; and, if they take no action, there will be no solution. 
They began by knocking on the doors and windows of the factory in the early 
morning for a few days. They then moved to the factory owner’s house, waving 
placards with slogans of ‘huan wo xue han qian’ (give back my hard-earned money). 
They also tried to block the main road to gather social support. Their demand was 
simple: they wanted to be paid their salaries. Line managers and office workers took 
the lead during the actions as they had the evidence of the payment arrears and also 
ha personal relationships with the labour disputes officers. As they were ‘all in the 
same boat’, the line workers relied on and trusted them.  
 
The town-level local government intervened as the workers were planning to ‘shang 
fang’ (apply for an audience with the higher authorities to appeal for help) and the 
local state took on the responsibility of solving the problem. It auctioned the factory 
buildings to pay the wage arrears: 31 employees received their outstanding wages of 
RMB 820,883, and 6 retired employees their retired pensions of RMB 134,000. Once 
the workers received their salaries, they found jobs in other factories.  
 
Factory C 
Factory C was established in 1999 from a collective TVE and had 500 employees 
working an average of 10 hours a day. Its annual output was around RMB 230 
million and its products aimed at both the domestic and foreign markets. Factory B 
paid all the social insurance contributions for all its employees. Because the cost of 
full social security was too expensive for TVEs, local states in Jiangsu turned a blind 
eye to the fact that the majority of private enterprises did not buy social insurance 
for all its employees.  
 
However, due to the economic recession, bad operation and bad management, 
orders steadily fell. Factory C decided to lay off 50% of its employees. The workers 
who were laid off demanded that Factory C give them redundancy pay. They 
believed the dismissal notification was illegal. As Factory C’s operations and 
management were in trouble, it could not afford to pay and workers started to take 
collective action. In the beginning only those workers who were dismissed were 
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involved in the actions, but later other workers also joined in. They started by 
blocking the factory gate, marched on the streets holding slogans, intercepted the 
factory owner’s car and sat by the door of the local government’s office building.  
 
The local state intervened directly and immediately. The head and deputy head of the 
town government played the role of mediators. They persuaded the factory owner 
and workers’ representatives to sit down and negotiate with each other, finally 
reaching an agreement that the factory would pay the statutory redundancy amount 
minus a discount of 20%. Workers who had not received dismissal notification 
should return to the factory to work. However, the workers accepted the payment 
agreement but refuse to return to work. All the workers chose to quit their jobs. After 
they got their redundancy payment, they found jobs in other factories. Factory B 
went bankrupt and shut down.  
 
7.4.3 Analysis    
 
These two cases are representative of collective actions by migrant workers in 
Yaoguan Town, and even in Wujin District and Changzhou. Migrant workers’ 
collective actions tend to happen in private enterprises. This is partly because private 
ownership is the norm in Yaoguan’s economic structure and partly because the 
operation of private firms is not as stable as SOEs and FIEs. Their ability to 
surmount risks is weak, especially in a grim international and national economic 
situation. Additionally, working conditions in Sunan are relatively better than in 
other coastal provinces and the rest of Jiangsu. However, the working conditions of 
private TVEs are not as good as SOEs and FIEs in Jiangsu. Therefore, around 80% 
of labour dispute cases in Jiangsu involve private enterprises (Xinhuanet, 2015). 
Moreover, when labour disputes arise, private TVEs lack the capacity and 
experience to deal with them and they tend to seek help from local states, which have 
the authority to solve problems.  
As mentioned above, local migrant workers used to dominate the labour market in 
Yaoguan and the non-local migrant workers, mainly from Subei and Anhui, bring 
their families with them. Hence, they tend to build up a stable relationship with their 
factory owners. It is quite common for migrant workers to work in the same factory 
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for five or more years. The stable relationship helps both the local capitalists and the 
migrant workers to build a ‘personal relationship’. The workers can get an advance 
on their salary if they have an urgent need and generally both sides like to solve any 
problems through this traditional ‘relationship’. Therefore, collective action was rare 
in Yaoguan Town. Since 2005, an increasing number of migrant workers from other 
provinces have become the main body of migrant workers in Yaoguan and they are 
more likely to be involved in collective actions because they protect their rights 
directly and actively, lacking the long-term relationship with employers the local 
migrant workers have.  
Although these collective actions are more of a reaction than an unprovoked action, 
migrant workers in Yaoguan soon started to realize the power of ‘gathering’. It is a 
‘reaction’ because migrant workers only take collective action when they are facing 
a ‘serious’ economic situation, such as a factory closure, redundancy, wage arrears 
and so on. These serious situations leave quite limited space for migrant workers to 
claim their labour rights. Therefore, the primary target of migrant workers’ collective 
actions is to claim back their economic rights, usually basic economic rights.  
The collective actions in Yaoguan are more like wildcat strikes. The migrant workers 
are not well-organised or unionized: they lack both an official trade union for labour 
rights protection and worker representatives. In Factory B’s case, all the employees 
were in the same situation and so the line staff relied on the management officers. 
During the collective action, managers took the lead in the struggles. In Factory C’s 
case, older, respected workers are relied on by younger, more inexperienced ones. In 
this case, the managers were on the opposite side to the workers. After the collective 
actions, the ‘gathering’ of migrant workers instantly disappears. Workers find that it 
is more efficient to seek help from local states rather than to negotiate with factory 
owners. Hence, they utilise their power of ‘gathering’ to put pressure on local states, 
forcing them to ‘protect’ their economic interests.  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
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Their powerful authoritative resource, inherited from the previous collective 
economy, facilities local states in solving labour disputes rapidly and efficiently. In 
Jiangsu Province, the Human Resource and Social Security Bureau has built up an 
antecedent supervision system to monitor enterprises’ labour relations dynamically. 
It operates a ‘traffic light’ system to grade businesses: a red light indicates the 
enterprises needed to be monitored and tracked as a matter of priority; amber, a less 
serious situation; and green indicates businesses with proper working conditions. 
This monitoring system provides instant information about labour relations in 
individual enterprises, which can provide advance warnings of potential ‘mass 
incidents’. There are 1,252 labour relations supervisors in towns and 7,950 labour 
relations supervisors in urban neighbourhood committees (Wang, 2013b). The local 
state relies on this ‘grid’ to monitor local enterprises and to get first-hand 
information. They deal with collective actions as soon as possible, not only to satisfy 
migrant workers (which may prevent them from taking further actions), but also to 
show the ability of local states to provide a peaceful and friendly environment for 
investors. In acting thus, local states may also enhance their reputation and gain 
respect from local communities as they act as ‘impartial mediator’ and this motivates 
local cadres to intervene aggressively in conflicts between capitalists and workers.  
In the relationship between the local state, local enterprises and migrant workers in 
Yaoguan, the solution to collective labour disputes is based on constitutional 
traditions and non-institutionalised rules. The power relations between local states, 
local enterprises and migrant workers are unbalanced: the reason local states are 
more overwhelming powerful than other agencies in labour relations is closely 
linked to the Sunan development path. In Sunan, local states actively drive economic 
development. They used to operate CBEs and collective TVEs directly, hence, they 
had built up absolute authority over an economic aspect of society. Even after the 
restructuring of collective TVEs, they still saw themselves as promoter and protector 
of private TVEs, the key factor in improving development in the township. At the 
same time, local states also have strong relations with ‘local community’. The idea 
of ‘protector of the people’ is deeply embedded in their minds. At the same time, the 
cadres are determined to maintain the the social stability. Hence, the local state has 
to treat labour collective actions with great caution because the higher level states are 
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very sensitive to any situation that might upgrade to social disturbance (Wang, 
2013b). 
However, solutions to collective actions, which are directed by local states are on 
potentially shaky ground (Wang, 2013b). They cannot deal with labour collective 
actions as a matter of routine. The local states are, like parents, refusing to admit the 
ability of both sides and leaving limited space for them to negotiate. They decide 
what the best solution is and then use their authority to force both sides to make 
compromises although, on the surface, it seems as if local states are trying to protect 
migrant workers’ rights and trying to help migrant workers to claim their rights. An 
unstable environment does not attract investment or maintain economic development. 
States want to stop migrant workers from calling more strikes or further collective 
actions, which would lead to more damage to the economy.  
 
The capable local states with strong authority have squeezed the space of 
insubordination of migrant workers. During the Mao period, the workers in the CBEs 
were immobilized as the collective economy took care of the social welfare of 
workers. Since 1978, even with the reform of the CBEs into collective TVEs, the 
workers in collective TVEs were guaranteed access to social welfare and (relatively) 
good working conditions. The collective economy had institutionalised the 
insubordination of workers in it. After the restructuring of collective TVEs, the 
safety-net of social welfare was removed but the relatively better working conditions 
remained as did the power relationship between local states, local capital and 
migrant workers to some extent. The capable local states have established a firm net 
to monitor and control labour relations, with both capital and labour under the power 
of authorities. This net, the labour regulation system, has absorbed the energy of 
insubordination of migrant workers, leaving very space for migrant workers to 
struggle. However, in the analysis of Yaoguan Town, we can still see the daily 
struggles of migrant workers and the collective actions they took. These acts of 
insubordination by the migrant workers to the existing capital relation further pushes 
capitalists to adjust their management strategies and lobby local states to make more 
effort to maintain the ‘net’.  
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Chapter 8 Synthesis  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation has examined the relationship between migrant workers’ agency 
and development in different socio-economic transformation processes in China 
since the reform and opening up process was launched. I explained the interaction 
between migrant workers, the state and capital inspired by the autonomy of 
migration approach (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; 
Mezzadra, 2010). The diversity of development pathways in Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Jiangsu, the three coastal provinces examined, is informed by their different 
preconditions, including socio-economic, political, geographic and cultural factors. 
The strategies for capturing migrants to the wage labour system and the 
subordination of migrant workers to capital also vary from pathway to pathway. I 
chose the three most successful pathways of economic development in China, the 
Pearl River Delta Model, the Wenzhou Model and the Sunan Model, to analyse the 
diversities of the subordination strategies. The repeated escaping of migrant workers 
forces capital and the state to adjust their strategies of subordination, thus continually 
reshaping the development paths.  
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced the socio-economic transformation of China in the reform 
era. China has integrated deeply into the global neoliberal order. The reform and 
opening up policy, combined with internationally moving capital, has led to the 
creation of migrant workers. In Chapter 3, I examined the process of the making of 
migrant workers in China. Migrants in China usually move from rural to urban areas, 
from the agriculture sector to the manufacturing and service sectors. The hukou 
system plays an important role in the capturing of migrant workers and their 
subordination to capital. The Chinese state utilizes the hukou system to control the 
mobility of migrant workers: rural migrant workers can only stay temporarily in the 
places where they work, as they are excluded from the public social welfare system 
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there and have to return to their home town for their social reproduction. Migrants, 
leaving their farmland, are captured and transformed into wage labour. At the 
beginning of reform and opening up, migrant workers were mainly peasants with 
low occupational expectations who were still deeply embedded in rural society. 
Rural society provided them with the resources to survive (farming) and social 
reproduction. However, along with the deepening of the socio-economic 
transformation, the young generation of migrant workers experienced 
‘disembeddedness’ from rural society while, at the same time, continued to be 
excluded from urban society by the hukou system.  
 
Chapter 4 provided the theoretical context for understanding the conflict between the 
subordination and the insubordination of migrant workers. The autonomy of 
migration approach (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; 
Mezzadra, 2010) provides us with a perspective from which to analyse the influence 
of migrant workers’ agency on the development of China. Historically, capital 
always wants to contain mobile labour while labour is always trying to escape. At 
the beginning of capitalism, capital succeeded in containing labour through the ban 
on vagabondage, and the subordination projects started to contain labour. Capital 
tried to absorb the energy of mobile labour into the exploitation process to extract 
surplus labour. But workers always attempt to escape from the existing control 
regime, pushing capital to adjust the control regime in order to recapture the 
escaping migrants. The escape of migrants triggers the following of the control from 
capital, mediated by the state, which is a crucial force of social transformation.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are empirical chapters. In the next section, I provide a synthesis 
of the empirical chapters to indicate the relationship between the agency of migrant 
workers and development in different contexts. In this synthesis chapter, I also link 
the research question with the findings and discussions of Chapters 2 to 7.  
 
8.2 The Subordination of Migrant Workers in the PRD Model, the 
Wenzhou Model and the Sunan Model  
 
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I reviewed the development pathway of Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Jiangsu. Subject to differing historical preconditions, the three provinces had 
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different development strategies. The different development pathways are 
accompanied by different strategies of containment of migrant workers. Different 
actors come together in this process, including the state (both central and local), 
capitalists, labour NGOs and, most importantly, migrant workers. Within the 
subordination process of migrant workers to capital, different actors have different 
powers. In different capitalist development contexts, the power relations between the 
actors are different, which leads to different processes of shaping and reshaping of 
the relationship between migrant workers’ agencies and development.  
 
8.2.1 Guangdong – One Step Ahead of Development and One Step Ahead of 
Labour Relations  
 
Guangdong Province, the experimental area for opening up and a series of reforms, 
treads its development pathway dependent on the inflow of FDI and support from the 
central government. FDI not only brings in investment but is also makes Guangdong 
an extension of the global production chain. It also brings in new methods of 
subordination of migrant workers. Foreign investment is mainly attracted by the low 
cost of migrant workers. The majority of migrant workers in Guangdong Province 
are not locals but workers from inland China and poorer areas in Guangdong. Their 
moving bodies were first captured by FIEs or private enterprises targeting overseas 
markets and they faced intensive formal and real subordination strategies. In these 
enterprises, migrant workers had to do harsh and repetitive work for extremely long 
hours in terrible working conditions for low wages. Along with the deepening of the 
reform and the spread of neoliberal projects, increasingly transnational companies 
relocated their production bases to the PRD, and also bringing with them the lean-
production systems and more machinery. Workers were bound to the production 
lines, deskilled and reduced to abstract labour power, which led to the real 
subordination of migrant workers to capital. The subordination of migrant workers to 
capital was also facilitated by the central government and the Guangdong 
government. Firstly, with rural reform, the household-based production contract 
system was introduced to release peasant workers from the collectives and the forced 
labour of communes. The increase in agricultural productivity had squeezed the 
surplus labour from rural areas. Additionally, the marketisation of public services 
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and the collapse of the people’s commune system exposed rural peasants to an 
insecure and vulnerable situation. Their sources of subsistence were eliminated, 
forcing them to leave their farmland and enter factories to be wage labourers. 
Secondly, the operation of the hukou system in Guangdong efficiently controlled the 
mobility of migrant workers. Migrant workers without local hukou faced the threat 
of repatriation and discrimination from local governments and local residences. They 
had to live in dormitories provided by factories or rented rooms separated from the 
local community. Migrant workers’ lives were divided into two parts – production in 
the PRD and social reproduction in their home town.   
 
The one step ahead development triggers one step ahead insubordination by migrant 
workers. The struggles of migrant workers manifest as labour shortage, increasing 
number of labour disputes, increasingly complicated requirements and demands of 
labour disputes, growing scale and number of strikes, and better organised strikes 
and protests, all of which force capitalists and the local state to make compromises 
and improve working conditions. At the beginning of the reform era, inland China 
had very few employment opportunities and migrants had to move to coastal areas to 
find jobs. However, not all surplus rural labourers engage in migration; a 
considerable number of migrant workers remain in their hometown. In order to 
contain the rest of the rural surplus labourers in capitalist production process, an 
increasing number of factories are moving to inland China, especially to provinces 
with abundant labourers.
97
 The inland provinces’ governments are also actively 
involved in creating an investment-friendly environment
98
 and more job 
opportunities for local people. Increasingly, migrant workers choose not to move to 
the coastal areas, but to work in or near their hometown. Also, the migrant workers 
in the PRD choose not to work in those factories with low wages and bad conditions. 
The shortage of labour in PRD does not necessarily mean there are not enough 
migrant workers in the labour market, but that there is a mismatch between the 
requirements of migrant workers and the wages and working conditions in factories. 
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 Foxconn relocates its factories in inland China (fushikang qian neidi sichuan henan zengsu chao 
guangdong富士康迁内地 四川河南增速超广东) 
 http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/22751/20130305/566633.htm  
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 In land China Provinces make effort to attract enterprises in coastal areas. (Zhongguo neilu 
shengfen ‘shoumai’ yanhai qiye 中国内陆省份“收买”沿海企业) 
http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140829/c29provinces/  
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Migrant workers would rather continue to search for jobs than accept low wages. On 
the one hand, labour shortages since 2009 have pushed factories into increasing 
wages and improving working conditions, while on the other, they have also resulted 
in factories introducing more machinery or even moving to inland China to reduce 
labour costs.  
 
Additionally, migrant workers do not only escape by ‘voting with their feet’. Since 
2000, the number of labour disputes and strikes has grown significantly in the PRD. 
Labour dispute cases in Guangdong accounted for one-quarter of the total in 2008.
99
 
The increase in recorded labour dispute cases reflects the influence of migrant 
workers’ resistance to the labour regulation regime. Migrant workers express their 
grievances through different kinds of resistance. Daily struggles, like job-hopping, 
slowdowns, sabotage and absenteeism, as well as more active actions like strikes, 
protests, marching, sit-ins in front of local government buildings, and even extreme 
forms of struggle, such as suicide ,against capitalists or government officials, have 
influenced the regular production of factories and social stability. The state has then 
adjusted the legal institutions (by constructing a regulatory labour relationship 
framework) to channel the resolution of conflicts between capital and migrant 
workers into a controllable official channel. After the launch of the labour contract 
law in 2008, there was a sharp increase in labour dispute cases and migrant workers’ 
demands have become increasingly diverse and composite. They no longer limit 
themselves to the minimum standards of labour law but demand more. They also 
actively seek legal assistance from official legal aid to labour NGOs, and help from 
the media, scholars and other activists in civil society.  
 
Migrant workers in the PRD also do not limit themselves to the official legal system, 
realising that collective actions are sometimes more efficient. Strikes and protests are 
quite common in the PRD, from small-scale wildcat strikes to relatively well-
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 New labour contract law and China’s labour relations ( 新 劳 动 法 与 中 国 劳 工 状 况 ) 
http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/09zgshxs/content_17106408_3.htm;  
Labour disputes cases in Guangdong account for one quarter of total labour disputes cases in China, 
there is a shortage of legal assistant officials. 广东劳动争议案占全国 1/4 “免费仲裁”遭遇人才荒
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/2008-05/07/content_1427305.htm 
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organised strikes. Migrant workers make use of their collective power to force 
capitalists to sit down and negotiate with them. The Nanhai Honda strike is an iconic 
event in the emergence of the Chinese labour movement. It was initiated by student 
workers who demanded fair treatment and democratic elections of trade unions, and 
it forced the company to compromise and pushed the local trade union into 
considering further reforms. It not only triggered the direct adjustment of the 
company’s management strategies, but also pushed local government and local trade 
unions to introduce a new framework of collective bargaining. Again, the state and 
capital wanted to contain the struggling migrant workers in capitalist relation.  
 
The struggles of migrant workers in Guangdong triggered adjustment of the 
subordination strategies of capital and the state. Further, the adjustment of the 
subordination strategies influenced the development of Guangdong. The 
insubordination of migrant workers pushed the Guangdong local governments and 
capitalists to move from labour-intensive and low value-added industries to high-
tech industries using more machinery. Their aim was to increase productivity and 
also increase the intensity of labour, which is the real subordination of migrant 
workers to capital. To facilitate this dual track transformation strategy, the hukou 
system in Guangdong also introduced a points-based system to select high quality 
migrants while excluding the low-skilled and uneducated. Overall, the interaction 
between the development of Guangdong and the migrant workers’ agencies clearly 
reveals that capital, mediated by the state, always attempts to contain migrant 
workers into capital relations, and the containment projects always meet the 
insubordination of migrant workers. In order to re-contain the insubordinate migrant 
workers back to capitalist production process, capital and the local state have made 
adjustments to the control regime and changes to the development strategies.  
 
8.2.2 Zhejiang – Relative Balanced Power Relation and Collective Consultancy   
 
Zhejiang Province, with its development based on local private capitalists and local 
migrant workers, followed a different development pathway. It is characterised by 
special markets and industrial clusters, based on family-owned industrial plants and 
private enterprises, and known as the Wenzhou Model. These family-based industrial 
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plants and private enterprises are generally located in rural areas, and both workers 
and management are local residents. The subordination strategies in Zhejiang are 
also different from the PRD. Initially the migrant workers were mainly local rural 
residents and had close relationships with local capitalists. The hukou system plays a 
role in controlling the migrant workers here, but not as significantly as in the PRD, 
as the majority of migrant workers hold local hukou. The deep embeddedness of 
local capital in local community creates a social network to absorb the conflict 
between capitalists and labourers. The line between capitalists and labourers is fuzzy 
as the factories are only small, sometimes employing less than ten people. The tight 
market and intense competition among factories empowers the migrant workers with 
relatively strong bargaining power, especially skilled workers. Additionally, the 
power relation between the local states, private capital and migrant workers is 
relatively balanced. Firstly, the local states of Zhejiang Province actively support the 
development of the private economy unlike in Guangdong, where, as the 
experimental area for reform and opening up, the FDI can sometimes bypass the 
Guangdong local government to get direct support from the central government. 
Capitalists in Guangdong are highly cosmopolitan and fractured (Friedman, 2014), 
therefore, the Guangdong local government is not as capable as the Zhejiang local 
government. Secondly, as the migrant workers, the private capitalists and the 
officials of the local state are from local communities, an unofficial relationship is 
created among them.  
 
The results of comparative surveys on wages and working conditions in the PRD, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu could probably be an effective explanation of the influence of 
localization of migrant workers in Zhejiang. Xu (2003) states that the wage of 
workers in private enterprises is basically determined by the market. Workers can 
freely move from one enterprise to another and in order to retain skilled and 
experienced workers, businesses have to distribute reasonable profits (Xu, 2003). 
Hence, the average wage of workers in private enterprises is higher than the 
minimum wage standard in Zhejiang Province. Based on survey data of the PRD, 
southern Jiangsu and areas of Zhejiang, Wei and Xie (2013) have discussed the 
impact of three developmental patterns on workers’ income. Their survey revealed 
that workers in southern Jiangsu have the highest income level and those in the PRD 
the lowest. However, when taking human capital endowments (including work 
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experience, educational background and occupational training) into account, 
Zhejiang offers better returns to the workers. Although the wage in southern Jiangsu 
is the highest, it demands better human capital of workers, i.e. a higher educational 
background, more occupational training and more work experience. The authors 
explain that the endogenous development model has had a great impact on the pay 
scales of workers in Zhejiang.  
 
Another piece of comparative research on regional differences in labour rights of 
rural migrant workers in the PRD and the YRD also indicates better labour rights 
conditions in the YRD (Liu, Yong & Shu, 2011). On aspects of wages, working 
hours and signing of labour contracts, the YRD performs better than the PRD. The 
researchers take the proportion of local workers in all employed people as an 
independent variable of their analysis model and come to the conclusion that this 
variable has no influence on wage standards but does have an impact on signing of 
labour contracts and working hours. 
 
Data on labour dispute cases in Zhejiang reveal a relatively lower level than the 
national level, and definitely lower than Guangdong Province. Of course, there is 
another reason for the low level of labour dispute cases in Zhejiang: the labour 
disputes of the family-based industrial plants and small-scale enterprises rarely go 
through the legal system. Migrant workers tend to solve their conflicts through non-
official channels, such negotiating directly with bosses, with mediators they both 
know, job-hopping, sabotage, marches and strikes.  
 
Since 2000, the surge of migrant workers from outside has stimulated the increase in 
labour disputes and turbulence in the labour market. In the Wenling woollen industry 
case, the migrant workers from outside brought with them their experiences of 
struggles from working in other places. They had more skills and tactics for 
struggling and protecting their labour rights. Additionally, as they were not local, the 
social network did not work for them. They were more likely to engage in strikes and 
protests, especially in the peak season. Although the industrial clusters in Zhejiang 
were mainly labour intensive, production also required skilled and experienced 
workers as the production process had not been fully mechanised. Within the formal 
subordination process, the skilled workers took advantage of their position in the 
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labour market and forced employers to pay higher wages. In the peak season, the 
sabotage, marches, strikes and job-hopping of skilled workers seriously impacted 
production and social stability. Initially employers responded with strategies such as 
wage arrears or even illegal job deposits and keeping workers’ ID cards, but these 
triggered more dissent from migrant workers. The local trade union, taking the lead 
as a quasi-state institution, cooperated with local capitalists and developed a new 
framework to absorb the insubordination of migrant workers. This collective 
consultancy system was meant to stabilise the production process and contain the 
moving migrant workers. Although collective consultancy has protected labour 
rights to some extent, for example, guaranteeing redundancy payments and 
negotiating piece-rates, its aim is to stabilise the labour market, especially in the 
peak season and re-contain the insubordinate migrant workers. The fixing of 
piecework rates actually eliminates the bargaining power of migrant workers, 
especially skilled workers. The alignment of local capitalists has deepened the 
subordination of migrant workers to capital. Wages remain at the same level and so 
does the work: within this industry, there is little choice for migrant workers.  
 
The success of the Wenling case was quickly identified as an exemplar by the 
Zhejiang government and Zhejiang trade union, and even the central government and 
ACFTU. It was recognized as a successful experiment in how to solve unstable 
labour relations in the private sector, especially with the “concentration of small 
enterprises or enterprises engaged in similar production” (Pringle, 2011:131). It is 
clear that the protests of migrant workers in the Wenling woollen industry have 
triggered the innovation of the labour regulation regime.  
 
8.2.3 Jiangsu – Capable Local State and the ‘Peaceful’ Labour Relation 
 
The development of Jiangsu, especially south Jiangsu, is known as the ‘Sunan 
Model’. Jiangsu Province, unlike Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces, had a strong 
manufacturing history before the launch of the reform and opening up. During the 
Mao period, CBEs were well developed and they transformed into collective TVEs 
at the beginning of the reform era (1978 to the late 1990s). The succession of CBEs 
to collective TVEs also led to the succession of the relation between Jiangsu local 
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states and capitalists in Jiangsu in the reform era. During the Mao period, CBEs were 
under the direct control of the local governments, people’s communes and 
production brigades. Local governments in Jiangsu took on the responsibilities of the 
operation of CBEs, including production management, personnel management and 
the social welfare of employees. After the launch of the reform and opening up 
process, CBEs had transferred to collective TVEs and gained a proportion of 
autonomy of management. Personnel management was still under the control of local 
town and county level governments. The local governments in Jiangsu, as with the 
local governments in Guangdong and Zhejiang, had a strong motivation to support 
the economic development by supporting the development of collective TVEs. But 
the local governments in Jiangsu had more power over the collective TVEs. At the 
beginning of the reform era, migrant workers in Jiangsu were mainly local residents 
and so, in Jiangsu, the capturing of migrant workers into the wage labour system was 
different from the processes in Guangdong and Zhejiang. Before the reform and 
opening up, a high portion of local residents worked in CBEs and they stayed on 
after the transformation to collective TVEs. Along with the rural reform, more local 
residents entered into the collective TVEs. Labour relations in collective TVEs also 
inherited a part of the labour relations of CBEs. As mentioned above, the working 
conditions were better and the wages were higher in Jiangsu than in Guangdong and 
Zhejiang. Also, because of their collective ownership, the collective TVEs had to 
take responsibility for the social welfare of local residents. Thus, local residents, 
including local migrant workers, benefited from the growth and development of 
collective TVEs. However, the power relation between local governments and 
capital was not as balanced as in Zhejiang: Jiangsu’s local states had the 
authoritarian power to manage both capital and labour and to solve the conflicts 
between them.  
 
After the late 1990s, collective TVEs were restructured into private TVEs. During 
the restructuring process, the previous managers of collective TVEs were given 
ownership of these TVEs. The private enterprises that grew outside of the collective 
system were mainly owned by local capitalists. Although the ownership structure 
had changed, the power relations between capitalists and the local states remained. 
Firstly, the owners of the factories, who used to be collective TVE managers, tended 
to keep the same management style and maintain the same relationships with local 
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government officials. Secondly, the private enterprise owners were mainly local 
residents, as were the migrant workers. In Chapter 7, I took Yaoguan Town in 
Changzhou as an example to analyse the relationship between the local government 
of Yaoguan, the factory owners and migrant workers. Local government supports the 
development of private enterprises while taking responsibility for local residents’ 
welfare; therefore local governments in Jiangsu have more power to mediate 
conflicts between capital and labour. Additionally, Jiangsu local governments have 
also learnt from the experiences of other coastal provinces, especially Guangdong 
and Zhejiang, in dealing with labour disputes and conflicts. The Jiangsu government 
has built up a series of systems to monitor labour relations in factories and to deal 
with labour disputes before they erupt into strikes or protests. When labour disputes, 
strikes or protests have occurred, the local government has taken rapid action to 
mediate the conflicts. Therefore, the capability of the local government, the 
relatively better working conditions and higher wages and the social network of the 
local community have successfully absorbed the conflict between the subordination 
and insubordination of migrant workers. Since the late 1990s, there has been an 
increasing number of migrant workers from outside Jiangsu, but the labour relations 
between the outside migrant workers and local capitalists are still more stable than in 
the other two provinces.  
 
However, the relatively stable labour relation does not mean there is no resistance 
from migrant workers to the subordination strategies of local state and local capital. 
More often, the insubordination of migrant workers in Jiangsu takes the form of a 
passive struggle: go-slows, job-hopping or arriving late and leaving early. These 
daily struggles force employers to increase wages and bonuses and improve working 
conditions, including the quality of food, dormitories and work environments. They 
also trigger the upgrade of the production process that is promoting the use of more 
machinery and increasing the intensity of labour. Therefore, even in Jiangsu, 
especially the Sunan area, under the tight control of local states, the insubordination 
of migrant workers still drives changes and adjustments in the subordination process.  
 
The Chapter 5,6 and 7 have applied the theory of subordination and insubordination 
of migrant workers to fields in PRD, southeast Zhejiang and south Jiangsu. They 
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have linked the theory with reality. In next section, I will list the contribution of this 
dissertation and provide a conclusion for this dissertation.  
 
8.3 Contributions and Conclusion  
 
This dissertation analysed the relationship between migrant workers  ´ agency and 
development in China. It provides a new theoretical paradigm to analyse migrant 
workers and their agency, stressing that migrant workers are not only contained by a 
fixed control system, but that their activities push the control regime towards 
dynamic adjustments Migrant workers are not fighting to ultimately become 
someone (e.g. urban citizens). They keep on escaping from the existing control 
regime. While capital always intends to contain mobile labourer in capital relation, 
workers always try to escape from it. In China, the escape of migrant workers from 
containment (i.e. the hukou system) and their insubordination to capital force the 
state and the government to adjust their containment strategies, which further pushes 
the socio-economic transformation.  
 
Secondly, besides the theoretical implication, this dissertation also provides concrete 
empirical evidence of the three most advanced provinces. The research of this 
dissertation provides a more encompassing view of the interaction between migrant 
workers and other agents of development – factory owners, officials of labour 
bureaus, officials of arbitration court of labour disputes, officials of labour NGOs, 
trade union officials and so on. These agents are all involved in the making of labour 
relations in China.  
 
Thirdly, based on the fieldwork in PRD, southeast Zhejiang and south Jiangsu, this 
dissertation provides evidences of comparative studies in terms of the relationship 
between migrant workers’ agency and development. Based on the comparative study 
of the empirical data, it leads to the conclusion that different historical preconditions 
lead to different pathways of capitalist development, which are linked to the different 
strategies of subordination of migrant workers to capital in China. Also, although 
migrant workers are continually involved in escaping from the existing control 
regime, they behave differently according to the particular the control regime and 
subordination strategy. Additionally, the Chinese state does not simply act as an 
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agent of capital, but also has autonomy from business. It is largely influenced by the 
struggles and resistance of the working class. Therefore, the escape and 
insubordination of migrant workers not only triggers a chase by capital, but also by 
the state apparatuses, through mechanisms such as the mobility control system (the 
hukou system), the legal institution of labour relations (labour laws), and the state-
run official trade unions. As analysed in the dissertation, migrant workers, whether 
they hold a local hukou or not, have more power than migrant workers from outside, 
as local migrant workers have not been excluded by the containment of hukou 
system. Also, the power relation between local states and capitalists plays an 
important role in shaping the development and subordination strategies. Migrant 
workers also have different insubordination strategies related to different 
subordination strategies. In Guangdong, as development is ‘one step ahead’, the 
interaction of subordination and insubordination of migrant workers also goes further 
than in the other two provinces. The struggles and resistance of migrant workers in 
the PRD not only triggers the adjustment of the control regime there, but also 
inspires migrant workers in other provinces. In Zhejiang, the insubordination of 
migrant workers forced the local trade unions to introduce a collective consultancy 
system to absorb the grievances of migrant workers. In Jiangsu, the capable local 
states tightly control both capital and the migrant workers, which leaves a very small 
space for migrant workers to be insubordinate. However, even with better working 
conditions, migrant workers refuse to be integrated with production, transferring 
their living labour to wage labour. They use passive struggles to show their 
insubordination to capital relations. Of course, we should be aware that the initial 
escape of migrants from the control of the people’s commune system and their 
insubordination to capital does not necessarily mean they want to stay outside of 
capital relation. The chasing of the insubordination of migrant workers shapes and 
reshapes the relationship between the state, capital and labour.  
 
8.4 Future Research  
 
Along with the spread of neoliberalism and the integration with the global market, 
increasing numbers of people are pulled into capitalist relations, and the 
subordination of labour to capital is deepening. The global division of labour is also 
spreading to inland China. Although, initially, development strategies are different 
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from region to region, there is a tendency for them to converge. After more than 30 
years of development and benefiting from low-cost labour, Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Jiangsu are all facing the challenges of industrial upgrade. In Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu, FDI has played an increasingly important role in economic development. 
The insubordination strategies of migrant workers will also converge over time. 
During the period of my fieldwork, 2012-2013, there was a growing number of 
strikes in Southeast Zhejiang and south Jiangsu, similar to the strikes in the PRD, 
southeast Zhejiang and south Jiangsu. Therefore, more work needs to be done in the 
future to study the convergence of subordination and insubordination of migrant 
workers, and the impact of such convergence on the development of China.  
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Appendix: Table of Interviewees  
 
 
Province  
Interviewee 
Number 
Location Occupation 
Guangdong 
GD-10202012-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Labour NGO official  
GD-10252012-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Officials of Arbitration Court of 
Labour Disputes in Tianhe District 
GD-10262012-1 Xiagang Street, Luogang 
District, Guangdong 
Officials of Xiagang Street 
adiministration organisation 
GD-10282012-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Factory Owner 
GD-01032013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Factory Owner 
GD-01042013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Official of Trade Union of Luogang 
district 
GD-01042013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Human Resouce Manager of Factory 
GD-01102013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Officials of Xiangxue community 
administration organisation 
GD-02112013-1 Hong Kong Labour NGO official  
GD-06212013-1 Luogang District, 
Guangdong 
Worker 
GD-06212013-1 Foshan, Guangdong Worker 
GD-06212013-1 Foshan, Guangdong Worker,used to participate in strike 
in 2010 
GD-06212013-2 Foshan, Guangdong Worker 
GD-06212013-2 Shenzhen, Guangdong Labour NGO official  
GD-06222013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Labour NGO official  
GD-06242013-1 Dongguan, Guangdong Officials of Labour Bureau of 
Dongguang 
GD-06242013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Scholar 
GD-06252013-1 Dongguan, Guangdong Factory Owner 
GD-06252013-1 Guangzhou, Guangdong Scholar 
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GD-06262013-1 Foshan, Guangdong Worker,used to participate in strike 
in 2010 
GD-06272013-1 Shenzhen, Guangdong Factory Owner 
GD-06292013-1 Shenzhen, Guangdong Factory Owner 
GD-07032013-1 Shenzhen, Guangdong Worker 
GD-07262013-1 Dongguan, Guangdong Officials of Arbitration Court of 
Labour Disputes of Dongguan 
GD-07292013-1 Dongguan, Guangdong Officials of Labour Bureau of 
Dongguang 
GD-07292013-2 Dongguan, Guangdong Officials of Labour Bureau of 
Dongguang 
GD-07292013-3 Dongguan, Guangdong Officials of Labour Bureau of 
Dongguang 
GD-07302013-1 Dongguan, Guangdong Official of Trade Union of Dongguan 
Zhejiang 
ZJ-07042013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Factory Owner 
ZJ-07062013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Official of Trade Union of an 
industrial park 
ZJ-07062013-2 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Factory Owner 
ZJ-07082013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Producation Manager of a private 
enterprise 
ZJ-07082013-2 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Labour NGO official  
ZJ-07092013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Official of Zhejiang Federation 
Trade Union 
ZJ-07102013-1 Xiaoshan District, 
Zhejiang 
Official of Arbitration Courst of 
labour disputes of Xiaoshan 
ZJ-07112013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Scholar 
ZJ-07152013-1 Yiwu, Zhejiang Official of Labour NGO 
ZJ-07152013-2 Yiwu, Zhejiang Labour NGO official  
ZJ-07152013-3 Yiwu, Zhejiang Wokrers on street  
ZJ-07182013-1 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Line manager 
ZJ-07222013-1 Yongkang, Zhejiang Official of Labour NGO 
ZJ-07222013-1 Yongkang, Zhejiang Workers on street 
ZJ-07232013-1 Jiupu Town, Zhejiang Official of Labour Bureau of Jiupu 
Town 
Jiangsu 
JS-02202013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Factory Owner A 
JS-02212013-1 Wujin District, Jiangsu Official of Career Service Center of 
Wujin District 
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JS-02212013-2 Wujin District, Jiangsu Official of Career Service Center of 
Wujin District 
JS-02212013-3 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker A,searching for jobs in 
career service center 
JS-02212013-4 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker B,searching for jobs in 
career service center 
JS-02222013-1 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker C,searching for jobs in 
career service center 
JS-02222013-2 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker D,searching for jobs in 
career service center 
JS-02222013-3 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker E,searching for jobs in career 
service center 
JS-02222013-4 Wujin District, Jiangsu Worker F,searching for jobs in career 
service center 
JS-02232013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Factory Owner B 
JS-02242013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Workers of one factory 
JS-02262013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Official of Labour Bureau Branch of 
Yaoguan Town 
JS-03012013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Factory Owner C 
JS-03012013-2 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Factory Owner D 
JS-03132013-1 Yaoguan Town,  Jiangsu Workers involved in Factory B case 
Number of Interviewee： Province-Month/Date/Year-order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
